Popper referred to the ancient atomic Greek philosophy, which postulated a similar epistemology as Bacon and Kant. Objects lose atoms, which forms perceptions in our minds, which are combined with a priori knowledge. Kant argued knowledge is not "pure". Our perceptions are mixed with a type of "digestive" process, which forms knowledges.[1]

"Strict empiricists" opine we should not interfere with experience, which is "pure". Kant disagreed with strict empiricists. Popper's own view is similar to Kant's but not the same. Popper distinguishes between "perceptions" and "observations". A "perception" can be compared with "naive experience" and "observation" is a process whereby experience is planned scientifically. Something "theoretical" precedes observations.[2]

Observations "presuppose" "principles of selection". The "inner states", which change over time, of organisms determine types of perceptions, which are possible for each organism. Each organism is different. A part of experience relates to "expectations" and knowledges are formed primarily when our expectations are not "fulfilled". We then become more aware of our expectations. "Perceptions and observations" are not innate but reactions to expectations are "innate".[3]

With "pre-scientific" knowledge only we live in the "centre" of our "horizons". Popper does not expand on his thought about "centres". He then refers to the bucket theory, which postulates determinism in the sense that we are determined by our experiences. Popper however prefers a view whereby our expectations or hypotheses determine our environment. He called this view the "searchlight theory" in "contradistinction" to the "bucket theory". Observations function as "tests" for hypotheses.[4]

The thought arose that Popper in a way contradicted himself because he philosophised that nothing can be proven true, but on the other hand he said observations function as tests. If nothing can be proven true, what is the purpose of tests. A logical conclusion is that the "tests" relate to probability emphases for inductive processes, which removes the contradiction. Probability theories, according to my example of Wan and Others are results of untruths.

Popper sketches a dialectic process whereby our expectations (hypotheses) are the inputs of next observations. Every time we observe, our expectations are adjusted with a synthetic process to form the next hypotheses.

Observations are thus antitheses, expectations are theses and our conclusions syntheses.[5] Popper however supposedly did not agree with this view because it is similar to a Hegelian view, which he opposed as totalitarian in for example After the Open Society. (Shearmur, Turner 2012).

During the 6th and 5th centuries BC something scientific happened in Greece whereby myths for the East were replaced with new facts. Medicine men and priests guarded the myths in their schools. The decisive change, which took place in Greece relates to "critical" approaches to our horizons. "Doubt and criticism" then became inherent to the schools.[6]

Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes had this critical approach in their schools because the three philosophers each created a new tradition. Teachers supposedly motivated a critical approach at their students in contrast to the Pythagorean schools, which enshrined the teachings of the "the master".[7]

"The task of science" is "theoretical (explanation)" and "practical (prediction" and testing). Explanations ("explicanda") and "premisses" (sic) ("explicans") are relevant. Modern science requires the testing of the premises to a larger extent then before.[8]

Explanations are "always" "deductions" from premises in a sylogistic sense. Popper gives an example and demonstrates that explicans (premises) must consist of "universal laws" and "initial conditions". All rats die if they eat rat poison (universal law); this rat ate rat poison (initial individual condition); this dead rat died from eating rat poison (explanation).[9]

Popper asks if all explanations of the above structure are "satisfactory".[10] "Cause" and "effect" are dependent on universal laws, something, which Hume did not identify.

Theories have a "predictive" purpose and a "technical" application.[11] "The falsification of the prediction shows that the explicans is false, yet the reverse of this does not hold: it is incorrect and grossly misleading to think that we can interpret the 'verification' of the prediction as 'verifying' the explicans or even part of it. For a true prediction may easily have been validly deduced from an explicans that is false. ..."[12]

"There is no road, royal or otherwise, which leads of necessity from a 'given' set of specific facts to any universal law."[13]

This is maybe the crux of Popper's belief. Maybe he then did not realize that honesties are necessities for creativities and survival. I presume his mistake was because of lacking in metaphysical philosophy or my honesties hypothesis is not actually a hypothesis because it is logical and therefore true. "Honesties are the best policies."

Popper - "Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and Refutations"

It may be genuinely true that empirical theories cannot be shown to be true and can only be shown to be false, but is it not also a metaphysical postulate, which cannot be shown to be true, then, according to Popper's argument[14] that metaphysical postulates are vices? Is Popper's theory a false metaphysical theory?

Evaluate the following explicandum. 'Any normal human, who pushes a normal Ping-Pong ball, into normal conditions, will cause movement of the ball in the direction pushed.' Opposing views will say the thesis is not universal, but i doubt that. I am sure this postulate cannot be falsified. Popper is wrong. It is clear enough to see and therefore there is probably something metaphysical behind Popper's thesis, for example Caiaphas syndromes against 'truths' or a primary wish to be in the 'middle', drawing attention.

Popper's theory is partly true because it refers fruitfully to psychological, political and sociological theories, for examples, which have not constant 'horizons'. Maybe the problem of Caiaphas syndromes influenced the lack of fruitful replies to Popper's thesis, because any refutation of Popper's theory requires a stand for truths, which cause devils' actions.

It can be seen that Popper opposed Wittgenstein's theory that observations have truths values.[15]

In answer to the notes by Popper it seems reasonable to write that proving falseness is a fact but proving that everything can be proven false is not a fact. Proving that nothing is true is the same as proving that everything is false therefore proving that nothing is true is false.[16]

Popper regarded empirical induction as psychological because he argued it relates to "custom or habit" of believing in laws.[17]

Whilst reading Popper, i thought that acceptance or non-acceptance of his theory is a psychological or metaphysical matter. If ones accept truths, then Popper's theory will be rejected and vice versa.[18]

Whilst reading Popper, i thought that our arguments about science, be that scepticism or the opposite, depend on our psychological make up. Whether psychological make up is genetic or taught during early age is the next question. 'Make up' can however be divided between honesties and deceits as methods of survival.[19]

Popper's thesis distinguishes primarily between 'dogmatic childish primitive individuals' and 'critical individuals', who date back to Thales, who was willing to oppose dogmatic views.[20]

"The critical attitude may be described as the conscious attempt to make our theories, our conjectures, suffer in our stead in the struggle for survival of the fittest. It gives us a chance to survive the elimination of an inadequate hypothesis--when a more dogmatic attitude would eliminate it by eliminating us. (There is a touching story of an Indian community which disappeared because of its belief in the holiness of life, including that of tigers.) We thus obtain the fittest theory within our reach by the elimination of those which are less fit. (By 'fitness' I do not mean merely 'usefulness' but truth; see chapters 3 and 10, below.) I do not think that this procedure is irrational or in need of any further rational justification."[21]

Repetitive observations, which make it possible to predict inductively, is not necessarily 'true' because we have not proof that the same natural laws will always apply.[22]

Whilst reading Popper, i thought the inability of some philosophers, for example Popper, to acknowledge truths about inductions, could be a result of not realizing that they will die if enough force is used on them. Maybe they were not ever in danger or never opposed at a required level to make them realize their own weaknesses.[23]

Whilst reading Popper, i thought that maybe the criteria 'truth' in his thesis relates to different conditions. The sun, which stood still in the time of Joshua related to war and therefore it is more likely that the laws of nature get broken during war times. Popper is therefore not accurate in transposing scepticism about natural laws to normal conditions. Maybe he should rather have transposed normal conditions to war conditions to reach a truer theory.[24]

The conditions of normal and abnormal circumstances and expectations during the conditions is also an important part of Kuhn's critique, which follows.

KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?

2nd Reading and later Readings

Popper and Kuhn 'are' united in their opposition to "classical theses" of "classical positivism". "we are correspondingly sceptical of efforts to produce any neutral observation language". They insist that scientists may use theories to "explain" "phenomena" which use "real objects, whatever the latter phrase ["real objects"] may mean."[27]

Some readers regard Kuhn's book to incorporate "parallelism",[28] probably the philosophically informed readers.

"Parallelism" means humans are made up of mind and body, which acts in concordance but the parts influence not the other part. Leibniz and Spinoza philosophized that. (Mautner, 2005)

Maybe Kuhn meant a difference between him and Popper is that Popper believes not parallelism.

I saw the duck first. Kuhn wrote that Popper's "locutions" could be the rabbit's ear. [32]

Kuhn did not appreciate Popper's "generalizations". Kuhn emphasized that any problem must be confirmed by empirical evidence and that any 'normal' scientific study must begin with previous academic research. Popper refers to "problems" where Kuhn refers to "puzzles" because Kuhn regards normal scientific work as parts of a whole.[33]

In contrast to Popper, according to Kuhn, normal scientific research tests scientists' selves, to decide whether their hypotheses are allowed in the academic whole. I use today 'selves' as parts of individual 'parallelisms'. Kuhn indirectly accused Popper of thinking he is a "better one" read with "sanguine" on p.1.[34]

"Or he may instead have failed to recognize the consequences of a particular choice among the alternatives, which the rules allow him. .. isolate". [36]

Kuhn regards himself to be part of "normal science", which decides on the "points" to test. Extraordinary scientists like Einstein and Popper decide not on the "points". "Sir Karl" only researched the "manner of testing".[37]

I agree today with Kuhn that a precise "demarcation criterion" cannot be found, maybe only criteria. Maybe the difference between Popper and Kuhn is in "continental" and "analytic".

Kuhn regarded "Continental philosophy" not as philosophy and regarded "critical discourse" only appropriate during "moments of crisis".[38] He regarded himself a "scientist" normally but a "philosopher", when confronted with critique.[39]

Testing is not "decisive"[40] with regard to metaphysical matters according to Kuhn, he stated his belief about testing metaphysicalities is in doubt; earlier Kuhn claimed that extraordinary scientists' selves are (should be?) tested before academic 'paradigms' are allowed to change.

Because Kuhn only allows theory changes within an already specialized existing academic discourse it could imply that he is "sanguine". Kuhn differs from Popper because Kuhn wrote only a scientist is blamed when his theory does not work.[41] Popper emphasized the wish that critical philosophy should not attack persons but rather theories.

"In a sense, therefore, severity, of test-criteria is simply one side of the coin whose other face is a puzzle-solving tradition. That is why Sir Karl's line of demarcation and my own so frequently coincide. That concidence is, however, only in their outcome; the process of applying them is very different, and it isolates distinct aspects of the activity about which the decision—science or non-science—is to be made." [42]

T.S. Kuhn, with much certainty, agrees with Popper that psychoanalysis should not be regarded as " 'science' " and that psychoanalytic diagnoses are frequently failures.[43]

Kuhn states that agreements by practitioners of scientific research about basics are important.[44] His statement supports my belief that honesties will therefore enhance or make possible scientific research, with regard to metaphysical matters because then the agreed upon Points of reference will be more uniform in understandings.

Kuhn wrote that he and Popper are not inductivists and Kuhn did not understand how Popper could call an out of date theory, which was previously accepted, a "mistake".[46] Kuhn's view can be explained if Kuhn was an idealist because if he was an idealist he believed that new realities of new theories, which replaced old theories, were newly formed by Mind. In time thus the reality changed. The causal linkages changed in time according to Kuhn's argument. According to Popper's 'mistakes' of old theories, causal linkages did not change from time to time. In the times of old theories, theorists who accepted the old theories, perceived actuality mistakenly, according to Popper. Actualities of causal links did not change but new awarenesses made the realizations about causal linkages more corresponding to actualities, which did not change from time to time. Popper supposed one unknown view of causal links in actuality in different times, maybe like Parmenides. Kuhn on the other hand postulated an idealist view; that the actual causal linkages changed from time to time due to changes in Mind. What exactly 'Mind' was in Kuhn's view is not sure. Did Mind include an incorporeal, separate from the cosmos entity; singular God, or was 'Mind' partly a plural concept for Kuhn included in the cosmos? Don't know.

Kuhn wrote Popper wanted apodictic certainty about theories, which is not possible.[47]

Kuhn writes that Popper barred the possibility of disproof of theories in Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).[48] After reading the prescribed material of Popper for the first class of FILM880 (this course) and three books of Popper; The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper [1945], 2011), The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (Hansen, 2012), and After the Open Society (Shearmur & Turner, 2012) it seems to me that Kuhn misrepresented Popper by quoting the quoted part from Logic of Scientific Discovery as a contradiction in Popper's philosophy. Popper included miracles in his view, which hardly ever occurs.

"To be scientific a theory need be falsifiable only by an observation statement not by actual observation."[49] On the page of this quotation Kuhn's writing did not read logical to me. The quotation is too general. All paradigms are different and all theories are different therefore the term 'a theory' cannot be a datum. The content of each theory should be stated and then from there the discourse should start. The last sentence statement of mine is a theory or a generalization about discourse of all theories, or is it a generalization about discourses of individual theories? The 2nd last sentence is a positive statement about discourses of theories and a negative statement about discourse of "a theory" in general; discourse about 'a theory' in general is impossible and not true.

I do not know all the time what Kuhn refers to when he uses "this" and "they" etc.[50]

Kuhn wrote Popper wrote an accepted theory can ' "drop out" ' if ' "the falsification of one of the consequences" '[51] exists.[52]

'Falsification' for Popper means non-correspondence.[53] "I think that the theory of truth developed by Alfred Tarski has dispelled many sceptical misgivings about the idea of truth. What Tarski did was to show there was no reason to give up the commonsense view according to which a statement or a theory is true if it corresponds to the facts. ...

I agree with the pragmatists that we have to seek for a third position between optimism and pessimism. But it is clear that our new 'third position' will have to be, in contradistinction to the 'third position' of the pragmatists, much further from pessimism than from optimism." (Popper, 1963b:6).

It seems thus there is a problem when communicating about Popper's theory due to a non-division between Popper's view about corresponding causes and his view about corresponding being.

It seems Kuhn regarded Popper's insistence on "honesties" as a religious ("maxims", "ideology") prerequisite of Popper, whereas Kuhn wanted methodological prerequisites.[54] The distinction Kuhn makes between types (ideological and methodological) of prerequisites is the same prerequisite for Popper, I think.

Did not read pp. 17,18, to the middle of p.19, because of black swans at Irene farm. Kuhn built an argument around a non-corresponding nothing; "all swans are white". Could he posit, at least, to start with, a positive statement, which can be readily accepted as true. It is not clear from reading his example, whether he knew black swans exist or not, like brown, white and black horses exist. Birds' types depend more on colour and are more readily given different names than mammals of different colour at the same species. Egyptian geese and white geese are different by name and colour but not brown Labradors and black Labradors because different colours are common at the same species of mammals.

Kuhn complained against Popper ("Sir Karl") ad hominem; that Popper's theory uses normal research criteria in abnormal circumstances and that Popper's theory does not distinguish between 'normal research' and 'revolutionary research'. Popper's theory is therefore, according to Kuhn's thesis doubtful because Popper put locutional (of "locutions") emphasis on revolutionary conditions. Kuhn searched for a way, which he did not find in Popper's work, to choose between competing theories, in order to observe how "science does progress." Kuhn stated his understanding could be lacking; was he sincere?[55] Again the view by Kuhn of Kuhn's singular "science", instead of truer 'sciences', which is leading and not misleading, according to my misunderstandings.

Kuhn wrote that "science" as a whole has more corresponding points with nature than before and that scientific theories do not only refer to corresponding points of nature. Then he wrote that in another area the changing in coherence of different specialities of science is not known. Different specialities of science are more and more articulated; he also asks whether there is more division due to communication breakdowns between different fields of science.[56] Kuhn was indecisive. Do sciences progress or not? Sciences progress, it is clear to see, but because progressions cause divisions and separate territories he postulated disunity that opposes 'progression'.

Kuhn wants to perceive one "science" and "enforce" "it" with "institutions". The "it" of Kuhn is a "description of a value system" without realizing no two people can describe "it" the same. He wants thus, logic says, one as God, who can describe "it", who cannot exist, because of the weakness of human singularity, therefore he contradicts himself.[57] Although Kuhn and i agree that nature is one reference point for science, i think we agree not on the impact of places in space, and times, which are also applicable. Each observation has matter, place in space, and time to consider, to start with. Kuhn wanted to see, or thought he sees the possibility of 'a united science', a non-corresponding term with no being. Kuhn wants a united description for his "truth", like i want a united description for "truths", that is why we are not in agreement, more so than the disagreements between Popper and i. Maybe the tension of the wanted union by Kuhn caused the eventual split of his unity into 'paradigms' the word he coined.

Kuhn exposed his socialist, dividing philosophy, which sets groups up against groups, due to his belief in 'One' against His group, ones who should be isolated to save the 'accomplishments' of The groups.[58]

"Simplicity, precision, and congruence with the theories used in other specialties are all significant value for the scientists, but they they do not all dictate the same choice nor will they all be applied in the same way. That being the case, it is also important that group unanimity be a paramount value, causing the group to minimize the occasions for conflict and to reunite quickly about a single set of rules for puzzle solving even at the price of subdividing the specialty or excluding a formerly productive member."[59]

Although i do not agree with Kuhn, his philosophy has benefits because the word 'paradigm' gives ones, he isolate, more existential worth.

The agreements that Kuhn states he has with Popper seems to be represented by words more than by actions.[60]

1st Reading and later Readings

Kuhn wrote he and Popper agreed that science does not progress by "accretion" but rather by revolutionary changes. They agree on the correspondence theory for truth but they doubt whether a neutral scientific language can exist to explain observations.[61]

Popper agreed to correspondences of Tarski and he disagreed with misrepresenting observations, but it seems today that his honesties related only to scientific honesties, similar to empiricists' honesties, for own sakes only. Although he disagreed with positivists of Vienna, it seems now the differences between him and them were not big. (2st reading)

Kuhn wrote about his and Popper's agreements for example, "and we both insist that scientists may properly aim to invent theories that explain observed phenomena and that do so in terms of real objects, whatever the latter phrase may mean. That list is already extensive enough .. to place us in the same minority amongst contemporary philosophers of science." [62] (later reading)

Kuhn differs with Popper due to Kuhn's "deep commitment" to culture and his dislike of "the implications of the term 'falsification' ". They observe the same data but when they explain their observations differences in "intentions" are relevant, according to Kuhn. Kuhn found the "meaning" in Popper's "metaphors" and "locutions" not agreeable to his own.[63] Did Kuhn imply he prefers to use illocutionary speech and perlocutionary speech in stead of locutionary speech?

It seems Kuhn means that Popper emphasized revolutionary paradigmatic changes in theory but Popper contradicted himself because paradigms are not decided on by observations of empirical data. Paradigms are rather decided on by logical arguments, words as objects, which do not refer to only corresponding objective data. Paradigms are decided upon by reference to metaphysical observations as well. 'Metaphysical' means references to concepts. [64] Implications of a word like 'intequity' are relevant. The word 'intequities' refers to understandings, which can only be subjective, because the entities, 'intequities' do not exist as seen intequities on particular singular days. I cannot say i saw 'intequity' on, for example, 12 December 2012. My understanding of the word 'intequity' relates to my own subjective experiences of 45 years and because 'intequity' is a new word, understandings about intequities will differ. 'Intequity' appears not in dictionaries and i claimed copyright to the word. The concept, 'intequity' definitely formed due to physical and metaphysical observations.

According to Kuhn, Popper overemphasised revolutionary paradigms of individuals instead of giving required credit to "the surest reason for doing so". His opinion was raised in the context of discussing astronomy and astrology. Astrology is not a science according to Popper and Kuhn.[65]

"But neither Sir Karl nor I is an inductivist." Kuhn wrote Popper and he (Kuhn) agreed that theories are not established with tests. Kuhn wrote he understands not how Popper can call refuted theories "mistakes" from which we learn. According to Kuhn, "mistakes" refer to observational mistakes about correspondences, which can be isolated, whilst not rejecting a theory as a whole.[66]

It seems thus that Popper thought new theories bring us closer to truths, but Kuhn did not believe that science progresses to the same extent that Popper believed sciences progress. Possibly, their different views relate to 'realism' and their own beliefs about non-abilities to observe the 'cosmos-as-cosmos'. Did Popper's 'mistakes' refer to mistakes of reason and Kuhn's "mistakes" to mistakes of observations?

Kuhn agrees with Popper that a theory cannot be proven true in all applications but can be proven false in a specific application. Kuhn found Popper's explanation of the action " 'falsification' " or " 'refutation' ", "odd" because according to Popper the words referred to actions where "a theory", "fails in an attempted application". Kuhn regards the two words as antonyms of "proof", the result of actions.[67]

Whilst reading i thought that the differences between Popper and Kuhn could exist because Kuhn refers a lot of the time to "a theory", which relates not to correspondence. Kuhn refers not to a specific theory therefore his point of reference is too unreal to have a meaningful discussion about.[68]

Kuhn claims Popper also "barred conclusive disproof" of theories. An important problem for Popper and Kuhn (?) was, to demarcate theories between scientific and pseudo-scientific theories.[69]

"I must first ask what it is that still requires explanation. Not that scientists discover the truth about nature, nor that they approach ever closer to the truth. Unless, as one of my critics suggests[70], we simply define the approach to truth as the result of what scientists do, we cannot recognize progress towards that goal."[71]

The above can be understood as "there is no need to explain that scientists move closer to truth" or "scientists are not moving closer to truth".

After reading Kuhn's section on 11 February 2014 once, i felt more uncertain about his opinion than about Popper's opinion. My feelings are today that he is not sincere with references to correspondences. Maybe his opinion is based on truth as "realism". He for example refers a lot to "a theory". [At his note 1, p.2, he wrote that elsewhere he used the word 'paradigm' in stead.] All theories [and all paradigms] are different therefore Kuhn's reference point ("a theory") is not something objective, about, which a reasonable discussion can be held. He made me think of Foucault's (The Archaeology of Knowledge) way of writing, which i did not find informative [after one reading.]

Class by Prof. Renato Coletto on 15 February 2014

2de Klas

KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research.

"In addition, commitment [commitment to the scientific culture of the time] has a second and a largely incompatible research role. Its very strength and the unanimity with which the professional group subscribes to it provides the individual scientist with an immensely sensitive detector of the trouble spots from which significant innovations of fact and theory are almost inevitably educed." Kuhn then goes on to explain, scientific dogmatic beliefs first break down and then discovery takes place by scientists. The breaking down processes are excluded by Kuhn from science.[72]

This quotation made me think that Kuhn did not regard experience from outside. Popper for example grew up and experienced situations, which Kuhn seems to write off us not scientific. Kuhn disregarded heuristic locutionary experiences, which Popper, an individual, had; experiences, which benefitted societies, because it entered academia through the writing and academic work of Popper worldwide.

Paradigms of sciences are taught to students with textbooks. It seems Kuhn regard a paradigm as something specific to a subject field, specific to a specific science. Where no textbooks exist "universal received paradigms" applies to individual sciences.[73]

Kuhn refers to "legitimate" problems of sciences, which are explained in textbooks, scientists regard part of them.[74]

"Classics", which Kuhn named "paradigms" are specific to a science for example the way Adam Smith's work pertain to economic science. The work of a paradigm, however pertain also to classics in other sciences, which share attributes of the paradigm. Kuhn explains "paradigm" as specific to a science because although a paradigm of a science shares attributes to a paradigm of another science there are attributes, which distinguishes the one paradigm from all "the classics of other creative fields", due to field specific attributes. Kuhn calls this distinguishing characteristic "the exclusiveness of paradigms".[75]

Kuhn quotes Lagrange: ' "There is but one universe, and it can happen to but one man in the world's history to be the interpreter of its laws."[76] ' Kuhn disagrees with the opinion by Lagrange but acknowledges 'the' consequential effect of Lagrange's belief.[77] Kuhn and i agree not on 'a' consequence of Lagrange's belief, but we agree that 'consequence' is relevant. What are consequences? Kuhn suffers as consequence from Caiaphas syndrome, because he accuses others of thinking they each are 'the one' when they say Lagrange was wrong. A 2^nd consequence is, honesties, by those who think Lagrange was wrong, without accusing others of thinking they each are 'the one'. This 2^nd consequence, which affected me, though postulates that people who suffer from Caiaphas syndrome do not think they are each 'the one', but subconsciously, although they say Lagrange was wrong, they do not believe that Lagrange was wrong, because they resigned not from Abrahamic religions.

A science ("Ptolemy and Copernicus or Newton and Descartes" shared a science) "if it has a paradigm at all, can have only one" at a time[78]. Copernicus and Ptolemy had different "models". According to Kuhn's explanation of the term "a paradigm" it is a synonymous term for 'a science'.[79]

Paradigms are not applicable according to Kuhn to the social sciences and art, like it is at the "mature sciences", with reference to Newton's and Einstein's science. Paradigms thus become relevant during the later phases of sciences, after substantial development.[80]

Kuhn quoted 'Francis Bacon's acute methodological dictum: "Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion." '[81]

"It ['a paradigm'] is in the first place, a fundamental scientific achievement and one which includes both a theory and some exemplary applications to the results of experiment and observation. More important, it is an open-ended achievement, one which leaves all sorts of research still to be done. And, finally, it is an accepted achievement in the sense that it is received by a group whose members no longer try to rival it or to create alternates for it."[82]

Kuhn's opines that sciences progress from paradigm to paradigm.[83] He mentioned not territories.

What is the normal, non-paradigmatic work that scientists do? They bring their paradigm as close as possible to reflecting nature by reducing vagueness in the original conception. Kuhn regards the "scientific community" exclusively separate from inventors of paradigms.[84] This view of Kuhn is contradictory because when realizations of vagueness about a paradigm reject a paradigm, the paradigm has to be rejected. Kuhn's 'normal' realizations are about theories within paradigms. Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science is not dependent on an existing phenomenon (an actuality as perceived and agreed upon), which identified distinctions between revolutionary and normal science, but rather dependent on individuals of the phenomenon, who recognize the revolutionary vaguenesses. Kuhn discounts individuals, who are parts of the phenomenon and therefore Kuhn perceives the phenomenon in non-corresponding away. Abilities to recognize revolutionary vaguenesses are results of honesties inside and outside of each individual. Kuhn was probably jealous of 'Sir Karl's' abilities to recognize recognitions by others (not Popper nor Kuhn) of revolutionary realizations, because Kuhn was part of the jealous 'God' of the Old Testament. Would Kuhn, if he recognized a revolutionary vagueness, have ignored the vagueness? Probably not; if Kuhn did recognize a revolutionary vagueness, who did he believe he is, postulating falsely that he is part of 'normal' science, as distinguished from 'revolutionary' science, which is a distinction that can only be made if individual revolutionary scientists are excluded from 'The scientific community'.

"In all these problems, as in most others that scientists undertake, the challenge is not to uncover the unknown but to obtain the known."[85] Isn't obtaining the known, uncovering the unknown for selves. Kuhn's statement excludes common sense observation and corresponding truths in favour of 'Only' his 'scientific' knowledge.

Revolutionary change is subversive according to Kuhn.[86] Scientists like Kuhn seek fame because they gather 'truth' but do not give truths. People who give truths, by being honest, like Popper, seek financial security because we are excluded from societies.

Whilst reading p. 365 i again felt that Kuhn generalizes to widely from his experience to all experiences like he wrote about 'a theory' in the reading of the 1st class as if there was only one 'the theory' in the world.[87]

According to Kuhn's arguments scientists, who were schooled in particular paradigms, who invent revolutionary paradigmatic changes, ceases to be scientists, because they are excluded from the "scientific community".[88]

Kuhn gives examples of paradigmatic changes from electricity to astronomy and states the list can be expanded "indefinitely". He was a knowledgeable man, who had a good memory, but who's logic cannot be trusted.

KUHN, T.S. Postscript 1969 (In 1996. The structure of scientific revolutions)

It seems the Postscript, which Prof. Coletto wants us to read was written during 1969 and published in 1996, but the book was first published in 1962.[89]

Kuhn distinguished between 'sociological' and more specific meanings of 'paradigm'. He referred to the 'beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation'[90]

It seems thus that in this postscript he started to identify territorial problems, but not explicitly as territorial because his "given community" can be an international community, for example the Jewish community he was part of.

Kuhn explains how scientific communities are divided initially due to emergence of a new paradigm movement. Eventually the discourse consolidates in one dominant school, which is 'esoteric'.[91] When a movement reaches this final esoteric phase - 'Only those who have taken courage from observing that their own field (or school) has paradigms are likely to feel that something important is sacrificed by the change.'[92] Kuhn's argument rotates thus absolutely around the coherence and agreement within a group that no paradigm differences may exist within his group.

"Kuhn was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, to Samuel L. Kuhn, an industrial engineer, and Minette Stroock Kuhn. He graduated from The Taft School in Watertown, CT, in 1940, where he became aware of his serious interest in mathematics and physics. He obtained his B.S. degree in physics from Harvard University in 1943, where he also obtained M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in physics in 1946 and 1949, respectively. As he states in the first few pages of the preface to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, his three years of total academic freedom as a Harvard Junior Fellow were crucial in allowing him to switch from physics to the history (and philosophy) of science."[93]

'Laws are often corrigible piecemeal, but definitions, being tautologies, are not.'[94]

Kuhn identified metaphorical "values" of groups important and with regard to that he wrote 'quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones'.[95] This generalization by Kuhn implies that possible logical correspondences were ignored in favour of trivial statistical observations by him, which discount the possibility of black swans, if a person is not aware of the existence of black swans.

... Kuhn was committed to his belief that a scientist can only solve a problem with field specific pre-knowledge attained.[96] Kuhn's view is contradictory because, although his view is the usual statistical circumstance, his view implies the following. That a problem can only be solved if a person knows what The whole is. Knowing what totality is, is impossible, therefore Kuhn's view is not correct. Persons, with naïve knowledges can see a fallacy of a doctrine, because they have not been indoctrinated into believing fallacies of the doctrine are truths. This relates to Kuhn's anomaly with regard to pre-knowledge, which i mentioned in the first assignment.

Kuhn wrote he expected that individuals of the same group can be expected to react the same to similar circumstances because of similar education and background.[97] His statement did not consider the vast differences caused by truthful and deceiving individuals in the same community.

Kuhn categorized breaking scientific Newtonian laws and breaking The Ten Commandments in the same category of breaking.[98]

Kuhn referred to the 'whiteness of swans'.[99] If Kuhn knew about black swans of Australia, whilst referring to 'whiteness of swans', his deceit decisively proofs his nature in the deceiving group at the time of deceiving.

Kuhn raised his opinion that incommensurability delimits scientific discourse, whilst at the same time referring to philosophers who disagreed with him.[100] I guess that is why he became a philosopher eventually.

Kuhn explains how a scientist can act 'parasitically' when the scientist accepts another view without 'internalizing' the view, due to differences in culture.[102] Did he mean by 'internalizing', memorizing because logic wise he had a strong memory. Kuhn's statement is interesting in light of my understanding that Kuhn's way is parasitic leaning on creators.

Kuhn's frequent use of his metaphor about solving the "puzzle" shows he is an ambivalent realist because he presupposes 'the' puzzle, which exists not, because existence of his 'puzzle' is impossible.[103] Puzzles, existing as puzzles, made of carton pieces should not be compared with scientific 'puzzles'. His metaphor is a transgression of the law about "gelykenisse", when serious matters are applicable. Presupposing such puzzles in science is an action based on socialist overpowering of minority views.

"Some critics claim that I am confusing description with prescription, violating the time-honored philosophical theorem: 'Is' cannot imply 'ought'.

That theorem has, in practice, become a tag, and it is no longer everywhere honored. A number of contemporary philosophers have discovered important contexts in which the normative and the descriptive are inextricably mixed.[104]"[105] Kuhn's problem to me is that 'descriptive' to him means not correspondence to facts and therefore his 'normative' is also different from my "normative".

Kuhn regards a 'paradigm' as a significant achievement by a group of scientists after the initiating work of an individual has paved the way to the group acceptance of a new paradigm. The 'paradigm's' existence according to Kuhn depends not on actuality but rather on group acceptance of actualities. Kuhn mentioned not the paving work although he mentioned a "second contribution". Kuhn ends his postscript by writing about the importance of deciding on a proper manner in which scientists are allowed into a scientific community.[106]

POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers.

Popper stated he did not distinguish between " 'normal' " and " 'extraordinary' " and he is glad Kuhn brought the distinction under his attention. Popper "disliked" the existing distinction because he regarded the distinction a "danger to science".[107] According to me there should not be a distinction because it causes Caiaphas syndromes and isolation of creativities.

Popper asks, what Kuhn understands by Kuhn's word " 'puzzle' ". Does he use it in the same sense that Wittgenstein used it in the sense of puzzles due to misuse of words or does Kuhn means, "problem" in Popper's understanding.[108] I think Kuhn, meant 'cosmos as cosmos' which shows his irrationalism because perceiving 'the puzzle' is impossible. Kuhn was not really aware of his own limitations. He did not believe one man cannot be God.

"Although I find Kuhn's discovery of what he calls 'normal' science most important, I do not agree that the history of science supports his doctrine (essential for his theory of rational communication) that 'normally' we have one dominant theory--a 'paradigm'--in each scientific domain, and that the history of a science consists in a sequence of dominant theories, with intervening revolutionary periods which he describes as if communication between scientists had broken down, owing to the absence of a dominant theory."[109]

Popper wrote Kuhn's way can be described as "historical relativism" because Kuhn referred to a dominant framework, whilst positing that the framework cannot be critiqued. Popper posited that the opinion that the framework cannot be critiqued should be critiqued. Popper further writ that Kuhn's framework is usually a fashion, which could be critiqued by scientists. Popper called Kuhn's view about the constancy of paradigm's "The Myth of the Framework" and he stated it is dangerous and the "bulwark of irrationalism". According to Popper it is simply not true that language differences divide the way Kuhn posits, because languages can be translated and foreign languages can be learnt.[110]

"I should just like to indicate briefly why I am not a relativist:[111] I do believe in 'absolute' or 'objective' truth, in Tarski's sense (athough I am, of course, not an 'absolutist', in the sense of thinking that I, or anybody else has the truth in his pocket). I do not doubt that this is one of the points on which we are most deeply divided; and it is a logical point."[112]

Popper felt that Kuhn contradicts himself because he favours "psychology of research" over "logic of discovery" but yet he does not want to regard the "sociological (or psychological or historical) lunatic fringe".[113]

"Indeed, as I have explained elsewhere, 'scientific knowledge' may be regarded as subjectless.[114] It may be regarded as a system of theories on which we work as do masons on a cathedral. The aim is to find theories which, in the light of critical discussion, get nearer to the truth. Thus the aim is the increase of the truth-content of our theories (which, as I have shown,[115] can be achieved only by increasing their content)."[116] This statement by Popper places him in my list of gods. He stated here that the "truth-content" can be "increased" without referring to 'the-truth', being a point, which is the end of the world. Although i have elsewhere disagreed with him and thought he might have been a bit subject to Caiaphas syndrome, i now think, he should be respected like a god and as part of God, like Kant, Jesus, Jaspers etc. as millions others should be respected. When did time of gods and goddesses start? I assume with Jesus of Nazareth, around the year zero. Popper's reference to "subjectless", acknowledges that knowledge is not a subjective thing of 'One' person, a time, but rather an objective subject ("vak", a scientific field, module) we can agree to, with honesties.

Prof. Coletto said in the first class someone else referred to Feyerabend as a "realist". I understand 'realist' as the class of Kuhn because current ambivalent realism posits the 'cosmos as cosmos' as datum, which is impossible. See the note below about Feyerabend.

FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist.

Feyerabend felt he recognized Kuhn's "problems" and Feyerabend agreed not with Kuhn's "theory of science".[117]

Feyerabend identified "ambiguity" in Kuhn's thesis because although Kuhn propagates a subjective view he tries to ground it scientifically in historical facts.[118]

Feyerabend refers to an example of gangs and in their midsts, safebreakers who rob banks. Feyerabend compares "normal science" with the activities of "organised crime".[119] The example relates to my distinction between two types of sacrifices in societies. The first where deceivers are sacrificed, for example in courts of law and the second where honest people are sacrificed in science by Kuhn's esoteric court. Was Kuhn's view a view of reality or was his aim to scare people?

Feyerabend wrote Kuhn said that normal science "is a necessary presupposition of revolutions."[120]

Feyerabend refers[121] to Kuhn who wrote that totality is too vast to explain scientifically.[122] Does Kuhn's view, referred to, mean, i am mistaken by thinking, Kuhn was in fact postulating a view of totality, without realizing it, because, his deceits blocked his consciousness from his own elthaughts[123]?

Kuhn's concern is a "monomaniac" concern, "the exclusive choice of one particular set of ideas".[124]

Feyerabend seems to regard the discourse a methodological problem rather than a descriptive problem about actuality. It seems he is looking for a best way to proceed to solve Kuhn's and Popper's oppositions.[125]

Feyerabend stated Kuhn's view was "dogmatic" and "authoritarian". The discourse seems to use the word 'dogmatic' (Kuhn's dogmatism in Kuhn himself), meaning, sticking to a paradigm, whilst realizing something is wrong.[126] Wider ambivalent realist discourse uses the word 'dogmatic', referencing truths, honesties and correspondences of Tarski and Popper. There could be two uses of 'dogmatic' in the Kuhn/Popper discourse. Kuhn could have accused Popper of dogmatism (honesties) and Popper could have accused Kuhn of dogmatism (sticking to a paradigm of fallacies). Kuhn perhaps regarded his view of dogmatism (Kuhn's opinion of a phenomenon in Popper) by Popper as Popper sticking to a paradigm about a Tarskian correspondence theory of truths. Feyerabend identifies dogmatism in Kuhn as Kuhn's sticking to wordly functionalism ("All for One and One for all") as old paradigm. Which 'dogmatism' is new and which "dogmatism" is old is not clear. According to intequinism both dogmatisms exist as parallel opposing forces in history and currently. The deep problem of the Kuhn/Popper discourse is about two parallel paradigms of realism. Prioritized correspondence (Popper) on one side and prioritized coherencies (Kuhn) on the other side, are the deep problems of the discourse. Even deeper than two paradigms of realism are two paradigms of religion/psychology/philosophy; is the idea that 'One' man can be 'God', prioritized correspondence (honest) or is the idea, prioritized coherencies (functionalism/deceit) in the Socratic? way.

"Socrates: 'And surely we must value truthfulness highly. For if we were right when we said just now that falsehood is no use to the gods and only useful to men as a kind of medicine, it's clearly a kind of medicine that should be entrusted to doctors and not to laymen. . . It will be for the rulers of our city, then, if anyone, to use falsehood in dealing with citizen or enemy for the good of the State; no one else must do so. And if any citizen lies to our rulers, we shall regard it as a still graver offence than it is for a patient to lie to his doctor, or for any athlete to lie to his trainer about his physical condition, or for a sailor to misrepresent to his captain any matter concerning the ship or crew, or the state of himself or his fellow-sailors.' " (Plato, The Republic, 389a)

Popper wrote: "In my book [The Open Society and its Enemies], I mention explicitly the points of Platonism which, in my opinion, were pernicious. They are: ...

(4) The use of white lies in politics. The belief that the people have to be told [such lies], and that they cannot be as wise as the rulers

It seems Kuhn regarded parallel paradigms of realism as reality's way in the sense of yin and yang.[127]

Feyerabend gave examples of incompatible theories for example a "theory of heat" which was incompatible with "mechanics". Feyerabend regarded the incompatibility of the theories a sign of different "paradigms".[128] Feyerabend thus looked at science as a whole and therefore his viewpoint could be a viewpoint about realism. Maybe "true realism", realizing that coherencies should not be prioritized because each cannot have totality as a datum. Feyerabend however on previous pages gave me an impression that maybe he is a pragmatist and pragmatists according to my understanding accept wordly functional arguments, which prioritize not correspondence above coherencies. His view after all might be ambivalent realism due to his pragmatist territory (the USA).

It seems Feyerabend opined that Kuhn posited that 'normal' scientists' works are esoteric and when their works proliferate, paradigms movements start. 'Normal' scientists then find a new paradigm, which they establish as esoteric. It seems thus that, according to Feyerabend, Kuhn posits a world in which esoteric 'normal' scientists already know what the new societal paradigm will be, before the rest of society, including 'extraordinary' scientists. 'Extraordinary' scientists are thus copycats according to Kuhn who let secrets out to society, or, 'extraordinary' scientists become aware of things normal scientists already know and then extraordinary scientists proliferate their new realizations to the public out of the esoteric sphere.[129] They seem to have generalized too widely because now i think, even paradigms changes are too different to generalize about: how such changes take place. We can only generalize, that changes take place but we cannot generalize about how it happens.

It seems, then, that the interplay between tenacity and proliferation which we described in our little methodological fairytale is also an essential feature of the actual development of science. It seems that it is not the puzzle-solving activity that is responsible for the growth of our knowledge, but the active interplay of various tenaciously held views. Moreover, it is the invention of new ideas and the attempt to secure for them a worthy place in the competition that leads to the overthrow of old and familiar paradigms. Such inventing goes on all the time. Yet it is only during revolutions that the attention turns to it."[130]

"It seems to me that the happiness and the full development of an individual human being is now as ever the highest possible value. This value does not exclude the values which flow from the institutionalized forms of life (truth, valour, self-negation; etc.). It rather encourages them but only to the extent to which they can contribute to the advance of some individual."[131] Why the reference to a singular person—"of an individual human being"—and not for example, "of individual human beings"?

Kuhn's view of reality is a view of scientists, which excludes individualism and indoctrinates society into robots.[132]

Feyerabend is in favour of tenacity and proliferation. Tenacities must retain sensitive truths when under attack and realize new truths when not needed, whilst freedom of speech is allowed. 'Proliferation' oppresses no new ideas. Feyerabend referred to freedoms in connection with individuals' own ideas and not to freedoms about uses of others' ideas.[133] In this idea of 'proliferation' is one of the main problems of Accounting of ideas. The imparting of ideas has not been mentioned directly by 'proliferation' discourse.

Popper defended "the free market in ideas" whilst defending correspondence (Shearmur, Turner 2012:405). Popper's view is not reconcilable if he referred to imparting of ideas because correspondence (honesties) and imparting of ideas (deceits) oppose. If Popper meant by "free market", freedom to innovate in oneself, as opposed to freedom to impart others' ideas, Popper's opinion, was congruent, am not sure whether Popper regarded imparting. Maybe the anomaly of Plato?[134] was also present at Feyerabend and Popper but to a lesser extent than at Plato. Popper opposed lies by leaders, but did he realize truths cause changes and creativities?

"The idea that knowledge can be advanced by a struggle of alternative views and that it depends on proliferation was first put forward by the Presocratics (this has been emphasised by Popper himself), and it was developed into a general philosophy by Mill (especially in On Liberty)."[135] It seems Popper regarded proliferation with regard to existing knowledge. Kuhn wanted to hinder proliferation of existing 'normal' knowledge because of its esoteric privileges. What Popper's view about new knowledge was is not clear in his words but he was serious about owning his own copyrights, probably due to financial insecurity. The proliferation issue between Popper and Kuhn relates thus probably mostly to existing 'esoteric normal' knowledge, but also to new knowledge, because logically Kuhn promotes a system, which regards new revolutionary knowledge as public domain mimetic knowledge, which should first be tested by 'normal science', whereas Popper regard new 'revolutionary science' as copyrightable.

The synthesis of proliferation and tenacity took place in the writings of dialectical materialists like Engels, Lenin and Trotsky and also in Lakatos's theory about development of science.[136]

Feyerabend's main critique of Kuhn is that Kuhn saw sequential chronological periods of normal, later revolutionary and even later again, normal scientific activities. According to Feyerabend, Kuhn's view is not actual because the activities coincide logically at same times.[137]

Feyerabend emphasises a philosophical and a normal side of science. Development is dependent on the coexistence of the two. He also identifies that we cannot generalize about how exactly these interactions happen during all times.[138]

Children, Popper wrote " 'learn to imitate others … (Feyerabend's ellipsis) and so learn to look upon standards of behaviour as if they consisted of fixed, "given" rules … (Feyerabend's ellipsis) and such things as sympathy and imagination may play an important role in this development'.[140] "[141]

Instrumentalism regard theories commensurable if related to the same "observation language" and interpreted on the basis thereof. "A realist, on the other hand, wants to give a unified account, both of observable and unobservable matters, and he will use the most abstract terms of whatever theory he is contemplating for that purpose."[142]

Feyerabend promotes a middle road between Popper and Kuhn, according to me, closer to Kuhn than to Popper, because he favours irrationalism; he identifies the endlessness of realities and the differences in understandings of definitions for words of definitions for words. Incommensurability should therefore be part of science and a striving for a coherent understanding of nature should be left behind, due to impossibility of realizing such a congruent view, according to Feyerabend.[144] Today, 19 August my view is not the same anymore. Now i think Feyerabend was closer to Popper.

Prof. Renato Coletto's class on 8 March 2014.

3:40 "When you acquire your first paradigm normal science begins. Normal science requires an accepted paradigm."

Dogmatism was discussed but not defined. The texts showed that "dogmatism" of the two sides are different. At 10:31 Coletto referred to creativity as dogmatism. Coletto thus accepted Kuhn's terminology and definition as his own.

15:32 "What precedes revolution which is the change of the paradigm? Crises is a better reason than anomalies because anomalies are not persistent."

17:20 "When is the revolution concluded? Kuhn confuses theories and paradigms. When the new paradigm exists we know the revolution has concluded."

20:00 "A paradigm is like a suitcase. A paradigm is like a hybrid presupposition. Exemplars for Kuhn is what he called paradigms in the past. Prof. Elaine Botha wrote about positivism."

22:22 "Poppers accusation against Kuhn is his one main problem, is relativism. Popper called it the Myth of the ..."

25:42 "Feyerabend wants tenacity with proliferation. The proletarians were poor people who only possessed their children. Too proliferate is to have children. Proliferation is multiplying the theories, the views. Feyerabend likes the variety of proliferation. He likes pluralism. Refutations of a paradigm requires another option."

29:20 "Popper will like the togetherness of normal and revolutionary science Feyerabend posits."

32:10 "What does normal scientists do? They solve puzzles, which are small parts of a paradigm."

19 August 2014 – Coletto posits puzzles as parts but according to my understanding of Kuhn he referred to one puzzle for each science. Coletto's view is thus more nominalist than Kuhn's, because he identifies smaller parts. Coletto however also emphasised the importance of universals. He 'thus' posit universals used when identifying smaller puzzles than paradigms.

35:20 "Popper destroyed verification. Kuhn destroyed falsification. The situation was confusing. In the 80s a scientist wrote that maybe there is no demarcation between science and non-science."

37:37 "Puzzles can be scientific or non-scientific, Feyerabend is right because there are two types of puzzles (scientific and non-scientific). Fixing own car in own garage is not science."

43:00 Coletto wants us to have a clear understanding of Kuhn's view. "Kuhn has phases: 1. pre-paradigm phase:

"What don't we have in the pre-paradigm phase? No competing theories. There are a lot of disagreement, fighting about the essence of a science. Small groups or even single scientists, who work in isolated ways."

2. "Normal science: One paradigm that dictates rules, instruments, most importantly the questions."

51:24 "Kuhn says the paradigm show what the final picture must be and he asks why would people spend time to prove something they know. His answer was that why do people buy puzzles. Because the scientist want to show his skill in getting the expected answer. For Popper it was depressing because he thought of the heroes of science. For Popper a "normal" scientist is not really a scientist, but more a technician. For Popper the individual was important. For Kuhn it is more about the community. For Popper also the community is important, but he makes space for the Darwin's etc."

59:00 "Paradigms should reflect nature because it refers to reality. Scientists sometimes give the impression that they care not about reality. It is an 'instrumentalist', 'relativistic' view, he called it 'nominalism' ". Kuhn is not like that because he finetunes his science to nature."

19 August 2014 – Here it seems as if Coletto's view of reality is realism; identifying universals and totality as a datum.

"Sometimes anomalies are solved and they strengthen the paradigm. If anomalies persist a crisis arrives. What is the plural of crisis? Crises."

1:06 "Crisis is a time of depression. Everybody knows about the crisis. After the crisis revolution follows. After the revolution the cycle repeats."

1:08:10 "Not in texts but some of you know about it. Does the new cycle lead to progress?"

"The pyramids of Kuhn shows the paradigms are not linked". I will stop using quotation marks now.

According to Coletto revolutions are not progress, like Kuhn said. Kuhn likes not Popper's evolutionary view.

There is no ontological development, 4 is closer to 1 than 3. Not more truth, the idea is downtoned with revolutionary 'progress'.

1:25:18 Kuhn does not say like Feyerabend that revolutions are good. Kuhn has a more descriptive method.

1:28:42 Coletto thinks Kuhn's view has not underlying unconscious presuppositions. "Hybrid" is Coletto's conception of a paradigm, which exist as suitcase in normal science.

1:33:50 Is Kuhn more rational than Popper? Student answered no. Coletto wants to hear from others, probably want yes for an answer. He asked the quiet student (Daniel who knows everything about these issues). She said Kuhn is irrational because we do not get closer to reality. With Kuhn, Coletto says we have to divide the answers into two. Normal and revolutionary. Rationality has to be divided into two. Normal science is a rational process. Revolutionary science toned down rationality.

1:38:40 Hennie said Kuhn said his view cannot apply to mathematics and asked how can it then be rational.

1:39:50 Coletto emphasised the 'human' side of Kuhn rather than objective science.

1:43:00 We are moving away from nominalism and Popper's view to a more relativist view. Does Coletto mean this statement descriptive (is) or requirement (ought)?

1:45:40 Incommensurability (Lack of an objective way to measure something) is a problem of more than one paradigm because it causes misunderstandings. It seems Coletto means there is only one paradigm in his field, which is philosophy. "Paradigms" equals "worlds".

1:48:10 Nominalism is the opposite of realism. Kuhn was radical about incommensurability early on in his career until criticism made him less radical. Feyerabend liked incommensurability and developed the idea further. It gave Feyerabend the possibility of pluralism in an anarchistic way like life itself which is rich and plural.

Normal science and its dangers is the title of the work by Popper Coletto discusses. Popper rejects the split between normal and revolutionary.

1:58:20 Popper said Kuhn's conception fits not theory of matter. Popper accused Kuhn of using logic, albeit relativistic logic. Popper regarded metaphysics as philosophical.

2:03 Coletto says the reference of Popper to "lunatic fringe" is to Kuhn's normal science but Popper meant it sarcastically as reference to the 'revolutionary' scientists Kuhn posited.

2:06:50 Popper believed in "objective" and "absolute" truth. Truth is correspondence to facts for Popper. Thomas Aquinas used the same. Popper is a realist. Earlier Coletto criticised nominalism as well.

2:09:20 Nominalism refers to names, not to universals. Plato and Aristotle disagreed about where "the universal" is.

2:10:10 Feyerabend is a nominalist because he says the world is what he says it is. In science nominalism gets the name instrumentalism. Science is not about something objective out there because instruments are used.

2:12:20 Coletto explains that "whiteness" or "horseness" exist and therefore he is not a nominalist. He does not like "progress" of Popper and the "roomier" next paradigm Popper posited.

2:17 Feyerabend has one purpose. He wants to show science is like life. He is a hedonist in the Epicurean sense. Pleasure is important. Science should not create atomic bombs, science should be gratifying, to human kind to "the individual". The highest focus is the development of "the individual". Coletto did not notice the "some individual". The messiah type isolation of revolutionary science.

2:23:30 Incommensurability is not an unbridgeable problem. We can discuss different theories. We can discuss different taste. Ancient Latin pproverb says taste that differ cannot be discussed.

2:27 Jaco referred to Feyerabend in the feminine and Coletto said Feyerabend opposes authoritarianism. Feyerabend approved of some violence to enforce pluralism. Scientists should be controlled according to Feyerabend.

2:30 A good friend of Lakatos (a realist) died prematurely and Feyerabend espoused his friend's philosophy.

2:31:50 Feyerabend takes critical discussion from Popper. We must create alternatives. How can we criticise a paradigm if there is only one paradigm. Kuhn says it is not him who criticizes another paradigm, it is Nature. Science changes into emphasis on "the subject".

2:34 Feyerabend takes from Kuhn, tenacity. A person should also be free to stick to his paradigm. Coletto referred to the "attitude of this man" with regard to Feyerabend's philosophy.

2:37 It is not easy to criticize Feyerabend. He wrote he is a "disciple of the Sophists" because there is not one truth. He was respected.

2:39:45 Feyerabend regarded normal and revolutionary as two aspects of science, which exist together. He also identified more than one paradigm from which progress came in the 19^th century and Coletto agrees. That was a weak point of Kuhn's philosophy. Kuhn wanting one paradigm.

2:43 Feyerabend wants progress and therefore he said we have to accept chaos. Fey asked whether revolutions are desirable, which Popper did not ask? We decide whether sience should be a "dragon (terrifying threat)" or an "attractive courtesan (pussycat)". That concludes Fey's philosophy, we don't want the dragon we want the courtesan.

2:48:09 Popper was unhappy about that because Feyerabend did not see a difference between myths and science.

2:49 Popper said science was not the abolition of myths. Popper was "the one" who opened the door for identifications of differences between myths and science. Popper was not happy to go as far as Feyerabend. The philosophies are linked, "it's just one step after the other". Popper's problems are the same "humanistic direction" as Feyerabend's.

3de Klas

FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method: outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge, Introduction + chapters 1 to 5.

Science has no " 'bare facts' " due to presuppositions, which determine the outcome of observations.[145]

Feyerabend quoted John Stuart Mill positively to help develop individual human beings and was therefore influenced by utilitarianism. He referred to individuals in the plural and not like before to "some person". He however referred incorrectly to "the individual" in stead of individuals because he meant the plural(s).[147]

"Puritanical dedication and seriousness which I detest. … 'search for truth' "[148] On p.38 it seemed to me that Feyerabend used the word 'truth' in a very wide realist sense and not in a nominal manner with reference to facts.

Feyerabend's "anarchism" can be compared to human sacrifice and isolation of Kuhn because Feyerabend removes the laws, which make it possible for individuals to be creative.[149]

"This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes."[150]

Just as a well trained animal will slavishly follow the instructions of its master so do humans under strain each follow the "mental image of his master" during argumentation.[151] An intequism of Intequinism is that there are only two high level "masters". The master of honesties and the master of deceits. A mixed methodology is in effect deceiving because The master of honesties allows not intentional deceits. Deceits according to The master of honesties should only be allowed if it happens due to Non-pathological criminal incapacity (NPCI).

Feyerabend referred to a difference he had with Popper about whether Popper "originated" an idea or not. Feyerabend considers not that more than one person can conceive the same idea from pre-knowledges in different territories and different times.[152]

Feyerabend argues that theories have not necessarily, to follow older theories with regard to consistency, because if the newer theory existed before the older, 'consistencies', would have benefited the opposing newer theory.[153]

Feyerabend used the words "as a sign of truth and correspondence with nature" in a positive manner, more comparable with Popper than with Kuhn (first and second class) according to my understanding.[155] It could mean that 'truth' on p.21 and 'truth' here on p.43 were not used in the same sense by Feyerabend. On p.45 Feyerabend referred negatively to the use of 'truth' as part of ambivalent realist means.[156]

Feyerabend promoted "humanitarian" philosophy and he uses " 'facts' " between single inverted commas to indicate that all 'facts' are not corresponding truths.[157] Feyerabend argues against demarcation between science and non-science.[158] Popper had a similar opinion as Kant who argued for demarcation relating to corresponding truths. My belief that truths should only be corresponding truths, is a metaphysical component of science, dependent on faiths, and is an intequism of Intequinism. Intequinism will cause wide agreement and societal coherence amongst the-honest (eerlikes).

Feyerabend promotes proliferation at several places.[159] He did not however make the distinction so far that Accounting of ideas make between new theories and old, which is essentially governed by copyrights and fair educational use of knowledge. The level of proliferation, which is legal depends on the age of knowledge. Copyrights are usually applicable up to 50 or so years after the death of an author. Institutional copyrights as far as I know has no limit and exist as long as the institution exist (Maybe this applies to registered trademarks only as long as the registrations are renewed. For how long can someone register copyrights on books in the USA?). Can institutional copyrights be transferred? Trade secret law is relevant. Another relevant factor is privacy laws especially relating to creators who are being spied upon by National intelligence agencies as reported by the Rupert Murdoch press debacle and the Snowden debacle about USA National intelligence infringements world wide, during the last few years. The responsible use of technology for example radio wave access to computers without Internet connections, as reported on CCTV news plays a role.

Feyerabend regularly promoted readings of John Stuart Mills's essay, On liberty.[160] It seems thus that Feyerabend's idea of liberty could have been the liberty of imparting of ideas, or did he just not understand the negative effects of imparting of ideas, like many others.

Feyerabend distinguishes between "numerical" and "qualitative" incoherence between theories and observations.[161] Feyerabend explains that "no single" theory corresponds with all the factual observations about the theory. Even the theory of relativity of Einstein was refuted by experiments relating to numbers.[162] The most visible qualitative difference between some theories of science for example Newton's theory, is that magnets, if turned in a certain direction pushes away from another magnet and when turned around attracts the other magnet. The forces of attraction between objects depend on the objects' constitutions and similarity. Magnets attract metals but attract not wood, therefore Newton's theory of attraction applies not to magnets.

"According to Hume, theories cannot be derived from facts." The demand that theories should be derived from facts will leave us with no theories.[163] Feyerabend argues against Popper's methodology of falsification as criteria to choose between theories, and the methodology he propose is to allow any actions in the form of anarchism.[164] Implications of his view in the context of remuneration points in the direction of communism because in effect it means that any scientific procedure should be financed. Logically his proposal cannot be applied when scientific anthropomorhic studies include using humans as means to ends because then the-experimented-upon should get finance to defend themselves, which will cause wars. He was however a humanitarian and probably did not include using others as means to ends.

Feyerabend applied Hegel's philosophy when Feyerabend wrote that experiments are affected by ideas of histories. Ideas of histories, which were absorbed in materials (the observed and tools of observation) used, during experiments, can affect outcomes of experiments.[165] Feyerabend was looking for a theory, which can be applied to compare other theories with, in order to criticize the fallacies included in all theories.[166] He was thus looking for a measurement tool (theory) to measure truth(s). According to my current understanding he was thus searching for truth like Kuhn. I have not seen anything that shows he wanted to give truths, which are personal philosophisings about selves, which benefit societal coherence.

FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method: outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge, chapters 14 to 16 + Appendix 4, chapter 17, appendix 5, chapter 18.

Feyerabend wrote that distinctions between observational actuality and truths about theories should be abolished.[167] His statement, according to my logic, contradicts the previous section of his book because there, I understood him to write that no theory has coherent corresponding truth value. He however wrote there that his philosophy is about a proposed methodology. His philosophy is thus a heuristic and not predominantly descriptive. A heuristic cannot exist without an opinion about description because no descriptions implies no use of language. My conclusion now is thus that in effect Feyerabend promoted deceiving wordly functionalism, like Kuhn. (19 Aug 2014 – Feyerabend does not contradict himself if he meant in the previous section no theory has corresponding truth value and correspondences ecist not, also not with regard to facts. Truth thus did not exist for Feyerabend, it seems. Did he also suffer from Caiaphas syndrome?)

Feyerabend wanted to "confound" observations or descriptions (History of science) with methodology (Philosophy of science).[168] Descriptions cannot have "methodology" because any descriptions sh(c)(w)ould have (had) just one purpose, that is to reflect actuality. Philosophy of science has as purpose, bringing descriptions (History of science) as close as possible to actuality in order to cause more agreement and more societal coherence amongst 'eerlikes' (the-honest). The split between eerlikes and deceivers (wordly functionalists, instrumentalists) into two different communities, cannot be avoided if sustainabilities of A group, for example, citizens of A country, or All eerlikes on Earth, is priority, or All human beings, is priority, or All mammals, or All living things. A distinction between wordly functionalists and eerlikes will show academically, which methodology of description is the most effective.

Feyerabend refers to a "real difference"[169] that has being but he promotes deceiving descriptions. He contradicts himself in that "real difference", he posits in existence.

He compares and confounds[170], one national border (borders due to disagreement), in a posited river with the continuous form of the river, which makes not sense, because borders and rivers are not the same matter in modern history. Before technology made it possible to divide rivers, measurements of actual borders in posited rivers gave wider widths than current widths measured, of posited borders.

Feigl did not accept the confounding between describing and using descriptions, which Feyerabend and Kuhn did, because Feigl argued the distinction is actuality and cannot be avoided.[171] Feyerabend wrote theorizing is deceiving and describing is telling the truth but in fact, the two activities are in conflict because describing happens according to a theory, which is the theory of truth.[172] Feyerabend it seems did not think, that theories of reality, relates not to truths but to searchings for truth, in stead of simple, nominalist logical, givings of truths, for societal coherence.

Feyerabend's problem was that he argued against truths due to psychological Caiaphas syndromes, which incorporated the fallacy of singular nature of A god.

Feyerabend wrote that, justifications of descriptions (truth value), is confounded with description, by their opponents, although, their opponents distinguished between justification and description. He argued that their opponents contradicted themselves.[173] Feyerabend however did not realise, it seems, that honest describing is not really a methodology, but logical necessity, in order to be able to proceed from describing to testing. My previous description therefore, that deceiving and telling truths are two different methodologies, could have been a wordly functionalist statement, and my actions maybe contradicted because whilst writing that wordly functionalism is wrong i made a wordly functionalist statement, because, in fact, telling truths is not A methodology but mere logical necessity. Faiths thus, to stay honest are not theoretical, such faiths are logical necessities. Plato wrote that The concept, truths, are the most actual, because it causes the most precise descriptions, which cause the most correct testing. The problem relates to the difference between faiths and reason. Three steps were identified. Faiths, descriptions and justifications (tests). Faiths to be honest cause precise descriptions, which make theorising (predicting) and testing (experiments) possible. Faiths to stay honest cause reasonable justifications, not the other way round. Realizations about the benefits of truths are more evident when devils require deceits in order to live longer materially and societies are eventually colonized due to lacks of creativities. When honest individuals follow this line of argument and laws protect individuals not sufficiently against gangs of deceivers, who suffer from Caiaphas syndromes, mobs win the argument in the short term, by sacrificing individual creators, but in the long term, societies, including Caiaphaci, are disadvantaged, due to lacks of creativities and eventual colonisations.

Feyerabend compares "intuition" and "experience", without considering the truth Kant mentioned when he wrote that accurate descriptions of experience causes more correct intuition and judgements. More accurate intuitions and judgements cannot be realised without honest experience.[174]

"My main objection is that the distinctions, while pleasing to simple minds, are irrelevant for the running of science and that the attempt to enforce them may arrest progress."[175] Creating, development and progress should be distinguished because development can cause destruction. Creating is responsible actions, which relate to faiths and good judgements. "arrest progress" implies that the "Anomaly of Plato?" is relevent. Plato's anomaly was that he was against continual change but also supported truths, which cause continual change. Feyerabend's anomaly was that on the other hand he wanted continual change but not truth. Continual change cannot take place without truths. The correct position to strive for is The truth and consequential truths which cause continual responsible changes.

"Critical rationalism, which is the most liberal positivistic methodology in existence today, is either a meaningful idea or it is just a collection of slogans (such as 'truth', 'professional integrity', 'intellectual honesty', and so on) designed to intimidate yellow-bellied opponents (for who has the fortitude, or even the insight, to declare that 'truth' might be unimportant, and perhaps even undesirable?)."[176]

"Is it desirable to live in accordance with the rules of critical rationalism?"[177] Feyerabend argues against the "rules" of critical rationalism.[178] What Feyerabend calls "rules" are not rules, its are just logic, which if not respected, will result in failures of societies as wholes.

" 'be honest' – whatever that means"[179]. He did not subscribe to 'that'. It seems the problem Feyerabend experience is due to his involvement in too much. He wrote about behaviour of planets, stars and Einstein and Newton's theories. His subject matters are not within reach of one human's knowledge. Honesties and what truths are become a series problem when academics remove themselves from realities to the extent that Feyerabend did and still need to publish to make a living.

A problem Feyerabend identifies about logical empiricism is that logical empiricism excludes own experiences, which were not gathered under strict laboratory type academic research.[180] Such experiences could be allowed because the experiences could cause, new realizations, new theories or expansions of current theories. If honesties are not a prerequisite, personal experiences, as such can not be included as actualities because fictions can be made up, which could derail the academic process. Possibly Feyerabend had a problem with situations whereby experiences under high war stress conditions, were unacceptable to colleagues due to their experiences under low stress conditions. Different levels of stress change cause and effect as testimonies about miracles proclaim.

Feyerabend opined that critical rationalism will "wipe" science "out".[181] He looked too wide and includes not sciences in his framework. He made me think of carthorses who need blinkers to enforce safe carriage in modernity.

"For what appears as 'sloppiness', 'chaos', or 'opportunism' when compared with such laws has a most important function in the development of those very theories which we today regard as essential parts of our knowledge of nature."[182] Feyerabend's problem was the inclusion of personal experience in academia according to my understanding, because his personal experiences of war are not applicable at academic peaceful conditions.

His problem was also a problem of prioritisation because he wrote reason should be overruled and "eliminated" by passions.[183] I think he means that passions overcame the 'numbers game' in the past, whereby Kuhnian mob justices isolate and exclude innovative work, to the disadvantage of sciences as wholes, but also as one coherent communicable science, which can only be achieved with correspondences as priorities.

His problem is further that he did not regard differences about Kantian space (territoriality) and time or future other conditional discoveries, which could exclude possibilities of making generalisations, in his conception of 'truth'.[184] What he meant was; what is true in one territory and time is not necessarily causally true in another territory or time when correspondences are regarded without wordly functionalisms present.

"And, Reason, at last, joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away ….[Feyerabend's ellipsis]"[185]

Feyerabend refers to atomic theory, which lacked content, but has developed into an acceptable theory to support his argument against opinions that theories should just build on previous theories as bases.[186] The history of atomic theory does not contradict my opposition against ambivalent realism because my argument includes ambivalent realisms as allowable. But, how can ambivalent realisms, which posits not the 'cosmos as cosmos' as datum, be allowed into academia? By publishing and acceptance by societies? That could include mob acceptance of deceiving methodologies. I have no rational answer today.

Whilst reading p.190 I thought that Feyerabend's mistake is primarily his lack of distinction between truths (descriptions) and theories. Basically truths relates to histories and theories to predictions. The 3^rd component is the adhesive between the two. Theories cannot come into existence without truths because truths are the components, which are needed to construct theories. Truths cannot come into sufficient existence without the theory of truths, which opposes mob justice. Without the theory and faiths, which uphold the theory of truths the 'numbers game' will eliminate the theory with resulting stagnation. Popper's extreme opposition against historicism places him with idealists who believe all is in The mind, which is mistaken. Only parts are in minds only. We influence materials and materials influence us. Popper's opposition to historicism however seemed to be an opposition to believes that what could not be achieved in the past shall not be achieved in the future. The thought kept on returning that marketing methodologies of expensive bad quality products and academic methodologies, which give truths, should not be confused. The search for truth is not an academic enterprise, but rather a personal conviction, each subject approaches in a different way. Similarly financing of giving truths and searching for Truth should not be confused.

" '… … [Feyerabend's ellipsis] the direction of science is determined primarily by human creative imagination and not by the universe of facts, that surrounds us.'[188] "[189] Feyerabend did not realise that creativities are dependent on truths and vice versa. Or maybe he did and that is why he tried to erase the border, which distinguishes the two. I think it is because of his ambivalent realist philosophical definition of the word 'truth', without regarding nominalist truths as part of the definition. Maybe he did not make the distinction because sometimes he did refer to validity with "True", "True, science and other increasingly depressing and narrow minded institutions play an important part in our culture, and they occupy the centre of interest for many philosophers (most philosophers are opportunists)."[190]

Feyerabend opined the requirement of "stability" was the basis of Aristotle's philosophy.[191] This opinion opposes the postulate of Popper that Plato's requirement was unreasonable stability, when conjuncted with the idea that Plato and Aristotle had opposing philosophies, which at base level differed. This statement of Feyerabend shows his definition of rationality, he opposed, related to Aristotle's rationality. My feeling that Feyerabend was maybe more in the camp of Plato, than Aristotle could be right. In Plato's The laws at 711a the Athenian (Plato) says, the reason a single benevolent leader institutes the best government and an oligarchy the least best is because a single benevolent leader can allow the "rapid and trouble-free transition", which is needed when progress is required.[192]

Feyerabend was a Nietzschian, Machiavellian philosopher by referring to the acceptance of deceiving functionalisms to attain goals.[193] His case could be a case of not doing what he preached because of his honest nature. His lack of anarchist (deceiving) actions might have contradicted his preaching of anarchism. On the other hand his promotion of deceit could be his deceiving action because he realised that deceiving is a non-sustaining methodology.

Are there only one valid theory; faiths that theories of corresponding truths shall cause survivals of God? All other theories should be known to be not true.

Feyerabend switched between astronomy, art, and Einstein and Newton. What is the link he sees between the different fields of study? The link can only be correspondences between truths (corresponding words) and actualities. Of course "actualities" corresponds to forms of noumena and "forms" corresponds to you-do-not-know-ex-act-ly-what-I-mean (ydnkealwim), due to different definitions for words of definitions for words.

Feyerabend acknowledges the influence of " 'mob psychology' " on research programs and that survival of researchers are at stake. Lakatos referred to " 'mob psychology' ".[194]

Feyerabend argues against "empiricists" because he says facts are vague, but he refers to vague facts, whilst arguing. He did not refer to facts, which are not vague.[197] I also argue against empiricists but do so because they do not distinguish between their opinions and our facts. Basically our argument is the same because vague facts are opinions. The vague facts Feyerabend argues against is what I call opinions, of empiricists, which they regard as facts. It is thus a phsychological argument against empiricists, because they refer to "facts", which are not facts in reality. They are thus not honest, which is the main problem.

Feyerabend states that the word " 'truth' " "has people in a tizzy, but has not achieved much else."[198]

Feyerabend says the first philosopher who constructed a system was "Anaximander who followed Hesiod." I understood his statement, together with the previous pages, that before Anaximander realist thought did not exist. Most events before Anaximander were described by nominalist parts. The descriptions were therefore mainly correspondence. Bottom of the page Feyerabend confirms my view by saying Thales did not try to connect all his observations in one system. According to me Thales was rational because he realised he could not see all of totality to treat "all" as a datum. The idea that Thales connected his observations by a principle was mentioned by Aristotle.[199]

"σοφια" means experise in a certain profession"[200] It is similar to Socrates's views about specialisation.

Feyerabend expands about anthropology.[201] Feyerabend's explanation of anthropology could partly confirm my view about Feyerabend's view about "some individual". Anthropological studies of living people are intrusive and treats other people like animals.

"The concept of an object has changed from the concept of an aggregate of equi-important perceptible parts to the concept of an imperceptible essence underlying a multitude of deceptive phenomena."[203]

During the ancient times in Greece concepts had the same stability in language than nouns about things of matter, for example "dog" and "cat". Conceptual words fitted into the whole of observation each with regards to a specific place and time, strictly interrelated in fixed patterns with all things of matter. Time in language however was flat. After ancient times poets started to use conceptual words loosely, which made time two-dimensional. [204] Solon however, did not appreciate this new form of prose. [205] Tenses probably then started to enter languages.

Somewhere i read or heard that Socrates opposed this attitude of Solon and therefore i assume that Socrates was in line with the new type of writing, which was sophistical (19 Aug 2014 – Today my view in my memory is that somewhere i read that Solon favored poetry and Socrates oposed poetry. I am pretty sure that in Ion, the dialogue Socrates opposed, at least, Ion, who appreciated poetry. A relevant question is whether Socrates opposed poetry and everything relating to it or did he just oppose Ion and Ion's favorite Homer, or what did he oppose. These uncertainties require nominalist truths and objectivity).

With reference to the past Feyerabend wrote: "True, there were no collective excursions to the moon, but single individuals, disregarding great dangers to their soul and their sanity, rose from sphere to sphere to sphere until finally faced God himself in all His splendour while others changed into animals and back into humans again".[206]

"Lawyers show again and again that an expert does not know what he is talking about. Scientists, especially physicians, frequently come to different results so that it is up to the relatives of the sick person (or the inhabitants of a certain area) to decide by vote about the procedure to be adopted."[207]

Science should not be controled by the state, which is a quasi religious institution. [208]

Class by Prof. Coletto on 3 May 2014

Feyerabend's anarchism relates to Dadaism. Dadaism is light and ironic. Feyerabend's work has sophist roots for example from Protagoras. Feyerabend wanted to proceed counter-inductively. It means that hypotheses should counter the accepted theories and facts. "The subject" has theories and paradigms and "facts speak for themselves" (Self: We experience different facts. Why would we agree on theories unless there are shared described facts, which lead to those theories. This statement by Coletto could imply he is looking at only one very wide theory). "The subject" is also the scientific community not necessarily "the individual". The facts, according to Feyerabend are appendices to our theories. "Counter-inductively" thus ignores the facts and currently accepted theories. Feyerabend did not want to proceed from only the past in a straight line, building on only the past.[209]

Feyerabend is not necessarily against the law because he is an "epistemological anarchist". "Objects" has not presuppositons, we create presuppositions and presuppositions relate to subjects.[210]

4de Klas

BOTHA, M.E. 1988. Objectivity under attack: rethinking paradigms in social theory – a survey.

"In the general empirical and positivistic conception of science, science is viewed as an institution for the acquisition of true knowledge about nature."[211]

"The new philosophy of science" threatens the objective functions of language. Incommensurability is the result of attributing corresponding truth value to theories, because when that happens, every theory has an own 'reality' connected to it. Correspondence as part of a theory of truth, dependent on faiths, that give courages to correspond, in opposition to Caiaphas syndromes; and correspondences to actualities, are then not the only truths, because, other theories than the theory of corresponding truths then become idealistic Truth. [212]

History of science supported the views of Feyerabend and Kuhn and contributed to the "appreciable" new outlook onto philosophy of science. Phenomenology and neo-Marxism also contributed to the new outlook.[213]

Kuhn's work was published in an accepted publication of logical positivists.[214] Kuhn could have identified deceiving natures amongst positivists and empiricists, whereby their actions contradicted their basic theory of corresponding truths, as a sign, of a possible coming paradigm shift from Platonic honesties to Aristotelian deceits. A new Middle Age?

The philosophers who initiated the new views about Philosophy of science, like Kuhn and Feyerabend shared an interest in history of science, the recognition of the importance of pre-suppositions and opposition to the formalization of science.[215]

Before the "observational-theoretical distinction", the "cornerstone of the positivist theory of science" started to falter, scientists realised that "Reichenbach's thesis", which posited justification the sole purpose of science, was lacking. The idea started that the ascent and descent of theories should be traced.[216]

This new philosophy of science emphasises the backgrounds and especially the languages of scientists. The Philosophy of science thus investigates the context in which scientists work. Observations and meanings of facts are influenced by the presuppositional theories of individual scientists and groups of scientists.[217]

Kuhn started using "exemplars" in stead of paradigm to indicate the solutions, which students encounter at the beginning when studying. Kuhn insisted that scientists can use only one set of exemplars or paradigm at a time. Scientists using a different paradigm will however see the same facts as scientists using a previous paradigm.[218] This seem very different from Feyerabend who wanted different beliefs to be represented in science.

It was a very important change for Philosophy of science when recognitions of the effects of historical beliefs as presuppositions took place, to determine how presuppositional beliefs affected facts. This new realisation was initially an attack on the concept, 'True' or in other words 'the "standard view of science" '. Kuhn's work influenced sociology substantially.[219]

Michael Polanyi, a lecturer of Kuhn, made a vehement attack on the "false separation between facts and value and the relations between facts and theories. … to make to sharp a distinction between fact and value, and subject and object."[220]

Western Sociology is in crisis due to oppositions between "freedom" (deceits, ambivalent realism) and "objectivity" (honesties, ambivalent nominalism).[221] "Sociological universals" and "the nature of scientific theories" are the two most important problems with regard to the "crisis of sociology".[222] These two problems Botha identified hides the first distinction of the problem, which is the opposition between deceiving methodologies and honest methodologies.

Adorno posited that the way social sciences gather facts leads to alienation of people. Reason being that opinions gathered takes not the circumstantial causes of the opinions into consideration. Adorno's opinion is in opposition to Popper's who claimed no theory is immune to criticism. Science is dependent on theories, which can withstand critique. Habermas differed from Hans Albert, a student of Popper, because Habermas put more emphasis on societal determining factors.[223] A difference between Adorno and Habermas on a side and Popper and Albert on another side is their views about 'historicism'.

"Functionalism was a sociology of order, but it was now confronted with the problem of change."[224] The neo-Marxists tried to fix the ' "broken-marriage" ', caused by the positivist empiricists.[225] What did Botha mean? She had two distinct sexes in mind and a marriage between the two, it is however not clear whether objectivity for her meant male, female, or overarching attributes nor whether freedom meant male, female or overarching attributes. She made not a clear choice between freedom and objectivity, however, it seems, she leaned over to the side of freedom and disorder, which i conjuncts with unsustainabilities. She argues against "presupposed cosmological homogeneity", which could be compared with my arguments against ambivalent realism. She posited a "false dichotomy", between "theoretical and practical reason", posited by Kant.[226] Botha required a synthesis between theory and practice, which i also promotes.[227] Her rejection of Kant and acceptance of a "Christian, normative direction within the social sciences"[228] is however problematic currently, because my understanding is that Kant provided the synthesis she requires. According to my current understanding many people just need to cross a psychological barrier inherent to Caiaphas syndromes to identify the synthesis provided by Kant. My opinion however is based on reading only Critique of pure reason.

Wolterstorff contributed with his work on the relationship between "faith and theory".[229] My current distinctions, for understanding, are, amongst, faiths, theory and facts. Faiths and theory can however be combined if only one valid theory of truths, which enhances clearer communications of facts, is postulated.

COLETTO, R. 2008. The “eclipse” of the object of research in late-modern philosophy of science: causes and possible remedies.

"Truths" are not necessities. According to Strauss nominalists place 'the "locus ordinis" ' (the "place order"[230]) "in the object" and subjectivists place the same "in the human subject of knowledge".[231] "The nominalist maintains that the only "things" that exist are individuals and universals are simply nomina (i.e. names) which exist only in the language or in the concepts of the subject of knowledge."[232]

Do "subjects of knowledge" refer to academic fields and "the subject of knowledge" and "the object" to "Christ" the "Son", with posited absolute knowledge in tact about "Him"? Author prefers due recognitions of plural forms; "truths", "subjects" and "objects"; truer reflections of actualities about phenomenal forms in minds and noumena in forms outside of minds.

"The realist, on the contrary, acknowledges the existence of universals as ontological components of the world." Firstly ontological realism accepts existences of universals, whereas ontological nominalism (cf. secondly epistemological "idealism", thirdly "anti-realism" and fourthly "scientific anti-realism") accepts not existences of Platonic forms. Coletto prefers the term "late-modern" in stead of the word "postmodern" because "modernity" is not over yet.[233]

Coletto made "Popper's realism" a heading.[234] "Realism" could be meant similar to my term "true realism".

Popper accepts the existences of universals but rejects the Platonic forms as absolutely united. Popper emphasised the existences of natural physical laws, which he equates with universals. Social laws however were, for Popper different signs of different times. Popper's realism posited universal laws important but not of ultimate importance, but nominalism accepts not laws.[235] Popper tried to synthesise objects in nature and subjects' understandings about those objects but did Popper's view can be improved upon because Popper had an unbalanced view in faour of objectivism.[236] However, Popper was balanced towards realism against nominalism.[237]

Michael Polanyi had a more realistic view, for accepting the existence of "the subject of knowledge". He refers not to a "universal order" or universal standard we ought to submit to. The universal standards are situated "in itself" and "we" commit to "them" with "universal intent".[238] "Commitment" is the central idea Polanyi posits, that places "the subject" with his knowledge first and foremost in his mind. Popper posited existence of knowledge without humans knowing, emphasing "the object".[239]

Kuhn distinguished Kant's phenomena and noumena. His distinction of noumena was however a singular being ("world") in itself where Kant posited different noumena for each type of material. Kuhn opined that the objective world stays constant but due to categorical changes of a priori subconscious identifications, the posteriori science changes with revolutionary shifts. A priori categories are more varied from time to time and between subjects in Kuhn's philosophy than in Kant's. Before 1979 Kuhn distinguished between form and unknown substance but after 1979 substance became less acknowledged. Where Kant distinguished amongst much phenomena Kuhn distinguished amongst phenomenal worlds. Objects are smaller in Kant's philosophy than the objects of Kuhn.[240]

Feyerabend's anarchism makes one expect a nominalist lawless approach but he however supported realism in Volume 1 of his Philosophical Papers.[241] Coletto places Feyerabend's "realism" of his Philosophical Papers preferable above "instrumentalism". Feyerabend's "anarchism" implies the co-existence of opposing theories. Feyerabend opposed ambivalent realism, which cannot be identified objectively as true or false and is therefore mere instrumentalist opinions, which are forced down onto others to favour the enforcers' powers.[242]

Collins posited different scientific communities with different languages. Each community has an own a priori set of categories, they establish in an idealistic manner similar to the idealism of Hume, which posited that causes could be the result of minds in contrast to cause and effect due to interactions between materials.[243]

Descartes placed the "locus ordinis" in "the subject" (thinkers) with a nominalist approach. The nominalist emphases of objects or things with "the subject of knowledge" the origin of knowledge, cause dichotomies in minds. "The dichotomy" and disappearance of "the object" is experienced through nominalism.[244] Experiences of dichotomies and disappearances of objects by ambivalent realists, which they blame on nominalism, have however origins in a search for one reality. The relativists posit different scientific communities due to different a priori categories but yet they contradict themselves by believing they are thinking one reality. "The subject of knowledge" is The self in each relativist, although they do not like to distinguish between bodies and souls.

Plato and Aristotle agreed on the existence of universals but they differed on the place universals were situated. For Plato universals were represented by forms, separate from the world and for Aristotle, Plato's forms were transferred into the world. Aristotle denied the independent existences of forms in a place, separate from the world.[245]

Scientific knowledge aims to know universals therefore nominalist views cannot bridge the gap between experiences of individual things and the universals.[246] According to my understandings true nominalisms combined with true realisms are better methodologies than ambivalent realisms or ambivalent nominalisms. In order to form scientific knowledges, accepting the fact that "all" cannot be a datum leads to acceptances of truths. Rational hypotheses about universals stay just extrapolations from observations, which we accept until proven wrong or until falcified. Ontological existence of correct epistemological knowledge is dependent on truths because truths are recognised eventually in agreements amongst thinkers. Without agreements cooperation is dependent on authoritarian instillment of fears. Universality is an aim of knowledge but positing responsible universality is dependent on acceptances that universality stays separate of us and cannot be a singular datum of scientific experiments. Universality is situated through subjects (thinkers) of knowledge and subjects (fields) of knowledge but will never be experienced in itself as a form with noumenon content. Universality is more substantial than noumena because noumena refers to the contents of material forms, which sciences investigate and through scientific progress, noumena are reduced with new formulations of new phenomenal experiences.

The opaqueness of "the object" is situated at ideas about the individual character of things. The removal of the universal essences of classes or kinds cause the nominalist problem which limits normal science. Ambivalent realism did not solve the problem of 'the elusive object' sufficiently.[247]

The aim of science is "the universal order for reality". This aim can be practiced by not distinguishing between "the subject of knowledge" and "the object". Coletto rightly asks if this aim for describing "the universal order", which structures our environment is "knowable".[248] I agree with Coletto that order is necessary but we differ about "corresponding truth", which, according to me is a plural concept, truths and, which are necessities for accurate descriptions; can only be attained via faiths that give courages to be honest. Caiaphas syndromes, which are grounded in the belief that one man can be the sole representative for God hinders necessary corresponding truths. The negative effects are especially visible in social sciences, where sacrifices of creators are common place, due to non-recognition of Caiaphas syndromes. The problem is partly because Caiaphas syndrome is a societal sickness, against order and laws, for "freedom" (freedom to deceive), which is dependent on group behaviour. Currently psychologists and the medical world diagnose not groups but only individuals, sometimes honest individuals, who become "sick" due to struggles between deceivers and the-honest.

Ambivalent realism stressed universals to the detriment of acknowledging individualities and nominalism stressed individualities to the detriment of recognising universals. Reformational philosophy posits individualities and universals important.[249] "Conceptualism lies midway between out-and-out nominalism, holding that nothing is common to objects except our applying the same words to them, and any realism which sees universals as existing independently of us and our abilities."[250]

"The link" between 'sophistical' (sophisticated) and honest epistemologies and "the link between universality and individuality" at ontological levels "are" objects of studies for recognitions of reality.

According to a paraphrase of Troost's (1994) work: 'A few "imperatives" or universal laws were formulated, which most people could agree to, however ' "positivists" ' of the time, of whom many were sophists, opposed laws, which were not universal because "nature of man" was not a universal concept. Sophists wanted positive laws, which could be generalized as good to all people. Problem was, they did not know of criteria or did not respect criteria of universality for laws.'[251]

According to Hart's reformational philosophy "universality and individuality" are not "entities" but are regarded as "traits of everything that exists". Dooyeweerd's reformational philosophy posited knowledge of "individualities" possible. He distinguished an opposition between "naïve" logical nominalist recognitions and sophistical theoretical 'realistic' knowledge(s). Dooyeweerd's realism is based on abstractions of modal aspects.[252] Ambivalent realism posits 'all' as a datum, which is not possible, as shown by Popper.

According to Stafleu "theoretical thinking" can be described as nominalist specialist recognition of only certain aspects within conceptual modular or aspectual knowledge.[253] Irrational philosophers however want to discard the logical aspect, which ought to be applicable at 'all' aspects.

Reformational philosophy hypothesise that "knowing the universal side of reality" is possible.[254] This hypothesis of reformational philosophy implies disbelief in miracles and is irreligious because existences of miracles, nullified any hypothesis, which includes the word 'all'; the sentence part, "miracles nullify any hypothesis, which includes the word 'all' ", is a contradiction, and is self referentially incoherent (Dooyeweerd), but that is where faiths to be honest and where logic and dependence of sciences on accurate descriptions play roles. There are however some generalisations, which are made humanely, which cannot be proven false for example "nobody is perfect", which relates to Christian beliefs about mercy.

According to Botha the metaphor, 'True', being partly God and being the ' "root-metaphor" ' for scientific discovery, are religious and linguistic identifications of necessity. Other theories are also metaphors according to her.[255] I think that the ' "root-metaphor" ' is the "really real" (Venter, 2012:144) of Plato, more real than observations and descriptions about forms of physical matter, which placed Aristotle in opposition with Plato. The really real includes noumena and the realisation we cannot know 'all' or take 'all' and therefore 'maximum profit' prices, are not beneficial for societies' coherence. Aristotle posited deceiving, the sign of a knowledgeable man, without realising the negative effects deceiving has on society. The search for scientific 'Truth' was Aristotle's métier and gifts of scientific truths, Plato's fort. Other theories than the ' "root-metaphor" ' are metaphors of true realism.

"The realist" places "the law" in "the object" and "the nominalist" places laws in "the subject". According to Coletto, Van Riessen identified the nominalist idea of "the human as creator and law giver of his own world", partly the reason for irrationality.[256] Nominalist stoic ideas relate more to honest humans, being creators and parts of God than relating to a singular human conception of 'Christ' or 'Messiah' and the root, as far as i can see, for the ' "eclipse of the object" ' can be identified in own Caiaphas syndromes, which cause sacrificing of parts of God. An example to think about when explaining the effects of Caiaphas syndromes on science, is hypothetical reactions, idealist and materialist scientists have about effects of poisons. Saint John of the Book of Revelation for example thought that poisonings are such common occurrences that its will cause the end of the world when 'the man' shall overcome being poisoned.

COLETTO, R. 2008a. When the “paradigms” differ: scientific communication between skepticism and hope in recent philosophy of science.

Baudrillard acknowledged the anti-social effects of deceits.[257] His identifications support the view that paradigms exist and are identified through at least two paradigms, namely deceiving functionalist methodologies and honest methodologies. These two paradigms cannot be combined in scientific terms due to the dialogic nature of academia. If cultural inclinations exist that other academics will deceive to gain a privileged position, naturally, causes will be separations amongst schools. Conversions of ones' selves and joining the opposition is the only way, if a need to overcome the division exists, whilst considering Blaise Pascal's mathematical reasonings about eternity.

Dooyeweerd however opined that the "order for creation" combines honest and deceiving scientists in a communal scientific process because creating is accessible to all.[258] Without having studied Dooyeweerd's philosophy, it implies that Dooyeweerd and Calvinist reformational philosophy has not identified the impossibility of creating with inaccurate functionalist descriptions, when ideas are not imparted from creators, to compensate for lacks of own creativities. Due to the current common ownership of ideas, imparting of ideas was instituted in state constitutions as a human right. Infringements on creators' intequities could become necessities to survive with the Calvinist reformational interpretation of religion, because real long term effects about religious sacrificings, which lead to colonisations are not identified to its full possible extent. Without being isolated from deceiving scientists, positivist doctrines are logical conclusions that make effective science possible. Positivist sciences, ones can argue, were caused by deceiving methodologies and were necessities to counter act deceits and functionalism. Ambivalent realists are not honest because not being able to posit totality as datum is psychological honesty. Nominalists can however be honest whilst building coherent understandings of the world and whilst adding corresponding components to their memories, which in part, corresponds with totality. Nominalist parts can be combined in wider understandings about totality. Ways to more truthful knowledge is thus closer to nominalist honesties than to realist deceits. Laws, inherent to the Greek word part "nom" of "nomos", indicate a close interaction between nominalism and laws, whether that relates to natural law or to written law, i am not sure. I have however experienced that the promotors of deceit through Christian freedoms, are more prone to sacrifing creators and more prone to ignoring written laws, relating to common law criminal assault, extortion, crimen injuria and poisoning and also relating to my long term conception of natural law.

According to Dooyeweerd, truths about causes for creativities could iron out the religious differences between scientists. The only antithesis to be barred is the group religious antithesis against, probably honesties or was it individualist antitheses against deceiving?[259] Antitheses against deceits for creativities looks like our best hope for combining different cultures into schools for cooperation. Realisations that creating, competence and cooperation are dependent on most accurate descriptive work, which respect others' physical and mental labour, could do the trick.

Empiricists said descriptions are independent from any theories, which is not true because of the important effect of presuppositions and because observations are based on instruments, which presuppose certain theories.[260]

Dooyeweerd identified two ' "poles" ' or paradigms in "the humanist ground motive". Its are "the ideal of the free creativity of the knowing subject (which gradually gained the primacy during the 20^th century)" and "the nature-pole (inspiring positivism and leading to the idea of "neutral" facts)". The "nature-pole" means incommensurabilities exclude cooperations amongst peoples with different frameworks.[261]

All Ancient Greek nouns are masculine, feminine or neuter. For people, supernatural beings, and animals, the grammatical gender is often the same as the actual gender: men, boys, and male animals are masculine, while women, girls, and female animals are feminine. There are exceptions, though, and many things that have no gender in English are grammatically masculine or feminine in Ancient Greek. Although there are a few rules and patterns(suffixes often have their own inherent gender, for example), there's usually no apparent reason for which grammatical gender a noun has if it's not referring to people, supernatural beings, or animals.

The grammatical gender and case of nouns is reflected in the grammatical gender and case of the adjectives and articles accompanying them. For instance, for nominative singular nouns, the articles can be masculine ὁ, feminine ἡ or neuter τό. In the first and third declensions, grammatical genders of the nouns may be distinguished through their different declined forms. However, in the second declension, the masculine and feminine forms have all the same declined forms, but you can tell the gender by the articles or adjectives that go with them. The first declension comprises only masculine and feminine nouns.

Examples: ἀνήρ (anēr, “man”), πατήρ (patēr, “father”), πούς (pous, “foot, leg”)

COLETTO, R. 2009. The progress of scientific knowledge: evolution, revolution or involution?

Since the Enlightenment, belief in human progress due to trust in science, increased gradually and religious activities lost ground. The industrial revolution did not cause only progress but also human social problems. The two world wars of the 20^th century, which made use of scientific discoveries, caused pain and disaster. Concomitantly Popper as philosopher of science started to doubt that progress could be always counted a result of scientific developments. He however stayed positive about benefits of "progress". Kuhn asked whether scientists are not more ' "ignorant" ' during current times due to more puzzles scientists are trying to solve.[263]

Popper identified two possible changes humans can undergo; progress and regress, depending on our actions. Progress, for Popper, is a result of a critical outlooks, which falsify theories. "According to Popper we can gradually aproximate the truth. We will never reach absolute perfection, the truth or any final point, but we can progress." The critical tradition, which finds answers to "problems", pioneered by the Greeks is the correct methodology for progress according to Popper.[264]

According to Popper, "verisimilitude" refers to degrees of truths between actualities and phenomena, which should not be confused with probabilities. The different degrees of correspondences for different theories can be determined and compared, in order to constitute the more correct theories. According to Coletto Popper posited approximations to "the truth".[265] Author thinks Popper had honest corresponding truths in mind and not "the truth"; author including the term "the truth" as part of 'realisms', which opposes nominalism.

Kuhn's view is understood with his distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Kuhn's identified aims for normal science is ' "puzzle-solving" ' and revolutionary science has ' "exploration" ' as aim. Kuhn asked: ' "does a field make progress because it is a science or is it a science because it makes progress?" '[266] Nonsensical questions? ' "does a field make progress because it is a science" '? A field (science) can obviously regress like Popper wrote, therefore the answer is no. ' "is it [a field] a science because it makes progress?" ' Again, sciences can regress like Popper wrote, therefore sciences do not necessarily progress. The answer is no. Two negations and "or" between the two questions are nonsensical.

Kuhn highlighted effects of revolutionary science for enlightenments about "progress". Kuhn wrote revolutionary changes bring not our understandings closer to "the truth"[267] Author agrees that Kuhn had "the truth"; his truth of his realism in mind. A problem with regards to the discourse about Popper and Kuhn is that they had not the same idea in minds when the "ts" of "truths" and of "the truth" entered their minds. Their root-presuppositions thus differed, which placed them in different fields. To resolve the oppositions in the discourse, agreement should be sought at their root-presuppositions, as far as it can be identified and be agreed upon. Popper had a nominalist polytheistic kind of corresponding truths in his mind and Kuhn had a monotheistic thought of philosophical realism that relates to 'The Messiah' or 'The Christ' in his mind. Therefore the imression was formed that Kuhn accused Popper that Popper thinks he is 'The Christ'. Popper however explicitly wrote that he believed not in existence of one "the truth". Kuhn's thoughts relate more to philosophy of sociological opinions, people can agree on when they are irrational and Popper's thoughts relate more to philosophies about facts, people can agree on when they describe observations correspondingly. Irrationalism, which is subject to the numbers game of democracy, relate to ambivalent realisms' measurement of "the truth"; is based on overpowering force by larger numbers of people, inherent to democratic decisions, against minorities. Correspondences relate to nominalism with external measurements of truths people can agree to, due to external (phenomenal) reference points. Truths here relate more to scientific forces, in for example, innovative products, which sway decisions of democratic majorities.

A 1970 publication, The structure of scientific revolutions, of Kuhn's work, described his opinion that revolutions represent not necessarily progress.[268] Author too would prefer to not generalise that all revolutions are progress due to conservative uses of the word 'all'.

After 1970 Kuhn started to scale down his previous identifications of discontinuity between times due to revolutions and identified shared contingencies amongst times, for example more precise measurements, contingent on improved instruments. He however did not accept that we get closer to "the truth" as time goes on.[269] Kuhn's view of progress is sceptic. The ability to solve more puzzles in wholes can be regarded as progression or regression in Kuhn's views.[270] Progress by cultures as parts of a whole and consequentially by that whole, can cause regression of a culture, another part of that whole.

"The goal of science" is topical in philosophy of science because Feyerabend wrote Kuhn identified not "the goal" and Stafleu wrote Feyerabend identified not "the goal". In Consolation for the specialist Feyerabend (1970) wrote "the happiness and the full development of an individual human being is now as ever the highest possible value." A gradual change can be identified from Popper's ' "search for truth" ' to Kuhn's ' "puzzle-solving" ' to Feyerabend's ' "happiness of the individual" '.[271] Due to the paradigmatic different presuppositions of Popper and Kuhn for example the change Coletto identifies could be not "change", but rather differences between parallel paradigms, which coexist in time. "The happiness" and "the full development" of "an individual" could be mutually exclusive from a stoic, nominalist point of view, during the "development".

Feyerabend, Kuhn and Polanyi opined that ' "short-term" ' progress for example "a new discovery" is not rational because they emphasise fortuitous discoveries.[272] Did they recognise that most scientific discoveries today are dependent on rational pre-knowledge and much study hours? How many observations of Copernicus lead him to his heliocentric hypothesis? Any hypothesis has to be based on something, even if it is an irrational sentence with words, which is based partly on language and symbols of an alphabet or other symbolic system.

Feyerabend postulated "arrogance claims of reason", whilst eliminating pre-knowledge from his view of new theories' developments. He regarded different theories in time connected almost like a chain, in two dimensions and two directions. The linked parts of the chain of his analogy represent the links between theories. The old theory's parts' linking parts, are however distorted to fit into the new theories vision. He intermingled scientific and non-scientific knowledge.[273]

Feyerabend is a postmodern philosopher, which regards irrationalism a methodology for success. His view is of a regressive part of the world, which regresses due to 'scientific' developments. Although he has only nominalist parts of his whole in view he regards his view as a whole of realism.[274] Feyerabend's philosophy raises a question; what link did Feyerabend notice between Greek art, modern science and many varied fields? A logical link could have been correspondences to actualities. If correspondences to actualities were the coherent links he observed, Feyerabend was closer to a nominalist than to a realist. His extreme nominalism then provided him with one of the most coherent views of actuality, similar to that of Nietzsche, who's view of ugly actualities eventually directed his writings to irrational unscientific views.

Dooyweerd's view are understood in the light of poles of society. Nature versus culture/freedom; 'reason' versus materialism/historicism. Nature represents honest truths identified in 'correspondending' phenomena with actualities, which lead to stoic happiness. Freedoms are represented by humanist mercy, inherent to bending 'the truth' for sophistical happiness. 'Reason' represents ideas that, humans decide their future, as opposed to, materialism/historicism/determinism, which posit 'the truth' who has to understand 'he' lives at their mercy; bending 'the truth' to ascertain a better life for themselves, by imparting 'his' ideas.[275]

The historicist movement emphasises determinism and materialism in order to show that humans are utterly dependent on their conditions. This materialist idea could depreciate powers of human reason to improve their conditions. When historic views are irratioanally posited as causes for an unrelenting downward spiral for society then hope is erased or all hope is placed in 'the truth', which exist not. 'The truth' becomes the enemy, without realising that selves are subject to corresponding truths, a concept, which gave humans real freedom to structure their environments by creating.[277] Creating gives free time to enjoy 'recreational' activities, for example sport and art.

Coletto's reformational philosophy holds the following multidimensional view of reality, similar to Stafleu's. Stafleu identified three dimensions, which Dooyeweerd identified. The ' "upward" z-axis' represent natural laws and what is ' "subject-ed" ' to those laws each at an extreme pole on the z-axis. This axis raises the question over the origin of laws, which, opinions of, indicate religious beliefs. Christian views are that laws are discovered as natural laws and are not given by humans. The y-axis makes the distinction between universal (realism) and individual (nominalism) interpretations. The x-axis, which recede away from us or proceed towards us is the latest contribution of the modalities, which require a wide spectral view of that reality before science can give representative theories.[278]

Focusing on Dooyeweerd's modalities Stafleu rationally distinguish between retro-cipation and anti-cipation. Retro-cipation happens when a higher modality for example truths retrocipate to a lower modality for example aesthetic appreciation. Anticipation happens when cultures progress from, for example, aesthetic appreciations to a higher modality.[279] According to Stafleu revolutionary science is not as unscientific an enterprise as Kuhn posited. Revolutionary science according to Stafleu is recognised by identifying primarily the lower modalities ascribed to the discovery. Paradigms then form when additional modalities for new discoveries are abstracted and researched.[280]

According to Kuhn and Feyerabend paradigm changes imply that observational empirical data of a previous paradigm will have to be reinterpreted according to the new paradigm's different presuppositions. The reformational attitude allows for more continuity (relativity) with change (deepening) whereby previous theories are built upon by researching new aspects observed. The observance of new aspects (modalities) expands the understandings about specific theories, without rejecting theories outright. Meanings of previous aspects identified, become clearer due to the interactions by law with the newly anticipated or retrocipated aspects.[281]

Coletto concludes that the sceptic attitude towards progress is caused by the stabilities, which set cultures sometimes prefer to change.[282]

COLETTO, R. 2011. Science and non-science: the search for a demarcation criterion in the 20th century.

According to some positivists like Comte, for example, sociology and ethics are also sciences. Such sciences should however use positivist methods before they qualify as sciences.[283] A serous question is thus relevant. What methods could be used to make reliable scientific conclusions.[284]

For Popper demarcation was central to the problem to distinguish between science and non-science. He believed that no theory can be proven ' "true" in a final sense'. He rejected the verification criterion of the positivists as truth. We can only approach and come closer to truth.[285]

Popper argued that no theory can be proven true because "all" with regard to history and the future cannot be a datum. There is no certainty that an observation in the future will not refute "all" historical observations. Popper distinguished science from non-science according to falsification. As long as theories can be falsified by observations and are "open to refutation", theories can qualify as parts of science. "Non-scientific conjectures, theories, views cannot be refuted."[286] This raises a question about the difference between theories and logic because logic says that we can only create from, partly, pre-knowledge if that pre-knowledge is corresponding truths. Science has not advanced to a stage in which wooden tables can be crafted from plastic. It was however posited on the Internet that some day materials will be interchangeable, which will raise serious rethinking about materials. We will then ask, if the predictions become true, what is "wood" and what is "plastic" and language use will be more directly time based.

Refutation however needs universal laws as background to base comparisons on. Popper believed social 'laws' exist not scientifically and he regarded only ' "physical laws" ' as ' "laws of nature" '. Social laws according to Popper are ' "trends and patterns" '. Popper used the statement ' "all living things die when exposed to intense heat" ', including gods and goddesses, whilst deliberating about "Giordano Bruno's death on the stake", to motivate why social sciences should use universal natural laws. "Why would physical dispositions be more real than physical dispositions? And why should historians pay attention to the individual Julius Caesar or to the unique English Revolution? Is it not because (only insofar as) they belong to culturally relevant categories like those of “dictators”, or revolutions?"[288]

"Popper argues that it is impossible to attain complete verification, but is it possible to have complete falsification? Popper himself admits that it is not possible: is this not a fatal blow to the whole criterion?"[289] The discourse is related to societal conceptions about 'singularity of God' and miracles and 'all humans' and 'god'. Problematically psychology and psychiatry, for examples, presuppose, without confirmation that some patients think they are the 'One and only' 'Christ' or 'Messiah'. Almost certainly Bruno was also accused of thinking he is 'Christ' or 'Messiah' and dialogical discussions about Daniel who was thrown in a fire and walked out unscathed makes not scientifically part of the discourse, but is relevant. Why would people like Kuhn sacrifice "innocent" scientists, and sway societies' approvals and succeed, by accusations that men think each they are "God"? Societal Caiaphas syndromes explain the phenomena, which all Christians were taught about, but, because of singularity syndromes most Christians know not truths and is blind with 'the truth'.Popper wrote: "The sceptic, who first doubted the absolute truth of our knowledge, is in turn compelled to explain this (absolute) concept of truth as anthropomorphic. But what he still doubts can now no longer be expressed; for it is evident that even the concept of doubt presupposes the concept of truth."[290]

"According to deductivist empiricism too, the thesis that natural laws can never be [demonstrably] true is equivalent to the thesis that we have no possible empirical (and certainly no a priori) justification for asserting the existence of universal states of affairs.

(We can, therefore, only assert the existence of those states of affairs that can be represented by singular statements; that is, only the existence of singular states of affairs.)

On the question whether or not experiential, empirical universal states of affairs exist, deductivism is in agreement with logical positivism: both answer this question in the negative.[291]"[292]

"We already know that only singular empirical statements can, in principle, be verified and falsified, whereas strictly universal empirical statements are, in principle, only falsifiable.

These properties can be used in order to distinguish, with sufficient precision, between singular and strictly universal empirical statements. To this end, however, it is above all necessary to define more precisely the expressions “in principle verifiable” and “in principle falsifiable”. For without such a definition, the statement “Singular empirical statements are, in principle, verifiable and falsifiable” would be ambiguous. Its wording could be so understood as to make it permissible for one and the same statement to be both true and false. Similarly, the statement “Universal empirical statements are in principle only falsifiable” could be misinterpreted as stating that universal empirical statements can, in principle, only be false.

I propose, therefore, the following more precise definition: the phrase “in principle verifiable” is to be understood as saying that no logical reasons stand in the way of empirical verification.

The statement “Singular empirical statements are, in principle, verifiable and falsifiable” is to be understood as saying that no logical reasons stand in the way of empirical verification or falsification of singular empirical statements. Similarly, “Universal empirical statements are, in principle, only falsifiable” is to say that experience can, for logical reasons, decide only their falsity but never their truth.

No logical statement justifies our saying a priori that universal empirical statements are false (otherwise they themselves would be logical contradictions, and experience could in no way decide them); we can, however, say a priori that their truth cannot be demonstrated by experience."[293]

Polanyi includes pre-scientific truths (correspondending "tacit" truths) in his conceptions of scientific knowledge by distinguishing between "implicit" (tacit) and "explicit" "focal" knowing. Ones rely on the tacit component to understand scientific knowledge. Implicit knowing is "subsidiary" to explicit scientific knowledge.[294]

"Summing up, the distinction between focal and subsidiary awareness informs the demarcation criterion between science and non-science." For Polanyi "however", "tacit" knowledge refers to 'nominalist' honest identifications of parts of totality. [295] This view of Polanyi is similar to Kant's view who posited that fair judgement abilities are built up with honest phenomenal identifications of parts in the world.

The view of Polanyi is problematic to Coletto. Coletto asked how, if pre-scientific truths (nominalism) is integrated with scientific truth (realism), can a demarcation criterion exist.[296] Intequinism posits that the demarcation criterion is explained by faiths (metaphysics) and rationality (physics). Rationalities are results of honest identifcations of parts, which are results of faiths. Without faiths, humans are not able to make honest 'nominalist' identifications of actualities, in order to build most reliable conceptions of realities (true realism). Popper implied that corresponding truths are the first principle of science or the most important presuppositions of reliable sciences in The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge edited by Hansen (2012).

For Kuhn the demarcation criterion relates to the difference between "normal science" and "revolutionary science". Revolutionary scientific realisations are rare and after proliferation of revolutionary theories those theories enter normal scientific processes. The borders are then set like for a "puzzle" and scientists solve and refine new puzzles that revolutions in science brought about. Revolutionary science for Kuhn relates to metaphysics, which Popper incudes as parts of science as wholes. Kuhn acknowledged that metaphysics are part of science but, usually, he excluded metaphysics from science.[297] Kuhn's exclusion of metaphysics cannot be compared with Kant's way of excluding metaphysics because Kant would have argued that revolutionary sciences are also subject to copyrights, like 'normal science', where Kuhn argued revolutionary scientists have not copyrights due to the metaphysical nature of revolutionary science. Kuhn thus vehemently, was indoctrinated to believe in One creator, Who causes all 'creative' work.

Kuhn placed more importance than Popper on understanding the psychological philosophic theological historical issues, which influence us in our scientific work. Kuhn regarded objective honesties as dogmatism and wanted to include in science the psychological relativist issues of the human sciences. The identification of the psychological factors was for Kuhn identification of reality.[298]

Feyerabend's views on demarcation can be understood in the context of "tenacity" and "proliferation". 'Tenacity' refers to the support of old theories (normal science) and 'proliferation' refers to the proliferation of old theories.[299] Logically 'proliferation' refers in Feyerabend according to Coletto, to actions of 'revolutionary scientists', whereby they spread existing knowledge to all. Tenacity refers to 'normal scientists', who protects exisiting knowledge from proliferation to all. Copyrights normally expires about 50 years after deaths of copyrightholders, therefore 'revolutionary scientists' are acting more in line with laws. Author is not sure about Feyerabend's views because sometimes it seems Feyerabend is more in line with Popper and at other times more in line with Kuhn. It seems however if Feyerabend could have been misinterpreted because Feyerabend's anarchism refers, maybe, more to proliferation of existing 'normal' knowledge, for which copyrights have expired long ago and 'tenacity' in Feyerabend's thesis, maybe, refers more to creators' courages to keep on creating whilst being excluded from scientific societies by Caiaphaci.

Coletto supports the above view of Feyerabend's work by author by opining that Feyerabend did not distinguish between normal and revolutionary science,[300] like Popper did not. This opinion thus places Feyerabend closer to Popper than to Kuhn in the discourse.

Other modern philosophies of science asks if the demarcation problem is non-existent. Those philosophers emphasise the language aspects of science.[301] This view supports the intequinism's that, demarcation problems relate to honesties and deceits and two different scientific groups, within groups, caused by two different methodologies. In classic philosophies Aristotle represented deceiving methodologies and Plato represented honest methodology.

With reference to Danie Strauss, Dooyweerd and Clouser, Coletto discussed Strauss's identification of an existing demarcation criteria between naïve and scientific knowledge. Where naïve knowledge refers first to objects, scientific knowledge refers first to aspects or modalities. The broadness of abstraction in scientific knowledge is wider than at naïve knowledge. The aspects contribute another level of identification according to Clouser.[302] Author thinks there is partly truths in this view of Strauss and Coletto but the view acknowledges not that aspectual views also refer to objects and can therefore not be separated as two types of science, it is rather an expansion from naïve identification to scientific identification. The expansion holds however dangers to societies when scientific knowledges are used to sophistically mislead. At roots we cannot get away from identifying objects. Objects are grouped to be viewed via aspects and generalisations about the ojects in aspects.

COLETTO, R. 2013. The re-appreciation of the humanities

The positivist "royal way" to include the social sciences as scientific was to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the "humanities".[304]

The " 'father of positivism' ", Comte, regarded sociology at the beginning of all sciences, followed in ascending order by, biology, chemistry, physics, astronomy and mathematics. Comte did not regard law and history, scientific. Philosophy was not science for positivists. They called philosophy " 'metaphysics' ", and the term non-science is also used. Social 'scientists' of the previous two centuries, like Dilthey, Rickert and Weber posited philosophical realist "nomothetic" methods suitable for natural sciences and nominalist "ideographic" methods for social sciences.[305]

Author agrees not with Coletto's descriptions of Popper's work, because Popper did not want humans to be used as objects. Coletto stated Popper wanted to use the same methods in natural and social sciences. Kuhn realised that psychology plays an important role in natural sciences.[306] It seems however that Kuhn and his followers posited a specific type of psychological influence, a paradigm, without wanting to allow debate. Feyerabend stated that Kuhn had an 'authoritarian' approach. 'Authoritarian', however is not a true word because all authors are not authoritarian. Authoritarianism is dependent on group behaviour.

Lakatos who appreciated Popper, believed not that falsification demarcates science from non-science, like Popper did. Lakatos distinguished between progressive and regressive research programs. He did not posit a strong criteria for demarcation. Progressive programs predicted the future with inductive methodology, based on deductive truths. Regressive programs use regression without abilities to predict the future. Regressive programs are therefore not scientific. Lakatos included social science in his thought.[307] Regressive methodology thus value not minorities in statistical analyses. All units carry the same value in regressive methodology. Small differences, which can explode are not considered. The regressive statistical 'numbers game' posits victorious causes to majorities without considering the effects of creative forcing. These victorious causes are posited by regressives as 'reason' Under faith. Are regressives the Plutocracy of the world? Mathematics, which considers not different qualities of ones cannot be applied in sociology, because mathematical calculations, which consider not different qualities for the same unit, identify only deductively and not inductively. Predictions can thus not be made when units are not stable as in the social sciences. To state that units must adapt to make science possible with normal mathematics is not realistic. Mathematics must adapt to the levels of stabilities of units.

Habermas regarded art, science, and morality, the three most important modailities of human existence. Morality determines the other two. The three " 'spheres' " should not be mixed because it cause catastrophies for example Hitler's regime, which confounded politics with aesthetics.[308] Habermas thus divided Clousers aspects into three major categories, each with category specific laws.

In the debate about Habermas's three spheres Lyotard wanted to not separate science from politics because honest scientists should consider the spinning of dishonest scientists, similar to contemporary politicians' recognitions of words.[309] Rorty in the other side wanted not to allow for regular corrections, which inaccurate descriptions necessitate.[310] Rorty did not appreciate Habermas's distinction between 3 spheres because according to Rorty each individual can realise self that precise descriptions are necessities for cooperation. It is not necessary to force it down from above.[311]

Coletto opines that the difference between natural sciences and social sciences can disappear.[312] In the lecture on 3 May 2014 at North-West University, Coletto opined that the two sides of dualism cannot be combined. His opinion is understood with a conflagration between objectivity and subjectivity. It is not clear whether he wants creators to become objects or the subjects of social science.

During the lecture on 3 May 2014 Coletto replied to a statement of author that sometimes Feyerabend gives the impression that he wants to sacrifice all creators in order to show 'One' can become 'Christ'. He replied to author's statement that "we are nearly there". It is not clear if that is something Coletto looks forward to or whether he wants to hinder such sacrificings. The impression, so far, is that Coletto is in favour of such sacrificings with him not the 'One', nor one of the other creators who perish, because he regards such sacrificings as a necessity of survival. Author realized that such thoughts, as methodology of survival, are irrational because 'One' exists not. Such practices will thus eventually eliminate all human creativities, with consequential colonisation of territories where such practices exist.

Coletto referred to humans being initially not "their objects of study" in relation to social sciences, similar to natural sciences' objects. When social scientists' new " 'prestige' " caused sacrifice of humans as objects of social science the discourse changed, to, uses for objects of natural sciences, being things with feelings.[313] Coletto seems, so far, to regard 'him' completely separate from reality with his lady friend.

Coletto seems to be against utilitarianism, similar to author.[314] Author can not give an opinion whether Coletto's side is on author's side.

"It [philosophy] is a recognition that avoids exaggerations and overreactions. It is also a return to the modest attitude attributed to Pythagoras who, after mentioning his modest knowledge of the 'sciences' of his time, explained: 'I am only a philosopher'."[315] There could be problems with the word 'philosophy' in relation to Greek, similar to the English word 'love', in relation to Greek agape, eros and philo, because in Euthydemus[316] (304e, 305c, 306c, 307c), Socrates opined that philosophy, the field of deceivers, in a nominalist sense, is a worth-while field of study. Whether the same meaning of 'philosophy' in Euthydemus can be ascribed to Pythagoras's meaning of 'philosophy' above is not sure. In Euthydemus (275a, 272b) "virtue" and "eristic" "wisdom" were what Sophists taught to learners.

From the undergraduate models, Ontology and History of philosophy of North-West University my impression was formed that the M.Phil i am busy with wants to teach in English definitions a love of wisdom (Wysbegeerte). Wisdom is understood with my presuppositions that accurate descriptions are important and the undergraduate modules taught me that faith is necessary to instill that presupposition. Lecturers of the masters modules however gives a different picture in the sense that "wisdom" has a different meaning, related more to eristic "wisdom". Other lecturers of the masters modules on the other hand seems to appreciate non-eristic wisdom more.

Class by Prof. Coletto on 17 May 2014

Realism places the law in the object. Nominalism places laws in subjects or the subject. Reformational philosophy has a synthesis between the two. Thus they place the law (laws) in objects and subjects.

When considering the dualistic structure, which philosophers have posited during time something is missing. It is law and the aspects. If we do not consider the aspects we can over-emphasise the nature or freedom pole.

The laws of aspects. Passive and active functioning (Clouser). Active functioning is when a tree functions in for example the biotic aspect. Trees function passively in the economic aspect.

Nominalists place laws in subjects but reformational philosophy places laws in/from God. Realists place laws in objects.

Distinguish between laws for and law of reality. Order for (realist) can be seen in the structural modality of Clouser. Order of (nominalism) relates to observation.

Progress in the sense of Stafleu's retrocipation and anticipation from aspect to aspect.

Communication by Stafleu. Is there incommensurability? Stafleu is looking for a middle way between nominalism and realism. Incommensurability of concepts is a problem. Stafleu's solution is theories are connected logically therefore theories are connected in the spatial aspect. Therefore this logic about concepts are relative.

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COLETTO, R. 2008a. When the “paradigms” differ: scientific communication between skepticism and hope in recent philosophy of science. Koers, 73(3):445-467.

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COLETTO, R. 2013. The re-appreciation of the humanities in contemporary philosophy of science: From recognition to exaggeration? (Koers – Bulletin for Christian Scholarship, 78(2), Art. #64, 7 pages, from Prof. Renato Coletto <email>, North-West University, South Africa, 07 May 2014 3:41:32 PM SAST to MDPienaar <email>)

FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist. (In Lakatos I. & Musgrave A., eds. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 197-230.)

FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method: outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge, Introduction + chapters 1 to 5. (London: NLB)

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KUHN, TS. 1970. Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? (In Lakatos I. and Musgrave A., eds. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-23.)

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[1] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 341.

[2] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 342.

[3] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 343-344.

[4] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 345-346.

[5] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 345-347.

[6] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 347-348.

[7] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 348.

[8] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 349.

[9] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 350.

[10] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 351.

[11] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 352.

[12] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 353.

[13] POPPER, K.R. 1979. Appendix 1: The Bucket and The Searchlight, 359.

[14] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and Refutations, 36.

[15] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and Refutations, 39-40.

[16] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and Refutations, 41.

[17] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 42-43.

[18] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 46-47.

[19] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 48.

[20] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 49-50.

[21] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 52.

[22] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 53.

[23] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 54.

[24] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 56-57.

[25] POPPER, K.R. 1963. Chapter 1 - Science: Conjectures and, 58-59.

[26] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 1.

[27] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 2.

[28] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 3.

[29] From: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Thomas_Samuel_Kuhn on 12 February 2014.

[30] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 3.

[31] From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabbit–duck_illusion on 12 February 2014.

[32] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 3.

[33] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 4.

[34] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 4.

[35] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 4,11.

[36] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 11.

[37] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 6.

[38] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 6.

[39] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 7.

[40] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 7.

[41] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 7.

[42] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 7.

[43] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 7-8.

[44] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 9.

[45] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 10.

[46] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 12.

[47] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 13.

[48] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 14.

[49] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 14.

[50] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 15.

[51] "Popper [1959]: Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959, pp. 53 f." (Kuhn, 1970:15,23)

[52] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 15.

[53] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 15.

[54] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 15.

[55] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 19.

[56] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 20.

[57] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 21.

[58] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 21.

[59] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 21.

[60] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 22.

[61] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 1-2.

[62] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 2.

[63] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 2-3.

[64] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 6-7.

[65] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 10.

[66] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 12.

[67] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 13.

[68] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 14.

[69] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 14.

[70] "Hawkins [1963]: Review of Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' American Journal of Physics, 31." (Kuhn, 1970:23)

[71] KUHN, T.S. 1970. Logic of Discovery or, 20.

[72] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 349.

[73] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 351-352.

[74] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 352.

[75] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 352.

[76] "Quoted in this 'orm by S.F. Mason, Main Currents of Scientific Thought (New York, 1956), p.54 [p.not sure]." The original is not identical in words but shares the same spirit. (Kuhn, 1963:353)

[77] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 353.

[78] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 354. "a first paradigm is reached"

[79] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 352.

[80] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 353.

[81] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 357.

[82] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 358.

[83] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 359.

[84] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 360-362.

[85] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 362.

[86] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 364-365.

[87] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 365.

[88] KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research, 363-365.

[89] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 174.

[90] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 175.

[91] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 175-179.

[92] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 179.

[93] From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn on 24 Feb. 2014.

[94] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 183.

[95] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 185.

[96] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 187.

[97] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 193.

[98] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 194.

[99] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 194.

[100] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 198-199.

[101] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 200.

[102] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 204.

[103] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 206.

[104] "Stanly Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (New York, 1969), chap. i." (Kuhn, 1996:207)

[105] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 207.

[106] KUHN, T.S. 1996. Postscript, 208-210.

[107] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 52.

[108] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 52-54.

[109] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 55.

[110] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 55-56.

[111] "See, for example chapter 10 of my Conjectures and Refutations, and the first Addendum to the 4th (1962) and later editions of volume ii of my Open Society." (Popper, 1970:56)

[112] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 56.

[113] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 57-58.

[114] "See my lecture, 'Epistemology without a knowing subject' in Proceedings of the Third International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam, 1968." (Popper, 1970:57)

[115] "See my paper 'A Theorem on Truth-Content' in the Feigl Festschrift Mind, Matter and Method, edited by P.K. Feyerabend and Grover Maxwell, 1966." (Popper, 1970:57)

[116] POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers, 57.

[117] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 197.

[118] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 198-199.

[119] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 199-200.

[120] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 201.

[121] "Kuhn [1961a]: 'The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research', in Crombie (ed.): Scientific Change, 1963, p. 363." (Feyerabend, 1970:201,230)

[122] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 201.

[123] Elthaughts are the thoughts, which cause Caiaphas syndromes and more specific cause accusations that others think they are returned 'Messiah' or "Christ".

[124] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 201.

[125] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 204.

[126] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 205-206.

[127] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 206 (bottom of page).

[128] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 207-208.

[129] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 208.

[130] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 209.

[131] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 210.

[132] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 210.

[133] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 210.

[134] From: http://www.africahead.co.za/Africahead/ICrM/ICrM.html on 27 February 2014.

[135] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 211.

[136] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 211.

[137] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 212.

[138] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 213.

[139] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 214.

[140] "Popper [1961]: 'Fact, Standards, and Truth: a further criticism of relativism', Addendum I in the fourth edition of Popper [1945], vol. II., p. 390, 1962.", "Popper [1945]: The Open Society and its Enemies, I-II, 1945." (Feyerabend, 1970:216,230)

[141] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 216.

[142] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 220.

[143] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 223.

[144] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1970. Consolation for the specialist, 214-229.

[145] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 19.

[146] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 19-20.

[147] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 20.

[148] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 21.

[149] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 21-22.

[150] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 23.

[151] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 25.

[152] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 35.

[153] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 36.

[154] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 39.

[155] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 43.

[156] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method.

[157] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 46.

[158] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 48.

[159] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 52.

[160] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 53.

[161]FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 55.

[162] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 55-56.

[163] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 65.

[164] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 66.

[165] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 67-68.

[166] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method, 68.

[167] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 165.

[168] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 165-166.

[169] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 166.

[170] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 166.

[171] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 166-167.

[172] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 167.

[173] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 167.

[174] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 169.

[175] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 169.

[176] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 171.

[177] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 174.

[178] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 175.

[179] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 179.

[180] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 179.

[181] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 179.

[182] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 179.

[183] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 179.

[184] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 180.

[185] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 180.

[186] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 183.

[187] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 191.

[188] "Lakatos." " 'Falsification' ", "p.187" (Feyerabend, 1975a:192,229).

[189] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 192.

[190] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 175.

[191] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 175.

[192] PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 122.

[193] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 195.

[194] FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975a. Against method, 199, 211.

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1ste Klas

Popper - "The Bucket and The Searchlight: Two Theories of Knowledge"