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to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
Title: Geskiedenis van die filosofie, studiegids vir PHIL
221 PAC
Author: JJ Venter
Editor: MF van der Walt
Year: 2012
Place: Potchefstroom
Publisher: Northwest University
Subdivisions of study guide:
Afdeling A: Algemene inligting –
Pages (i) to (xii)
Afdeling B: Leereenhede – Pages 1 –
38
Afdeling C: Leesbundel – Pages 1 –
254
Reader: Mr. M.D. Pienaar (Excerpts
relating to ICrM)
This document title:
A
history of philosophy in relation to accounting of ideas
Table of
Contents
1.
Organismic and mechanistic world pictures
1.1
How do world pictures and world views come about
1.2
Pre-Greek antiquity - Egyptian
1.3
Greek antiquity
1.3.1
Hesiod
1.3.2
Plato
1.3.3
Aristotle
1.4
Hellenism
1.4.1
Plotinus
1.5
Early Christianity
1.6
The Middle Ages
1.6.1
Early medieval Neo-Platonism (from Scotus to William of
Conches)
1.6.2
“Aristotelian
1.7
The Renaissance
1.8
Modern Philosophy
1.8.1
The transition to the mechanistic picture
1.8.2
Descartes and Leibniz
1.8.3
Thomas Hobbes – mechanistic and organismic societal
explanations
1.8.4
Radical mechanism – La Mettrie
1.8.5
Adam Smith and Kant – competition as mechanism
1.8.6
Hegel and the recovery of organismic holism
1.8.7
Goethe – organismic philosophy of nature
1.8.8
Darwin and mechanistic evolution
1.9
Irrationalism
and the recovery of the organismic picture
1.9.1
JC Smuts – holism get as name
1.9.1
Mussolini – when the organic state itself becomes the
reality
1.9.3
Capra – the organismic history and oriental philosophy
1.10
Understanding
and rebuilding Africa
2. Nature versus culture
2.1
Ancient Greece
2.2
The Middle Ages
2.3
Modern philosophy and culture
2.3.1
Enlightenment
2.3.1.1
Jean-Jacques
Rousseau
2.3.1.2
Hume
2.3.2
Neo-Classicism
2.3.3
Hegel
2.3.4
Romanticism
2.3.4.1
Van Wyk Louw
2.3.4.2
Karl Marx
3. The idea of order
3.1
Introduction
3.2
Ancient Greeks
3.2.1
Background
3.2.2
Plato
3.2.3
Aristotle
3.3
Hellenism
3.3.1
Scepticism
3.3.2
Stoicism
3.3.2
Plotinus
3.4
Early Christian period
3.5
Middle Ages
3.6
Renaissance
3.7
Modern rationalism
3.7.1
Descartes
3.7.2
Leibniz
3.7.3
Kant
3.7.4
Transitions
after Kant
3.8
Irrationalism
3.8.1
Sartre
3.9
Summary
4. The dominance of reason
4.1
Introduction
4.2
Ancient thinkers and Hellenism
4.2.1
Mythological
thinkers
4.2.2
Xenophanes
4.2.3
Plato
4.2.4
Aristotle
4.2.5
Sceptics and the Stoics
4.3
Early Christianity and the Middle Ages
4.3.1
Clement
4.3.2
Tertullian
4.3.3
Augustine
4.3.4
Thomas Aquinas
4.4
Summary of first section
4.5
Renaissance
and the modern era
4.5.1
Introduction
4.5.2
Tomasso Campanella
4.5.3
Descartes
4.5.4
Kant
4.5.5
Transitions
after Kant
4.5.6
William James
4.6
Christian alternatives since the Renaissance
4.6.1
John Calvin
4.6.2
Reformed Scholasticism
4.6.3
Blaise Pascal
4.6.4
Maurice Blondel
4.7
Summary of the second section
4.8
Anselm's Proslogium
9 October 2012
1. Organismic and mechanistic
world pictures
1.1 How do
world pictures and world views come about
Page 7
' Thus
the question is: how do these views of reality come about? I
contend that the principal answer is that any view of
reality requires an overall perspective, transcending our
present situation. Either we can transcend our own situation
by our own human intellectual ability, or our view of
reality will have to be fundamentally determined by some
communication from outside, breaking into our experience
(for example a “revelation”). '
Self
I agree
with Venter that the true definitions of God we believe in,
come about after difficulty. The definitions that come about
due to material wealth and current ' success ' are
not true definitions of God. If ICrM can be successfully
explained and accepted the situation could then change. I will
then, if financial gain is the result probably argue
differently, that ICrM's definition of God is true even though
it caused financial gain. That will then imply that the
definition is not the important part but something else and it
will imply that the current ' successful ' has
something on their side. A paradox, maybe, because
' success ' cannot be equated with presence of God
or not in a person's life. Some other analogy must then be the
sign of presence of God or maybe the absence of
' success ' must be the analogy that signifies
presence of God in persons' lives. Certainly the absence of
' success ' cannot be the right analogy because some
godless people are not ' successful '. Success here
means material wealth. What then is the sign of God's presence
in persons' lives? Maybe the presence of success caused
through them for themselves and people around them for a long
period, maybe the repopulation of Earth, maybe both. Maybe
something else. True success is noumenon.
Afdeling
B: Leereenhede –
JJ Venter
Page 12
' The
priests then rewrote the stories about the origins of the
universe and the gods in order to fit the new paramount chief
into the story. '
Page 20
' As
die hemelliggame ewige lewende wesens is, wat 'n direkte
invloed op my lewe het, dan moet hulle sekerlik oppermagtig
wees (goddelik). '
Self
Venter
equates power with God, which is comparable to my
understanding of God. One man cannot have power. Jesus was
crucified then he said his God left (' lama
sabagtani ') him. Truths are relevant when communication
takes place between members of a group in order to ensure
coherent actions. If only one man has power of God then truths
are not really relevant in groups because only one man is
really relevant.
Afdeling
C: Leesbundel – JJ Venter
1.2 Pre-Greek antiquity -
Egyptian
Page 12-14
' The
text is a magical one entitled: Book of the knowledge of
the manifestations of Ra, for the sake of subjecting the
snake, Apophis. .. Ra creates in different ways: by
planning and executing his plans, by self-fertilising and
spitting, by crying and by uttering a magical word. The many
mythical ideas of “creating” are hereby woven into one, with
special stress on the fact that Ra did it all alone and from
his own self. And yet his father, Nun, also creates what Ra
creates, by elevating Shu (Wind) and Tefnut (Rain) on high. By
sexual intercourse other gods now come into being – a whole
genealogy of gods. '
Self
The
planning and executing of intellectual (rational/worldly)
creations plays a minor role. Sexual pro-creation is more
important. The word creation does not distinguish between
different kinds of creation for example planning, sexual
procreation etc.
Page 14
' The
pool was there before any creator. Although Nun is sometimes
called creator, he is not an active conscious creator. Rather
the active creator (the sun-god, Ra, or the earth-god, Ptah,
et cetera), come into being in Nun. The (few) myths in which
the creator is actually identified with Nun, are of a fairly
late date. '
Page 14-19
' In
Memphis the earth-god, Ptah, was revered from ancient times as
the creator. He is the god of the arts, himself represented as
a potter, who made the living beings and put life into the
bodies of the pharaohs. He is called Ta-tenen (the earth who
elevates itself), after his elevation from the pool, in the
form of an island-hill, and has made things by forming them
from the water, while he himself had neither father nor
mother, and formed his own body. The sun is his son; … In
Heliopolis the sun-god was honoured as the creator – a
tradition that goes back as far as 3000 BC. He is known under
the names of “Chepri” (his format at dawn: the becoming); “Ra”
(his majestic form at midday), and “Atum” his dying form at
dusk). In later time the priests also added characteristics of
other creators to these: those of Amun (Thebe), Chnum (Aswan),
Sobek (Crocodilopolis). About Ra it is said that he came into
being out of himself ( as related in the long quote above). He
was revered as the only creator, but in such a way that the
other eight, making up the nineness with him, are supposed to
create with him, being actually his members. ..
In some
other myths, the sun is also accepted as creator, but he is
provided with a mother, such as a cow who gave birth to him,
or the goddess Neith (of the city of Esne), or the eightness
(four pairs of gods, accepted in Hermopolis, and later also in
Thebe and Crocodilopolis) ..
We have
now only scratched the surface of the Egyptian myths about the
creator god. Importantly, “creating” here is not
represented as speaking a sovereign word. Although it does
include forming (such as the work of the potter god, Ptah),
it is mostly related to birth, or emerging from an egg.
The
“theologian” priests landed in philosophical difficulties in
their attempt at reconciling the myths. One difficulty was the
age-old philosophical problem of how the “one” and the “many”
are related to one another. For example, in Thebe, it was
initially said that the sun-god was the product of the
eightness; later this was inverted. To solve the apparent
contradiction, it was said that the eightness is the
manifestation of the sun-god, which was only later perfected
in the one. In this way the eightness and the one are
represented as actually being the same, but viewed from
different sides. ..
Every city
had its own supreme creator god, and a whole hierarchy of
divinities coming into being out of it. To reconcile this
variety, the priests were saying that all these creators were
actually only manifestations of one and the same creator god.
.. The “many” is actually only different appearances of the
“one”. This approach is clearly an anticipation of
Neo-Platonism, a philosophical school that developed, unknot
(sic) surprisingly, in Alexandria in Egypt, and which had a
vast influence on Christianity's conception of the “one” and
the “many”. ..
Well-known
hermaphroditic gods were Chnum (from Aswan), Amun (Thebe) and
Ptah (from Memphis). ..
(Hapie is
represented as a male god with breasts, a symbol still found
among occult groups and sometimes even in esoteric
representations of Christ) '
' Hermaphroditus |hərˌmafrəˈdītəs|
Greek Mythology
a son of Hermes and
Aphrodite, with whom the nymph Salmacis fell in love and
prayed to be forever united. As a result Hermaphroditus and
Salmacis became joined in a single body that retained
characteristics of both sexes. ' (New American Oxford
Dictionary, Version 2.1(80), Apple copyright)
' In
a few cases the creator god emerges as a snake, such as in
Dendera, where the god, Harsomtus, is represented as a shiny
copper snake emerging from a floating lotus flower and is then
elevated on high as the sun-god. ..
Different
ways of “creating” is ascribed to the creator god, as …
Finally, creation is also represented as artisanship – such as
the pottery of Ptah, or of the master craftsman, the ram god
Chnum, who enjoyed wide popularity all over Egypt.
It is very
important to note that the different representations of the
process of origination often appear as synonymous in one and
the same story. This validates the conclusion that we have
here basically a monistic viewpoint, according to which
there is only one primal source, namely the initial pool,
and that the creator god, who emerges from the water, let
the next generations of beings emerge from himself. ..
Since
the great powers, which originated in the beginning, came into
being, when the light was made, thanks to the works of their
hands – since this time the world was enlightened. The cosmic
order came down from the heaven to the earth, and became the
brother of all the gods. Food and nourishment was available in
abundance, without limitation. There was no injustice in the
land; no crocodile robbed; there was no snake bite in the
times of the divine ancestors (Urkunde 14; WBG, 1980, 74).
How
did evil make its entry into the universe? The stories differ.
In Heliopolis the primal danger, the snake Apophis was
indicated as the source of evil. He was there from very early
on. In other stories, evil is derived from the rebellion of
mankind. In Memphis, the source of evil was attributed to the
attitude of humankind: he who loved that which Ptah wants to
be loved, received life and justice; he who hated this,
received death and injustice. Yet, even in this case, the fate
of man is a direct product of the heart and tongue of the
creator god. ..
In
spite of the different mythological stories, we have one
basic world picture, which is at the same time a world view
determining the order and meaning of life. The world view is
both organismic and pantheistic. ..
Ra
assumed a human form and lived among human beings, governing
them. .. Isis was jealous of the power of Ra, and she incited
a snake to bite him. ..
Fourthly,
there
is no clear difference between man and god, or between
creatures and gods. The gods can suffer and die, and they can
do evil things. Human beings can threaten the lives of the
gods. Ra was supposed to have lived among beings, and the
pharaohs were considered as gods ruling over human
beings. '
1.3 Greek
antiquity
1.3.1
Hesiod
In
Hesiod's Theogonia: ' With Ouranos evil became a reality
in this world – later a whole group of gods were born who
represented all kinds of evils:
“Baneful
Night
bore Nemesis too, a woe for mortals,
and
after her Deception and the Passion of lovers” '
Self
According
to Greek mythology Deception was one of the evil gods(esses)
that did not exist from the beginning. In Egyptian mythology
the snake was evil that could have been a reference to
creativity. According to ICrM creativities and honesties are
linked. There is thus an opposing difference between the
Egyptian and Greek mythologies. In the Greek mythology
adjectives are abstracted whereas in the Egyptian only names.
In Popper's book, The open society and its enemies, he wrote
that Plato opposed change. Plato was thus also against
creativities, according to Popper, but nevertheless he
propagated truths. Probably then Plato did not realise that
truths cause creativities and improvements. Plato's philosophy
could therefore be contradictory.
Page
26
' Hesiod
starts
from a revelational perspective, but he relativises that
immediately by saying that the Muses do lie at times. Thus he
falls back on the mythological approach of up-scaling. Note
that, at least much more than in Egyptian mythology,
non-physical functions (Memory, Argument and Strife) are
up-scaled into universal divine powers with personalities too.
This is what takes away the hope. Who can resist a god? ..
The
story of the gods proceeds with the marriage of Kronos and
Rheia, but Kronos, being a deceitful power monger, personally
swallowed all his children at birth in order to prevent any of
them from taking his rule from him. '
Self
The
above statement supports my definition of God of ICrM because
if metaphysical revelations cannot be trusted to be true who
else can be trusted? Honest people who are God.
Pages
8 to 29
The
word ' create ' does not clearly distinguish between
sexual procreation, artistic pottery. It is therefore possible
that in the bible too there is not a clear distinction between
sexual creation and technological creation. I am sure there is
an androalogy (genealogy) in the bible that starts with God,
then Adam and so forth. Possibly the real meaning is that God
sexually procreated Adam and we are misunderstanding the
creation in Genesis.
10
October 2012
1.3.2
Plato
Page
33
' While
Heraclitus
claimed that the universe is in permanent change (although
guided by a law of change), Parmenides insisted on the primacy
of stability and changelessness. However, Pythagoras, the
great mathematician, with his followers, suggested that
although the world changes it is somehow stabilised by
inherent proportions that can be measured in geometrical
terms.
Via
the Pythagoreans and Parmenides, unity and simplicity became
part of Plato's struggle to explain the “ideal” world. '
Self
It
seems the prioritization of stability or change is relevant.
They generalised too much by saying stability or change OF the
' world ' IS primary. They did not focus and
abstract. Plato down-scaled his stable forms into the sensible
world and therefore pictured change and creativity as evil
because he wanted the sensible world the same stable form as
the concept truths. Plato did not realize it seems that the
stable form of truths in the intellectual world becomes
inverted in creativity and change in the sensible world.
Page
35
' Plato
attributes
the myth, around which his explanation of the construction of
the universe in the Timaeus is built, to an Egyptian
prophet. ..
The
Supreme Being is the world of Ideas, which is a living being,
but a perfect one. In this, Plato followed Xenophanes by
taking that which is the most important to him in the cosmos
and elevating it into an ideal being. To Plato, this is a
separate ideal world, even higher than any god.
Self
It
can be argued that Plato's philosophy propagated big thefts
because he ascribed ideas of ICrM to his Supreme Being. He
thus did not give credit to the creators who improved the
world with their ideas and partly because of Plato's
philosophy and influence ideas are today common properties
that can be easily appropriated by the controllers of
currencies. Did he do that to appropriate others' ideas and
instill his families control or did he argue that because he
was in danger because of his own creativities. According to
Popper it was because he saw change as evil, possibly
creativities of creator's that opposed his families control of
the status quo.
Page
35
The
story goes that a supreme “artisan” (god), looking at the
perfect “living being, the world of Ideas, tried to imitate
it, creating “the world at large”. The “world at large” is
called the macrocosm. Being an imitation of the world of
Ideas, the macrocosm is itself also a living being. It is
however not a perfect one, as it is only a changeable
imitation of the Supreme Being. The macrocosm furthermore has
its own soul and its own body (like humans). Inside the
macrocosm we find the social organism (referring to the state)
as well as the living beings (called the microcosmoi) with
whom we are acquainted. Each human being is therefore a
microcosm inside the state. '
Page
36-37
' Smuts
espoused
three doctrines about “wholes”:
(I)
against the mechanistic world picture (since
Hobbes) Smuts says that the whole is more than the aggregate
of its parts; and
(II)
the parts can only be living entities within
the whole;
(III)
against the doctrine of a personal creator,
Smuts maintains that every whole is creative and will open up
the ways for wholes of a higher complexity to emerge
(organismic evolution).
However,
the basic principle of holism, that of a living whole that
sustains its parts as if they are organs, has been there from
ancient times, although not explicitly stated.(35) In many of
the myths, the holistic presuppositions are not so clear,
since the stories are directly focussed on the whole and its
development and not much is said about the relationship of
small parts (like individual human beings) to the universe as
the “whole”. . the whole would be the most important,
for this is what sustains the parts. ..
(35)
The explicit formulation of the holistic principle by Leibniz
to a certain degree, very clearly by Hegel, and given a name
by Smuts, comes in reaction to the “partialism” of the
mechanistic picture. '
Self
Holism
sounds one-sided because it over emphasises the importance of
the whole. The whole, without creative ideas from individuals,
will degenerate to a state, to be colonised, with holism.
Individuals therefore through their ideas has an important
enough influence on the whole to be recognised to a greater
extent than in holism.
Page
39
' (38)
During
the Renaissance especially the occultist Neo-Platonists
removed the state from the picture, and simply said that the
human being is the centre of the universe, for the human being
is a mirror reflection of the world at large and its ideal
model in the mind of God. Thus the human being could also be
the concentration point of the secret divine powers on
earth. '
Page
40
' (39)
This
kind of social totalitarianism we also find, for instance, in
Jean Jacques Rousseau, on the basis of a very similar world
picture. It is present in Marx, who, in spite of his
materialism, kept on using the organismic metaphors adopted
from Hegel. It is found in many Romantic-ethnic idealisms. It
is also found in the kind of Afrikaner nationalism espoused by
influential Afrikaners in their defence of apartheid – every
aspect of Afrikaner life (religion, culture, education etc.)
is only given sense within the encompassing “organic” ethnic
community – the “volk”. '
1.3.3
Aristotle
Page 43
' Aristotle,
especially in his later years, constructed an extended
hierarchy of things, consisting basically of two archetypal
elements, namely matter and form. All of reality is composed
of matter and form [hylemorphism], except for the highest, the
divinity, which is pure form. ..
What
anything naturally strives for is what is good for that sort
of thing. State differently, everything naturally strives for
its own good. The form indicates the good. '
' (47)
In the 17th - 18th century, biologists
used these differences [Aristotle's forms] to classify plants
and animals. It was called “artificial” classification, in
contrast to “natural” classification. “Artificial”
classification was popular among Roman Catholic biologists,
for many of them were aligned to Aristotle. The result was a
hierarchy of plants, and a hierarchy of animals. In the case
of plants, for example, the classification was done on the
basis of the development of their food absorption and their
procreative organs, for feeding and procreating were
considered the most important (or vital) functions. “Natural”
classification was popular among Protestants. For some time at
least they rejected Aristotle completely. “Natural”
classification was based on the work of Linnaeus, and was
based on the relationships between an organism and its
environment. In the long run this method seems to have
won. '
Self
There is no
direct link between ICrM and classifications except perhaps in
relation to the Protestant measures of relationships between a
creator and his/her environment.
Page 44
' In
the case of humans, it is not clear whether there are
different species, but still there is a hierarchy. Aristotle
truly believed that some are born to be slaves and others are
born to be leaders. .. the emotions had to be controlled. ..
(49)
(49) This
idea of intellectual control over the emotions remained a
central theme in Western thought. In Cicero it is central to
the definition of human dignity. In the theory of human
dignity of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, a Renaissance
thinker whose work is often said to be the starting point of
Modern humanism (since he said that the human being makes
itself), the hierarchy is maintained, although the ceilings
have been removed. Pico says that the human being can either
intellectually move up to God, or relinquish this and move
downward to become animals or plants. '
Self
It seems a
major difference, maybe The major difference, between Greek
philosophy and Christianity is the emphasis in antique Greek
philosophy on genetics, whereas Christianity emphasises the
importance of the possibility of being reborn with a
consequential erasure of genetic memories and by implication a
reactivation or activation of creative abilities.
Page 44
' One
might say that the form, to Aristotle, was the destination of
the particular being. '
Self
If the
highest form of human beings is being Creators then my
definition of God of ICrM can be supported by Aristotle's
philosophy.
Page 45
' What
Aristotle means is that somehow we are driven by our goals.
This he transfers to all of reality in an anthropomorphic way:
everything has a goal that drives it on. .. The god pays no
attention to the lower beings. He is his own object, as
Parmenides said. '
Self
Although
Aristotle has an anthropomorphic view of God, I believe today
that his image of God is a negative image because his God is a
selfish being. He created a image of God that has
deceitfulness as a characteristic. Aquinas was heavily
influenced by Aristotle and he said God (one being) only is
honest. They maybe saw honesty as a selfish characteristic and
did not realise the negative unpleasant social impacts on
honest peoples.
Page 46
' Towards
the end of his life, Aristotle idealised the intellect even
more. He came to the conclusion that the human intellect also
needs actualising by an external cause and therefore supposed
that there exists a supreme universal intellect (Nous)
that made contact with the human intellectual soul and
activated it. It has a memory and carry traditions from one
generation to the next. The universal intellect works by
“inspiring” - almost a spiritual “lightning” discharging
itself into the individual intellect.
Finally,
we find one single god at the top. .. the identical
object-subject god of Parmenides. '
Self
From the
above it seems Aristotle also removed creativities to be not
part of humans. Parmenides' view was organismic and Venter
said Aristotle had a anthropomorphic view and Venter equates
Aristotle's god with Parmenides'. Anthropomorphism and
organismic pictures can be seen as one. In the case of ICrM an
organismic picture does not exist because it cannot be seen
although it can be imagined but that does not mean it really
exists.ICrM is an anthropomorphic view of creativities with
much less emphasis on Nous. The concept Truth is placed
highest in that, that can be seen and imagined. My definition
of truth currently is, that we can agree upon or would be able
to agree upon if we were present and reasonably conscious,
without much contemplation, whilst being honest. My definition
of honesty currently is corresponding descriptions of our
sense experiences.
Page 49
' After
Aristotle, “teleology” became closely associated with the
organismic picture of the world. Telos is an
anthropomorphic metaphor. It ascribes something like a will
and a choice to all levels of things. Soon after the
mechanistic picture became dominant, the belief in progress
also grew. Thus all the mechanisms of world-history were
regarded as mechanical (e.g. competition), although history is
guided by nature – a hidden teleology. Darwin tried to rid
science of this, but his own mechanistic discourse often
reverts to the teleological formulas. '
1.4
Hellenism
Page 49
' These
new schools … the Stoics', whose ideas on logic can be
connected to the minor Socratic schools. The Stoics' theory of
the word logos resembles that of Heraclitus, while their
astrology probably came from outside Greece, from the
Chaldeans. '
11 October
2012
1.4.1
Plotinus
Page 50
' According
to Plotinus, the basic source from which everything has its
origin is the One. The One is also the Good and the
True, as well as Being. .. The One is the first god. All other
things downwards in die (sic) hierarchy continually and
eternally exist from the One as their source.
Plotinus
uses the term, “emanation” to describe the way in which the
other levels of the hierarchy originate from the One. .. The
rest of the hierarchy, at all levels, is forever sustained by
this emanation process, except, possibly, “matter”. '
Page 51
' The
first to emanate is the Intellect (Nous). It is a superior
intellect, only one for all beings, the second god, and also
the image of the first god (the One). This Super-Intellect
contains the Ideas as its thoughts. These are the ideas of the
Intelligible world – as Plato called it. This implies a
unifying of the Intellect (subject) and the Intelligible
(object) into one single being – the return of the philosophy
of Parmenides and Aristotle, but with this difference: these
two thinkers knew only one single divine entity or god, in
which subject and object are the same, while Plotinus
downgrades the divine object-subject to the second level. It
is also a downgrading in terms of Plato's view of the (ontic)
status of the intelligible world (the Ideas). .. it is not the
same utter simplicity as that of the One, because perfection
diminishes as one goes down the hierarchy. '
Self
Plotinus
also removed the origin of ideas from humans in one view. In
another view one could argue that when ideas are brought into
this world by speaking humans the ideas has a distinct human
character because of the non-perfection. The perfect emanated
ideas are changed by human interaction and therefore the
remuneration relevant to the spoken ideas can validly go to
humans because of the human nature of the ideas. This argument
could be relating to reality because it seems in reality the
good ideas are not remunerated at the human origin. The bad
ideas are remunerated at the human origin after the bad ideas
caused extortion of the good ideas. Perhaps it relates to the
arguments why Sophists charged their pupils and other
philosophers believed that they should not charge their
pupils.
Page 51
' Aristotle,
in his later works, wrote about the Nous (Intellect),
i.e. one single intellect for the entire world. This inspires
the individual intellects of human beings from one generation
to the next. '
Page 52
' One
thing is clear though: Aristotle's Super-Intellect was not the
seat of the Ideas, as it is with Plotinus, for Aristotle
rejected Plato's theory of Ideas... '
Page 52
' Also
from the World-Soul emanate the souls of individual human
beings. These souls lapse into matter, and adopt bodies
for themselves. They become “microcosms”, i.e. little worlds
that look and act like the world at large and therefore each
of them makes a body alive. This, according to Plotinus, is a
kind of lapse into “sin”. The souls turn away from the
World-Soul, they turn away from the Intellect with the Ideas,
and also from the One. The souls can, however, become
“converted”(59). By conversion into themselves (introspection
and introversion), the souls can re-establish contact with the
World-Soul, the Super-Intellect (gaining knowledge of the
Ideas) and through this they can even have an ecstatic
identification with the One. '
' (59) Plotinus
picked up this and other Christian terms (although he wasn't a
Christian himself) since he lived after Christ and among many
Christians in Alexandria. '
Self
The above
philosophy again degrades creativity because of the World-Soul
which can be logically compared to a culture that has its
origin in multiple humans and human actions. Any new
creativities which cause a change of culture or circumstances
are sins according to Plotinus.
Page 53
' Emanation
means dispersion from the One, like the rays from the sun.
Therefore the Super-Intellect and the World-Soul and the
individual souls are not different in kind from the One. They
are just less perfect and they have less being than the One.
As you follow the path down the scale or extend your vision
outwards in concentric circles, you will find the lower
entities farther and farther removed from the source of being.
Evil is not a power opposite to the One – like the ancient
mythologists and some Gnostics believed. In Plotinus' system
there is actually no “evil” - there is only less and less good
down to zero. Evil is where the higher goods are absent in the
lower levels. '
Page 54
' The
influence of Plotinus was considerable in many areas. [Saint]
Augustine [of Hippo] kept on reading his works up until his
deathbed. '
1.5 Early
Christianity
Page 54-55
' The
learned early Christian church fathers were strongly
influenced by Plato and the platonic traditions. Firstly, the
predecessors of Plotinus in Egypt, i.e. the middle Platonists,
influenced the Chistian school of Alexandria, notably Origen
and Clement. There was also the influence of Philo Iudaeus
(“Philo the Jew”), also of Alexandria, himself very strongly
under the influence of Platonism. .. The main issue of these
church fathers was how to interpret Plato and the Bible in
such a way that these two interpretations would not
clash. '
Page 30
' To
Xenophanes, the god that holds all together is a simple
consciousness.(21) '
' (21)
The idea of god as a simple spiritual being was adopted by the
early Christians and since then Christian theology was very
careful not to talk of God in anthropomorphic terms. The Dutch
theologian, Kuitert, created quite a stir in Reformed circles
with his doctor's thesis, De mensvormigheid Gods: een
dogmatisch-hermeneutische studie over die anthropomorfismen
van de Heilige Schrift (Kampen,: Kok, 1962) in which he
argued that the Bible does speak of God in terms of the human
form, and thus suggested that theological anxieties about this
had their origin in Greek thinking, not in the Bible.
Kuitert's approach does open the way to talk about the
biblical Jahwe Elohijm as having female attributes, or
being a Black god, a poor or downtrodden god, as long as one
realises that these terms will then be metaphorical terms
indicating the way in which Jahwe relates to the
diversity of creatures, his (non-exclusive) solidarity as
expressed in terms like Immanuel – the essentialist theologies
have their origin in Aristotle. '
Page 55
' They
[Alexandrian Christians and Jews] were strongly influenced,
however, by the Platonist doctrine of a living soul that is
relatively independent from the body. They adopted the
Platonic doctrine that the soul is on a journey of
purification in order to recover its contact with the Ideas or
the One or the divine. ..
The famous
church father, Augustine, accepted a hierarchy similar to that
of Plotinus. .. he adhered to the tradition started by
Xenophanes. He eliminated the Super-Intellect … also
eliminated the World-Soul … on the divine side he eliminated
all the elements of Plotinus' hierarchy. It is on the creation
side – angels, human beings, animals, plants and minerals –
that a hierarchy very similar to that of Aristotle, remained.
But Aristotle's hylomorphism was no longer there. '
Self
The
biggest differences of opinion exist with regards to
definitions of the divine as can be seen above. The importance
of these definitions relates to the influence it had on
creators. ICrM's definition of God has a noumenon metaphysical
part and a physical part that is all honest people. References
to God in the singular human for example ' His ' is
not acceptable for ICrM because my opinion is that it is
simply not true. No singular human can have God's power as the
origin of the power. A definition of God has to define God as
close as possible to the origin of God. The definition was
formed due to the courage that faiths cause, to stay honest
and the creative results of honesties that is important for
volhoubaarheid. It is a definition that generates the most
faith in me and thus helps me to stay honest and
consequentially creative.
Page 55
' Augustine
was always at pains to hold on to the idea that there is a
fundamental difference between God and His creatures:
God is eternal and uncreated; no creature flows out of God, so
no creature shares in God's substance. All creatures have been
created “in the beginning” (in time) from “nothing”. ..
He ..
explicitly rejects those doctrines that are related to
organismic occultism (such as astrology). '
1.6 The
Middle Ages
Page 56
' Intellectual
life began to break free from the boundaries of the
monasteries by the tenth century. By then some political
consolidation had taken place and the expansion of the
southern intellectual tradition to the north, again especially
via the Catholic Church, began in all seriousness.
Unfortunately, we do not know much today about the original
intellectual culture of the north, as records are very scarce.
Southern Europe, from Germany to certain sections of Italy,
became a more or less unified political system, especially
under the leadership of Charles the Great Charlemagne]. He
started a Renaissance of knowledge, for he needed
administrators to administer the large empire. The monasteries
became centres of training and education also for those who
did not want to become clerics and who would become civil
servants. An important expansion of knowledge took
place. '
Self
The
Renaissance proves the effect of pre-knowledge in the quote
above.
1.6.1
Early medieval Neo-Platonism (from Scotus to William of
Conches)
Page 56
' A
few centuries later John Scot's doctrines were rejected by the
Catholic Church as “pantheism”. It is clear that Scot was not
able to distinguish between God and creatures, for he followed
Neo-Platonism too closely. '
Page 57
' .. William
of Conches .. He said that the World-Soul is the
same as the “Holy Spirit” ...
organismic
world view is here, as often elsewhere, directly connected
with pantheism.
The Church
as such did not act against William of Conches, but a fellow
monk (William of St. Theodoric) attacked his viewpoints.
William of Conches then retracted, saying that he was a
Christian in the first place, rather than a follower of Plato.
But the
far-going adoption of ideas from the Platonist tradition
introduced exactly what Augustine seemingly tried to avoid –
the blurring of the border between God and creation. '
Self
Again the
influence of organismic Greek thought entered the Church and
Potinus' and Plato's removal of ideas from subjects becomes
apparent. Augustine had an opinion that opposed organismic
thought but for ICrM his thought had not a difference impact
because he removed God from the world therefore the origin of
ideas could be argued to be not in this world.
1.6.2
“Aristotelian” Scholasticism – Albert and Thomas
Page 57-59
' During
the 11th and 12th centuries, the
intellectual tradition of the Jews and the Arabs made their
way into the West. Parts of Southern Italy and the Iberian
Peninsula had been occupied by the Arabs, and especially in
Spain there were large Jewish communities. Both the Jews and
the Arabs had initially been under the influence of Plato and
Neo-Platonism. When the works of Aristotle were being read
again, both the Jewish and the Arab Moslem traditions changed
from a synthesis of their religious ideas with Platonism, to a
hybridisation of this with Aristotle's ideas. Ultimately, the
learned of the time discovered the differences between
Aristotle and Plato more precisely, and a new synthesis of the
traditions came about. The contact between Christians, Moslems
and Jews in Southern Europe caused similar changes in “Latin”
Western thinking. It moved from a synthesis with the Platonist
tradition to a hybridisation with Aristotelianism and then to
a synthesis with a purer distillation of Aristotle's thought.
. decisions of the Synods .. were seen as equal in authority
to the Bible. Thus Plato's influence remains strong, because
his ideas had already been melted into the accepted tradition
of the Catholic Church.
Albert the
Great, an early thirteenth-century thinker, was a follower of
Aristotle. He believed that the whole universe is teleological
and accentuated this aspect. . he was also involved in
alchemical experiments.
Albert's
student and disciple, the famous Thomas Aquinas, followed
Aristotle even more closely. .. He developed a very
complicated theory of the relationship between his God and
creatures. Being a Christian, he could easily follow in
Aristotle's footsteps and say that God was his own object, and
that He was not interested in His creation. The biblical idea
of God, however, is that of a person: a father in relation to
children, a king in relation to subjects, a judge in relation
to transgressors and other similar metaphorical descriptions
that abound in the Bible. ..
Remarks by
Thomas Aquinas, it seems, provided the starting points for the
witch hunts conducted by the church. Thomas's thought is
ambiguous, leaning towards the organismic, and in some cases
crossing lines in that direction, something Augustine would
have seen as pantheistic or occult. '
Self
Venter and
I agree that God are partly people. ' The Biblical idea
of God .. that of a
person .. father ..relation .. king ..relation .. judge .. relation .. metaphorical .. '
Thomas
Aquinas had a similar ugly, selfish; possibly totalitarian
G[g]od that Aristotle had.
Page 236
' .. being
told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot
lie. ' [Excerpt from The summa theologica by Thomas
Aquinas]
12 October
2012
1.7 The
Renaissance
Page 59
' There
was a constant refusal to interpret the Classics or even the
Bible simply in the light of the dogmas of the church. One of
the reasons was that the theologians and philosophers of the
church got so involved in solving complex logical puzzles that
the issues that affected daily life were forgotten. Another
was the corruption in the church hierarchy, which induced some
to say that the original sources said something different from
what the church officials were saying. '
Page 61
' Since
almost all of the Renaissance adherents of the organismic
approach were proponents of occultism, they will not be
discussed here. Well-known names are Copernicus, Nicolas
Cusanus, Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Paracelcus,
Cornelius Agrippa and Giordano Bruno. Not all of them engaged
in serious occultism. .. yet others, like Bruno, were totally
pagan in their thought. '
Self
The
relevance of occultism at ICrM relates to trade secrets
because occultism implies secrets.
1.8 Modern
Philosophy
1.8.1 The
transition to the mechanistic picture
Page 61-63
' In
the late Middle Ages, we have the emergence of the impetus
theory, which replaced Aristotle's theory of the natural
destination of elements. ..
During the
Renaissance, a new kind of technology emerged, namely the
artificial imitations of living animals, viz. automata (little
ducks moving by themselves) and very importantly, the
development of the pendulum clock. ..
In this
way, the image of the clock was transferred to the universe.
The Perfect Engineer made the universe as a clock. ..
Organists
would say that orthodox Judaism and Christianity contributed
to this for, on the basis of the cultural mandate” in Genesis,
they preach control. The Biblical tradition, they complained,
de-sacralised the world. According to them, the world was
living, spiritual and divine and we should treat it as such.
Furthermore, we should stop trying to master it, and rather
try to live in harmony with the great living god in whom we
have our home.
Self
Mechanistic
pictures and Christianity allow more ICrM than organismic
pictures, therefore additional truths are relevant. The truths
that make us realise where to stop. Thoughts about maxima
becomes relevant. Is it right to take and make the maximum
possible. I argue currently that truth is a natural restrainer
because honesties restrain onvolhoubare profits.
1.8.2
Descartes
and Leibniz
Page 63-64
' Descartes
accepted the mechanistic world picture as developed to explain
the movement of the heavenly bodies. ..
He
expanded it even further by applying it, not only to the
astronomical universe and the human body, but also to all
living things. All animals are machines, he says: their bodies
function like machines. As for human beings, they differ from
brute animals in the sense that, apart from bodies, they have
souls – A human being therefore consists of reason (thought)
and extension (body) – a thinking soul in a mechanical
body. '
Self
The effect
of separating soul and body could have different effects on
human behaviour. Let's say a creator oppose a status quo with
new intellectual creations (ICr). The controllers of the
status quo can argue, if they sacrifice the body of the
creator they will get rid of the opposing force. The sacrifice
is not really a sin because the soul keeps on living. They
could also argue that whilst the intellectuality (soul) is
contained in the body they should rather preserve the body so
that they can keep track of the intellectual development by
spying, for, if they sacrifice the body the intellectuality
contained in the soul will emerge somewhere else and they
cannot foresee where. They could also say they should allow
free will and free ICr and remunerate it because it will
increase exports and wealths of nations. There are many ways
of looking at the effects and I will not expand about it here.
Page 64
' Descartes
was one of the earliest thinkers to formulate the basis of
Modern scientistic (68) rationalism, namely (i) that the laws
governing the world are rational law; that (ii) we can know
them by deductions from rational principles; and that (iii)
these deductions lead us to truth if they are done according
to the method of the natural sciences (especially
mathematics). ..
Descartes
believed that knowledge of these laws could help us obey
another law, namely the one that commands the promotion of the
general good of mankind. This we can do by coming to know the
power of the elements and the heavenly bodies to the same
degree that we know the crafts of artisans, and “apply them in
the same way to all the uses to which we are adapted, and thus
render ourselves lords and possessors of nature” (Discourse on
method VI, V&L:49). ..
When today
the organismic thinkers accuse modern thought of disrespect
towards nature, they have only to produce this quote from
Descartes. Descartes, in referring to the elements and the
heavenly bodies, really pointed to a divine throne for the
human rational engineer who, he believed, could become the
owner and sovereign over “nature”. On a small scale, a medical
follower of Descartes showed how the values and attitudes
towards the environment changes with the adoption of the
mechanistic picture. The Dutch physician, Boerhaave, had no
qualms about the vivisection of animals, since he thought that
animals have no souls; they are simply very complicated
machines. Thus, in fact, the sensitive life of the animal was
denied.
This
attitude ingrained itself in modern Western thought.
(68)
Scientism is the view of science which proposes that only the
methods of the natural sciences can ever bring us near truth,
also in the human sciences. Adherents of scientism move
between two extremes: those that are deductivists, and believe
that the answer lies only in the method of mathematics, and
inductivists, who think the starting point is always
experiment and observation. '
Page 65-66
' Another
seventeenth-century
philosopher, Leibniz, (a scientistic rationalist like
Descartes) tried to combine the mechanistic and the organismic
world pictures. . “monads” .. They are all alive and all
monads are “aware” to a certain extent. ..
The
hierarchy is reminiscent of that of Aristotle. Some monads are
sensitive (they can feel) and other monads are rational. ..
In
Leibniz, the organismic side still dominates. Later we find
combinations of the two pictures, where the mechanistic
dominates (such as in Kant and Adam Smith below). '
Self
Mechanistic
pictures allow more abstractions which is good for ICrM and
organismic pictures require more restraint which is also good
for volhoubaarheid of ICrM.
1.8.3
Thomas Hobbes – mechanistic and organismic societal
explanations
Page 66-67
' Hobbes
put his readers before a choice: if you want to be safe,
rather be satisfied with the civil state. If you think of
rebellion, then the state of nature will take over and you
will be in constant danger.
.. The
mechanistic picture, from them (sic) on, was associated with
totalitarianism and – as we have shown in discussing Plato
.. the organismic picture became closely associated with
totalitarianism. The reason for this is that organismic
thinking tends to include the smaller into larger wholes,
which gives them life and control them. .. The mechanistic
picture, however, suggests that one can remove the parts of a
machine and replace them or put them back again. For those
using these pictures, the machine is not a structured whole in
the same sense as a living body (parts can exist for longer
outside the machine than limbs can outside of a living
body). '
Self
Depending
how much change is implied by intellectual creations will
partly determine how rebellious it seems. The openness also
signifies rebelliousness or not. ICr in a way nullifies the
organismic picture because parts are dependent on the whole in
the organismic picture. If a new part grows independently then
it is not dependent on the whole especially if the
totalitarian nature of the organismic picture tries to destroy
new creations. New creations will normally be dependent on the
whole in the sense that it grows out of the whole, because of
the current circumstances that have incoherent imbalances that
cannot be sustained. More freedom is allowed in the
mechanistic picture to create because in the organismic
picture new creations that can disturb the equilibrium first
have to be approved by totalitarian rulers. Totalitarian
rulers will logically not be very creative because
creativities would be against their own philosophy of
stability.
Page 67
' Hobbes,
however, feels there is a difference between taking apart a
watch and taking apart society. A watch is a small thing that
is objectively there before me, but society is a large entity
that encompasses me. Concequently, Hobbes says: “OK. We do as
if ...” Thus he wants to take the social machine apart in a
hypothetical sense. Hobbes may not have thought of this at the
time, but what he says is very pretentious: he says that if
you follow a mechanistic method, you can come to understand
with scientific precision that in which you are boxed
in. '
Self
Studies of
accounting of ideas is similar to Hobbes's study because it is
a study of circumstances that encompass us all. It doesn't
matter whether a person is a creator or not, we are all
involved due to the effect that new creations have on us all.
Page 68
' According
to Hobbes, humankind has four faculties: bodily strength,
experience, passion, and reason (1972:109). It is the
passions that determine the way of life in the state of
nature. All men are equal in that state, and nature allows
everybody an equal right to everything. That different
men have a passion (appetite) for the same thing must lead to
the right of the stronger; intellectual contest, aimed at
glory, may itself lead to severe violence. Even in the civil
state this is visible in the fact that people socialise not
for the love of fellows, but for the sake of self-love in the
form of gain or glory. (1972:115) '
Self
The above
quote shows another paradox of the organismic picture. If a
stable totalitarian organism exist people do not have to use
their passions and bodily strength to survive. What will they
use then? Mainly two things of which one is rational
capacities, that leads to ICr that will naturally then cause
new things that oppose totalitarian stability.
Page 72
' The
mechanistic analysis was to show that in the state of nature,
the individuals as independent parts destroy one another, but
inevitably come to the realisation that they have to cooperate
and make peace for the sake of the self-preservation of all
individuals. It is clear that this rational conclusion does
not guarantee the peace and the right to self-preservation.
The organismic metaphors then shift rationality and the
righteous will to the living societal animal, using terms and
metaphors that make it totalitarian and absolute. This serves
the purpose of denying the right to protest and of warning
that whoever considers rebellion is actually re-instituting
the state of nature. Hobbes speeded up the publication of his
work especially to warn against rebellion. Since the reason
and the will of the state provide us with the protection
needed for self-preservation, we have to serve the state as
our god. (In the Leviathan, Hobbes calls the state the
mortal god!)
… the
criticism that he made civil powers too strong, taken away
liberty of conscience, and set princes above the laws
(1972:105). '
Self
Currently
intequism puts the law of truths highest above any ruler.
1.8.4 Radical mechanism – La
Mettrie
Page 72
' To
De la Mettrie there is no real difference between a human
being and an animal: both of them are really only
machines. '
1.8.5 Adam
Smith and Kant – competition as mechanism
Page 77
' ..
gravitational equilibrium model .. '
Self
Kant's and
Smith's models gave too much power for free fluctuations that
led to economic imbalances that could have been prohibited
with enforcement of Kant's universal laws with regard to ICrM.
Extortion and other civil transgressions are used as methods
of competition whilst their models apply. The transgressions
are not easily controlled with criminal actions which makes
the transgressions highly relevant at ICrM.
1.8.6
Hegel and the recovery of organismic holism
Page 77-78
' He
believed that everything flows out of the Idea (or Concept).
Hegel, being extremely rationalistic, thinks of reality is
(sic) concept and logical deduction. The “Idea” or “Concept”
is alive and divine, and the process of out-flowing occurs
according to a logical system of deducing one concept from
another. Yet it is all organic – to Hegel it is not simply
dead logic, but the living concept enriching itself through
its different oppositional moments. '
Self
It is not
clear where Hegel would ascribe remuneration with regard to
ideas because he has a view similar to that of Plotinus and
Plato but he acknowledges the logical reasoning that takes
place in thinkers. I think copyright law is partly based on
his philosophy therefore some attribution must have been
accredited to creators by him.
Page 78
' Thus,
instead of the long hierarchical chain that we find with
Plotinus, Hegel's ontology moves between two points only: the
“Idea” and “Nature”. The Idea subverts itself and becomes its
opposite, Nature. In nature, the Idea remains hidden
(alienated from itself). Nature then subverts itself to become
the Idea again, but now the Idea has completely opened up like
a flower, and we call it Spirit. …
The
initial Idea is abstract, claims Hegel, for we cannot make any
distinctions in it. It is only in its development that we can
make distinctions. It is like Plotinus' hierarchy in which we
can only make distinctions in the lower emanations – not in
the One. As the Idea transforms itself, it grows in content –
it is now more specific: the universal becomes more and more
individual. In nature, the individuals are fixed. Nature is
subject to Necessity (the natural laws are inevitable). Thus
in Nature, the Idea is not free. As matter it has no leeway at
all, but Nature transforms and enriches itself to become more
and more universal again, until it completely emerges as
Spirit. Spirit is freedom. In its self-transformation, it
increases its freedom until it is identical with the Idea
again, i.e. the Absolute Spirit, the divine “flower” now being
fully open. By then, it carries all the distinctions that
opened up in it through all the moments of its opening
up. '
Self
The
development of an Idea can be recorded through its phases of
development until the idea returns to the Absolute where it
cannot be recorded. The life cycle of a product can be
recorded from the time it can be distinguished at the
conceivers and from their, through the development process to
the marketing process to the eventual replacement by other
products. ICrM applies to the initial phase because we already
keep record of the later phases. Modern information systems
should make the earlier recognition of Ideas possible.
Page 79
' This
theory, according to which opposites are born from one
another, is called dialectics. According to Hegel, the
dialectical “process” works in this way: the Thesis gives
birth to its Antithesis. Thesis and Anti-Thesis form a new
unity, a new Thesis that gives birth to a new Anti-Thesis. In
abstract form, one of the earliest traits of organismic
thinking reappears, namely polaristic thinking. '
Page 80
' To
summarise the system: Everything is alive, for the Idea is
alive. The Idea is the same as god, but in an undeveloped
form. When the Idea goes out of itself, it becomes Nature,
which includes matter and plants and animals. When the Idea
returns to itself, it becomes Concept, Reason, Spirit, and
god. Everything is alive and full of Reason (everything is
logical), for the Idea is in everything. The Idea is god in
development, In Nature, therefore, everything is alive,
reasonable and logical. Even concepts are alive. …
-
He firmly believed that the Idea
develops into ever more complicated wholes, with Concept
inherent in all of them.
-
He said that, from their outward
appearance, we could analyse them as parts of a whole –like
machine parts.
-
On the inside, though, they were
organic wholes, like living things that have no parts, with
only members and organs, ones which cannot function outside of
the living body. (You can take a steering wheel out of a car
and use it as the front wheel of a wheel barrow, but you
cannot take an arm off a human being and use it as an
instrument to dig your garden, for example.)
-
It is Concept that give them life,
that makes them into wholes. Even if outwardly it seemed as if
the universe is a machine (as De la Mettrie proposed),
inwardly the universe is a logical, living, conceptual being –
it is “divine”. '
Self
Was god
written with lower case because it refers to people? If so it
could be an argument in favour of ICrM. If ideas can be
analysed like machine parts they can also be recorded.
15 October
2012
1.8.7 Goethe – organismic
philosophy of nature
Page 81
' Goethe
was a very famous German poet, and dramatist. In his own days,
he was also a well-known philosopher not only with regard to
nature, but also regarding the development of the human being.
He was a humanist, related to the Neo-Platonist tradition.
Like Lessing, his interest was the progression of the human
being to a higher moral level.
As a
philosopher of nature, he was clearly a pantheist and his
thinking was closely related to that of Plotinus. …
Being an
adherent of Neo-Platonism, he also believed in Ideal
Forms. '
Self
Being a
poet he probably used metaphors that are against Plato's
order. It is not possible to generalise about one thing as
criteria in a categorical hierarchical order for example
absolute truths being maximum honesties, or is it? Do
pantheists always become ' poets ' or are some of
them Platonists. I assume Plato was not a pantheist because
his Forms were removed from nature of which our bodies form
part.
1.8.8
Darwin
and mechanistic evolution
Page 82
' Darwin
adapted the idea of competition from the economic sphere into
a struggle of one organism against another, and of the
organism against its environment. '
Self
If
Darwin's theory that our environments change us is true, then
our attitudes towards accounting of ideas will change us as
organisms, because attitudes towards accounting of ideas
(intequism) changes the environment within which a person
survives. Environments will eventually then cause different
species. The difference is that when looking at two attitudes
towards intequism the one attitude can be compared to
materialism and determinism. Nature and the environment will
determine those species. The other attitude relates more to
idealism which will form that specie. The second that relates
to idealism can be compared to an order in which God is
present and the other to an order in which Pan is present as
supreme deity.
1.9
Irrationalism and the recovery of the organismic picture
Page 83
' Physical
nature, the law of entropy says, always moves back to
equilibrium when the equilibrium is disturbed, for example
when I heat a glass of water and leave it in a room, the water
will have returned to room temperature after a brief time. …
The law of entropy thus seems to make the spontaneous
generation of life impossible, because if by any accident an
imbalance favourable to the origination of life should come
about, it would not be sustainable for long enough for life to
realise.
… Some
organismic thinkers (such as Bergson) argued that life itself
has creative abilities and that life as such did not come from
matter but from some higher source. '
Self
According
to the above my current thoughts do not classify Bergson then
as a pantheist or organismic thinker because ' higher
source ' implies God. According to the Penguin dictionary
of philosophy and the Oxford dictionary of philosophy
Bergson's thoughts compare favourably to mine but I remember
reading something somewhere else that differed substantially.
Maybe it relates to his opinion about ICr in his open society
and trade secrets and remuneration for ICr.
1.9.1 JC Smuts – holism get
as name
Page 84
' General
JC Smuts was an adherent of holism, which stands in a tension
with the second law of thermodynamics – the law of entropy.
According
to this law, whenever you have any order, then by nature it
will return to chaos. In other words whenever you have any
imbalance, it will automatically return to equilibrium. '
Self
' by
nature will return to chaos ' implies an outside power or
a higher power. In a mechanistic view in the short term this
cannot be observed. After a chemical solution has reached a
balance it stays stable unless something is added. The law of
entropy is thus maybe not as pantheistic (organismic) as
portrayed sometimes because if chaos is a result of balance in
nature there is an unexplained (noumenon) first mover.
Page 84
' Smuts
said that anything that formed a “whole” is creative. A
“whole” does not simply follow the second law of
thermodynamics by returning to chaos, but rather creates all
kinds of more complicated forms. Thus, if we had a whole
system of matter, this may create life, and systems of life
interacting as a whole may create even more complicated forms
of life. … Starting form matter there is an evolutionary
process, one which in the end brings about human beings and
finally man changes into god. '
1.9.1
Mussolini – when the organic state itself becomes the
reality
Page 85
' Mussolini
explicitly declared his adherence to an organic picture of the
world and to him the world has only two parts: that which is
spiritual and permanent (the state) and that which is material
and transitory (the individual).
He adopted
a kind of holism: the state is a real spiritual living being
and the individual citizen is actually only an organ of the
state. Individuals have no being and no life outside the
state. The state therefore only cares for those individuals
who really are in harmony with it. The interests of the state
are primary and all-encompassing: a totalitarian state.
… Of
course, our human tendency to expand the application of our
pictures and symbols into areas more and more unrelated to
their original application can also be seen in the history of
the organismic world picture: the living wholes found need not
be organisms in the ordinary sense of the word. '
Self
According
to some sources the totalitarian regimes espoused Plato. Their
believes would then have the Anomaly of Plato (Truth and
stability combined cannot exist currently) inherent to it. I
wonder if Venter meant by ' human tendency ', human
weakness because earlier he talked about us transcending our
difficult situations by forming pictures of what we cannot see
(Pages 6-7).
Page 86
' But
note that even though the totalitarianism is extreme, there is
no sign of scientism here: the bergsonian background,
specifically the adjustment to the ebb and flow of evolution,
points in the direction of anti-scientistic
irrationalism. '
Bergson's
philosophy was explained as follows:
' But,
on the other hand, he has shown that life also consists in the
practical necessities imposed on our body and accounting for
our habitual mode of knowing in spatial terms. More
specifically then, Bergson's project in Creative
Evolution is to offer a philosophy capable of
accounting both for the continuity of all living beings—as
creatures—and for the discontinuity implied in the
evolutionary quality of this creation. …
We
can see again that there are bodily needs which must be
satisfied. The force of these needs is the source of the
closed morality. Because of these needs, there is a rigidity
to the rules of closed moralities. Kant's moral philosophy has
its source in such needs. The survival of the community
requires that there be strict obedience: the categorical
imperative. Yet, although Kant's categorical imperative is
supposed to be universal, it is not, according to Bergson. It
is limited and particular. Closed morality really concerns the
survival of a society, my society. Therefore, it always
excludes other societies. Indeed, for Bergson, closed morality
is always concerned with war. And static religion, the
religion of closed morality, is based on what Bergson calls
the “fabulation function.” The fabulation function is a
particular function of the imagination that creates “voluntary
hallucinations.” The fabulation function takes our sense that
there is a presence watching over us and invents images of
gods. These images then insure strict obedience to the closed
morality. In short, they insure social cohesion. '
(Lawlor,
Leonard
and Moulard, Valentine, "Henri Bergson", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), From: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/bergson/>
on
15 October 2012.)
1.9.3
Capra – the organismic history and oriental philosophy
Page 86-87
' Society
is also an organic entity – it is born, it grows, it gets old,
it dies … and somewhere in the womb of the old society a new
one is born, one that has different characteristics...
… He opted
for the organismic world picture and world view, and therefore
occultists (who share this world picture) do find him helpful
and interesting (also since they want to project the image
that their beliefs are “scientific”).
… Capra
follows the historian and philosopher of history, Toynbee, in
his analysis of the cultural crisis. According to Toynbee,
history proceeds through repeated cycles of cultural birth,
flourishing, and decline. A cultural epoch or civilisation
grows through the leadership of a creative group, until it
reaches a summit and has a large following. Soon after this,
however, it appears to become unable to handle the challenges of
its times, because the leadership starts to smother
creativity. From this point on, it goes inevitably downhill,
but at the same time a creative minority will arise. They will
develop new forms, and these forms will be able to handle the
challenges of the time. Up to a very late stage, the
traditionalists, who by then will be a minority, will still be
in power and will attempt to suppress the creative minority.
Still, the old forms will inevitably die out, and the new ones
will take their place. A totally new civilisation will develop
which, of course, will be subject to the same cycle of growth
and decay. '
Self
Capra
implies that the new conceived states and objects start at
parts, according to ICr. Organismic views can have two
different directions that creativities are remunerated in.
According to Capra creativities start at parts. According to
Smuts creativities can only be ascribed to wholes.
Page 87
' Capra
combines Toynbee's ideas of the historical cycles with the
so-called ancient idea of a cultural rhythm. He adopted this
latter idea from a Russian sociologist, Sorokin. The latter
developed a theory on cycles of values. He believed that there
are basically three value systems, namely materialism,
spiritualism and idealism. In materialism, all attention is
directed to material things. Spiritualism focuses one-sidedly
on spiritual values. Idealism, in turn, tries to keep these
opposing sets of values, i.e. the materialistic and
spiritualistic, in balance. '
Self
Currently
my thoughts distinguish between idealism and materialism.
Thoughts of materialism start at objects of physicality and
thoughts of idealism start at concepts/objects of
meta-physicality for example truths. Philosophies can be
categorised with these two directions. Both these directions
include thoughts in brains that is a go-between, in between
the physical and the meta-physical. Probably my
' idealism ' should rather be called spiritualism
and my ' go-between ' should be called idealism in
order to have the balance between physicality and
meta-physicality. There are thus three points of reference to
establish a balance and to exclude generalisations to one or
the other side.
I have not
conceived of a third point of reference between honesties and
deceits. It is not necessary to choose between the two because
we all choose naturally because we all communicate via words.
At the categorical hierarchical level of truths and deceits
thus there is only two points of reference which we all choose
between without thinking about a choice. This automatic choice
could be an instinctual choice that can perhaps only be
affected and changed by being reborn to either side. Many
people are not aware of the three choices inherent amongst
idealism, materialism and spiritualism because to be aware of
that, philosophical knowledge is required. That implies that
' idealism ' for a schooled philosopher is according
to me the only honest opinion because of the generalisations
inherent to ' materialism ' and
' spirituality '. Three lapses back in two when
materialism and spiritualism are classified together in
deceits and idealism in honesties. ICrM will have the maximum
effect in territories that espouse ' idealism '
because it implies honesties by schooled philosophers and
religious ministers etc. in those territories.
Page 88-89
' Systems
theory is holistic, like the philosophy of JC Smuts. It says
that the whole of anything is always more than the sum of its
parts. According to systems theory, the whole reality is
composed out of systems, which are part of larger systems,
which are again parts of even larger systems. All of these
systems are living units. The universe in its totality is
therefore not just a collection of things, but a living system
(much like a human being or an animal). … wholes are more
important than the parts – which is exactly what “holism”
means.
… to be
part of the larger whole, viz. the tribe [This is what Jesus'
love implies. Individuals should be trying not to be breaking
laws (with understanding that abnormal temptations from devils
exist) to love one's enemies so that we can fit into a larger
whole.] '
Self
Systems
theory contradicts the earlier section of Capra that said that
parts change wholes. The situation is the same as Sorokin's
idealism, spirituality and materialism. The impression exist
that Western (Left?) philosophy has not reached a balance
between the generalisations that wholes are more important
than parts or parts are more important than wholes. Although
our instincts are to generalise to one of these two
directions, left (west?) or right (east?), we forget about
other directions that have a more balanced view that combines
the left and right, for example from/to straight ahead and
from/to the back. Perhaps thoughts will be more balanced if
its are conceived within a framework of north, east, west,
south, north-east, north-west, south-west and south-east. Left
becomes west, right becomes east. Although it gives eight
directions of thought in stead of many's instinctual two
directions it will cause much confusion if political thought
for example is described as west in stead of left and east in
stead of right.
1.10 Understanding and
rebuilding Africa
Van der Walt,
B.J. 2008. Understanding and rebuilding
Africa, from desperation today towards expectation for
tomorrow. Institute for Contemporary Christianity
in Africa. (In: Van der Walt M.F.ed. 2012. Geskiedenis
van
die filosofie, studiegids vir PHIL221PAC, Afdeling C:
Leesbundel Potchefstroom, South Africa: North-West
University. Pp. 93-98)
Page 94
' Of
the three worldviews (sic) to be compared later on in this
chapter, the modern Western [mechanistic] and traditional
African [organismic] worldviews (sic) belong to the first
category, viz. they are not built on divine revelation.
However, the third worldview, the Christian, is based on God's
revelation.
… A
worldview functions like a map, it provides orientation; like
a compass, it gives direction from a deep religious
commitment.
…
definition of religion: it is the central directedness (sic)
of all human life towards the real or presumed ultimate source
(God/god) of meaning and authority. I will not elaborate
further on this definition. '
Self
ICrM was
heavily influenced by the Bible with regard to sacrificing of
creators. ICrM has a definition of God that is actuality and
not presumed.
Page 95-96
' In
his excellent book Christianity and African gods (1999) Yusufu
Turaki indicates that the African holistic reality is a
spiritual reality. This is in sharp contrast to Western
materialism. Basically everything is of a spiritual nature.
This is the reason why the African worldview was in the past
described as “animistic”. Recognition of and participation in
the spirit world is of the utmost importance to the African
people (see also Steyne, 1989).
… the
pietistic, apocalyptic, “gospel of wealth” and other types of
Christianity imported from the US, which are regretfully
spreading like wildfire on the continent. All of them are
Christian “narcotics” rather than Christian “tonics”. They do
not encourage challenging the status quo, but rather promote
submissive acceptance.
… A
communalistic worldview
.. in
contrast to Western individualism, Africa emphasises the
community.
… As we
already know .. most Africans believe in a Supreme Being. He
is, however, an aloof god, a deus remotus, not much interested
or involved in his creation. He is (due to the holistic
character of this worldview) also not clearly distinguishable
from the all-encompassing spiritual reality.
… The
religious life of Africans is not something isolated, focused
on a god. It is an inherent part of their communal life ..
spirit world of demi-gods and the ancestors or “living dead”.
… From a
Biblical perspective – which equally asserts individuality and
communality – human identity neither arises from within the
individual nor stems from the community. God created human
beings with both an individual and a communal facet. We are
defined neither by our individuality nor by our communality.
Individuality and communality are two aspects or qualities of
the multi-dimensional human being. It is preferable to say
that a person has individuality or speak of a person as having
the quality of communality, rather than saying a person is an
individual or is a communal being. Furthermore, individuality
and communality are complementary.
… they do
not acknowledge universal norms for one's behaviour towards
other human beings. … Discriminating against or even
killing a person from another tribe, is not considered a crime
or sin. Good or bad, right or wrong can only be committed
against a member of one's own ethnic group. Anything outside
the kinship system is labelled the “outside world” of
strangers where no rules apply and where “the end justifies
the means” or “might is right”. '
Self
With
regard to ICrM the above kinship system is applicable in all
parts of the world due to the common property status of ideas.
Page 97
' Africa
does not clearly distinguish between a creator and its
creation, as already indicated. It is not acquainted with the
Biblical idea of creation. What is, has always been. As a
result “nature” is something isolated from the divine,
separate from the spirit world. Nature is full of spirits
(pantheism). '
2. Nature
versus culture
22 October
2012
Leerenhede
Bl. 24-25
' Die
Grieke het nie 'n duidelike afgrensing van die idee van
“natuur” gemaak nie – die term “phusis” wat gewoonlik met
“natuur” vertaal word, beteken eintlik iets soos beweging, wat
ook insluit die beweging van gode soos die sterre. ...
Gedurende
die Middeleeue … God herstel die mens as “natuur” (skepsel)
deur genade as die mens glo. Deur hierdie genade word ook die
rasionele vermoë
van die mens weer aangevul, sodat die mens die natuurwette vir
sy lewe beter kan verstaan. Deel van vaardighede, soos
berekeninge, musiek maak en skrywe, maar ook vervaardiging van
materiële dinge en wapens.
…
Die Moderne visie ..
Hierdie visie perk die idee van “natuur” duidelik in tot die
benede-rasionele (anorganiese, die biotiese, die sintuie,
die instinkte, die passies, die sentimente). Die “kultuur”
is die sosiale produk van die rede, maar dit ontspring aan
die “natuur” en ontluik deur 'n lang natuurproses waarin
konflik en kompetisie 'n groot rol speel. Die Moderne-Tyd
gebruik die Griekse en Romeinse geloof dat die mens se
waardigheid daarin geleë is dat hy sy benede-rasionele
aspekte moet onderdruk, en omvorm met behulp hiervan die
verhouding van “kultuur” en “natuur” tot een van
oorheersing, onderdrukking, en herskepping.
Self
Rasioneel gaan ook oor
wat waar is. Venter het waarskynlik Sartre as irrasioneel
geklasifiseer, omdat dit wat Sartre geskryf het nie waar
was, bv. ' net mens self beïnvloed mens se lewe '.
Waar is 'n ontologiese meta-fisiese begrip wat mens weer by
die onbeskryflike bring. My begrip van ' waar ' is
meta-fisies, beskryflik, as gevolg van geloof in God, wat
dit verseker, soortgelyk aan Descartes.
Vandag dink ek die
term rasioneel, waaroor mens eers begin dink waneer mens se
kennis daaroor uitbrei, dui in essensie op geloof van God in
God. Die ' ra ' gedeelte van die woord is
waarskynlik 'n afleiding van die Egiptiese ' Ra '
en die ' sion ' van die Griekse ' sun '
wat met beteken. Die woord beteken dus—met God—wat gelees
kan word in die sin van ' ration ' of
' ratio '. Dalk kom die ' tio ' gedeelte
van Theo af wat ratio dan laat as: God (ra) God (tio). In
Afrikaans ' breekdeel '. Dus wiskundige
denkpatrone. Prof. Pienaar het gesê volgens sy kennis moet
betekenisse van woorde nie bepaal word deur hoofsaaklik na
die etimologie (oorsprong) te kyk. Die etimologie maak egter
sin saam met die ander agtergrond. Om saam met God te dink
veroorsaak dat mens onder omstandighede van druk nog steeds
rasioneel optree. Die rasionaliteit verwys dus meer na
die—met God—as na die optrede. Die—met God—hang weer af van
'n definisie van God wat reg of verkeerd is en die reg of
verkeerd aangaande 'n definisie van God is moontlik 'n
onbeskryflike oorweging. Die moeilikheid om
' rasioneel ' te definieer word veroorsaak deur
definisies van God. Mnr. Van der Walt het gesê moderne
rasionaliste sal nie na ekstreme voorbeelde kyk bv., met
doodsgevaar, om rasionaliteit te verstaan. Gestel mens word
aangeval deur 'n baie groot leeu wat mens verseker sal
verskeur en die persoon vries. Mens kan nie dan sê die
persoon is irrasioneel omdat hy vries, want mens weet nie of
die vries saam met God of sonder God was. Hoe kan ons
werklik seker wees oor definisies van God behalwe deur ons
eie geloof?
16 October
2012
Page 100
' ..
wherever mankind is present, there nature in man and in man's
environment is changed. In some contexts, these changes occur
in harmony with the course of nature. This could lead to an
adoration of nature, in which natural phenomena are
experienced as divine. In the Bible, man and his environment
are unified in creation. Sin, as well as the subsequent
actions of mankind, is the cause of the destruction of the
environment and man himself. In yet other instances,
alienation between man and nature occurs. We find this already
present among the Ancient Greek sophists who were contrasting
“physis” with “nomos”, some choosing the side of “physis”
(like Callicles of Acharnae, who preached the right of the
stronger as the only right). In modern Western secular
culture, for example, nature has been experienced as an enemy
to be subdued. '
2.1
Ancient Greece
Page 100
' In
Ancient Greece “nature” was conceived as “physis” (from which
our modern word “physics” is derived) “Physis” meant something
like “the moving”, “the changing”, “the growing”, which can
probably be understood in terms of the organismic world
picture of the Greeks. Opposed to “physis” were different
terms that expressed the typical actions of humankind, such as
“logos” (“reasoning” and “word”), “nomos” (“law” or “civil
obligation”), and the most important one, namely “techne”
(“skill” and its concomitant products).
2.2 The
Middle Ages
' In
the Middle Ages, we find a similar contrast: “creation” (which
was probably related to the Greek “physis”), “that which is
given by God in the beginning”, and “ars” (a translation of
the Greek “techne”), which is that which is brought about by
the intellectual and manual skills of man. Unfortunately, the
words “techne” and “ars” are usually translated into English
as “art”. The English word “art” is ambiguous; it can refer to
the fine arts (like poetry, painting, sculpting), or to
“skill” and its products (.. artisan ..). '
2.3 Modern philosophy and
culture
' In
the late seventeenth century, “nature” was conceived of as
teleological, both in and outside of man. This means that
“nature” aims at progress and that mankind will make progress,
regardless of whether they know it or not. (This does not mean
that everything is well with every human being, but that
mankind as a species will improve over time). A mechanical
concept of “culture” develops with this - “nature” is supposed
to ensure progress through competition and war, and this works
automatically. The constant threat of war forces us to develop
faster, so as to avoid being overpowered by other nations.
Thus, when we come to the eighteenth century, war and violence
is considered to be good, for it contributes to
progress. '
2.3.1
Enlightenment
Page 101
' Man
was supposed to create order within his own reason, and impose
this order on creation. Man was also supposed to be master of
his own fate. Thus Kant, for example, tells us on the one hand
that we do not know the order of the universe outside of the
mind, but that we impose our plans on that order. He also
views man as an end in himself (which to him means “freedom”),
i.e. mankind autonomously decides on a rational moral order. …
Part of
the nature-culture dialectic is the tension between a
return to nature and the necessity of progress. …
Another
aspect of the nature-culture tension finds expression in the
individual-social tension. “The natural human being” is
considered to be a free individual without any social bonds.
Each individual takes care of his or her own needs. … We
always need some power structure to protect us from one
another. … It seems to me that this is also still the case
with Locke, but towards the end of the 17th
century, the relationship between nature and culture, and
therefore between individual and society, became a historical
one .. (Those who followed Aristotle, like Hutchinson, Adam
Smith's teacher, accepted that the human being is always
social. Such adherents were, however, few and far between.)
This individualistic approach to the “natural” human being is
exactly the opposite from the beliefs we find in Africa.
According to African tradition, naturally, all human beings
live in society – in fact, they are considered products of
society: “A human is a human through other human beings”, is
the Ubuntu adage. '
Self
The
meaning of ' social ' according to Hutchinson
differs from the meaning for Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Hutchinson's definition relates more to Jesus' love because
individuals show their commitment to society by not breaking
laws whilst staying creators. Societies of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau expect of members of their group (common wealth) to
transgress universal laws for their common wealth and to
oppose new creativities.
Page
102-103
' (Hobbes
and Defoe) … although it is believed that individual human
beings are naturally unsociable (a war of all against all, as
Hobbes says), yet they find some agreement with others not to
attack one another and to form a group that is able to protect
its members against the stronger. (The idea of ganging up in a
group against the stronger ones was already denigrated in
Ancient Greece by the Sophist Callicles of Acharnae. As modern
thought became more naturalistic, it focussed more on the
struggle for power and survival. After Hobbes, we find this as
a very strong element in Turgot, Kant, but especially in
Darwin, the Social Darwinists, and Nietzsche (who seems to be
quoting Callicales).
We find
two views of the contractual society:
-
The first and most well-known kind we
find in the theory of Jean Jacque Rousseau. According to him,
society is set up by a single contract that binds all members,
and this is almost “once and for all”.
-
The second view was that of Adam
Smith. To him, society is actually a continuous process of
contracting. All human interacting is a continuous
contracting, thus all human relationships are based on
self-interest. Loving your wife is similar to trading or
bartering. Life is one big “market”; we are “trading” all the
time.
The
inherent tension involved in the understanding of the
individual-social relationship is quite complicated. … Both
Hobbes and Rousseau tended to understand this freedom as under
the protection of an absolute and totalitarian state. '
Self
I do not
agree with Venter's explanation about the forms of the two
social contracts. The crux of the difference between the two
contracts is that according to Jean Jacque Rousseau we should
be creatures and according to Kant and Smith we should be
creators. Kant and Smith thus imply we have to conceive ideas
to survive, whilst continuous change is a given. Kant's and
Smith's view implies a bigger emphasis on manufacturing as in
the economy of Germany. Rousseau's view implies dependence on
trade as in the economy of Israel. Rousseau takes an attacking
stance and Kant a defensive stance if creations are seen as
normal. Jean Jacque Rousseau implies we should not conceive
ideas and therefore, to survive, we have to take creators'
ideas and develop its or we should trade with creators'
creations. The difference between the two views is maybe the
essence of the different views towards ICrM in Western society
and maybe in the world. Trading is therefore more relevant at
Rousseau than at Smith and Kant. According to Venter trading
is more relevant at Smith. Probably, Rousseau's followers are
more dependent on territorial controls in order to sell
products that are manufactured by Kant's followers and to sell
raw materials to manufacturers (Kant's followers). It then
logically follows that according to Rousseau's view, common
wealth groups isolate creators and ' sacrifice '
creators because creativities are seen as evil. Plato's
philosophy is part of Rousseau's and Kant's philosophies but
Rousseau's philosophy still includes the anomaly of Plato
whereas Kant's philosophy does not include the anomaly of
Plato. The anomaly of Plato exists because Plato thought it is
possible to espouse truths and have an unchanging sensible
society, as stable as the intellectual concept truths. Truths
(honest communications) however naturally cause change in
Plato's sensible world because of intellectual/natural
progressions and improvements that are logical results of
knowings (knowledges). The ontic stability of Plato's truths
(honesties) in his intellectual world gets inverted into
change in the sensible world. It seems Plato did not realise
that, according to Popper's book The open society and its
enemies, because according to Popper, Plato viewed change as
evil.
Page 104
' ..
what Rousseau says about the state, is an adoption and
elaboration of the form taken by the city state in ancient
Greece. He was not in the first place searching for facts in
the classical works; for there were new methods of collecting
facts, but rather for norms and standards, for a moral
code. '
17 October
2012
' Never
was
a man more in earnest in his hostility towards the individual.
And this hatred is deeply rooted in the fundamental dualism of
Plato's philosophy; he hated the individual and his freedom
just as he hated the varying particular experiences, the
variety of the changing world of sensible things. In the field
of politics, the individual is to Plato the Evil One
himself. ' (Popper, K. 2011. The
open society and its enemies. p. 99 [First published
1945] London and New York: Routledge Classics)
2.3.1.1
Jean-Jacques
Rousseau
Page 105
' Once
equality had disappeared, it was necessary to form coalitions
for the sake of survival. The way in which to defend yourself
against somebody stronger is to find the help of somebody
else. In this way the first societies were founded. Free
individuals formed groups. Some of their freedom was
sacrificed for the sake of security. '
Self
The
opinion of Rousseau above is wrong today. Because of the
protectionist nature of the state a person should not form
groups to protect themselves. They should go to the state,
who's job it is to protect people. When groups are formed it
causes trouble and eventually civil wars. The same applies to
extortion of valuables like ideas.
' Aristotle
tells
us that Lycophron considered the law of the state as a
'covenant by which men assure one another of justice' (and
that it has not the power to make citizens good or just). He
tells us furthermore that Lycophron looked upon the state as
an instrument for the protection of its citizens against acts
of injustice (and for permitting them peaceful intercourse,
especially exchange), demanding that the state should be a
'co-operative association for the prevention of crime'. It is
interesting that there is no indication in Aristotle's account
that Lycophron expressed his theory in a historicist form,
i.e. as a theory concerning the historical origin of the state
in a social contract. On the contrary, it emerges clearly from
Aristotle's context that Lycophron's theory was solely
concerned with the end of the state; for Aristotle argues that
Lycophron has not seen that the essential end of the state is
to make its citizens virtuous. This indicates that Lycophron
interpreted this end rationally, from a technological point of
view, adopting the demands of equalitarianism, individualism,
and protectionism.
In
this form, Lycophron's theory is completely secure from the
objections to which the traditional historicist theory of the
social contract is exposed. It is often said, for instance by
Barker, that the contract theory 'has been met by modern
thinkers point by point'. That may be so; but a survey of
Barker's points will show that they certainly do not meet the
theory of Lycophron, in whom Barker sees (and in this point I
am inclined to agree with him) the probable founder of the
earliest form of a theory which has later been called the
contract theory. ' (Popper,
K. 2011. The open society and its
enemies. pp. 108-109 [First published 1945] London
and New York: Routledge Classics)
Self
Rousseau's
philosophy seems like arguments he had in favour of revolution
to overthrow the gentry of his time. He opposed creativities
as evil and thus did not see the anomaly of Plato.
19 October
2012
Extracts
from ' from The first and second discourses ' by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Stanley Rosen (ed.). New York: Random
House Reference. In Leesbundel pp. 120-125.
Page 120
' This
selection is excerpted from “The Second Discourse,” also
known as “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men.” '
Page 121
' Taught
by experience that love of well-being is the sole motive of
human actions, he [humanity] found himself able to distinguish
the rare occasions when common interest should make him count
on the assistance of his fellow-men, and those even rarer
occasions when competition should make him distrust
them. '
Page 122
' .. they
used it to procure many kinds of commodities unknown to their
fathers; and that was the first yoke they imposed on
themselves without thinking about it, and the first source of
the evils they prepared for their descendants. …
Men who
until this time wandered in the woods, having adopted a more
fixed settlement, slowly come together, unite into different
bands, and finally form in each country a particular nation,
unified by customs and character, not by regulations and laws
but by the same kind of life and foods and by the common
influence of climate. '
Page 123
' The
one who sang or danced the best, the handsomest, the
strongest, the most adroit, or the most eloquent became the
most highly considered; and that was the first step toward
inequality and, at the same time, toward vice. '
Page 124
' For
the poet it is gold and silver, but for the philosopher it is
iron and wheat which have civilized men and ruined the human
race. …
From the
cultivation of land, its division necessarily followed; and
from property once recognized, the first rules of justice. For
in order to give everyone what is his, it is necessary that
everyone can have something; moreover, as men began to look to
the future and as they all saw themselves with some goods to
lose, there was not one of them who did not have to fear
reprisals against himself for wrongs he might do to another.
This origin is all the more natural as it is impossible to
conceive of the idea of property arising from anything except
manual labor; because one can not see what man can add, other
than his own labor, in order to appropriate things he has not
made. It is labor alone which, giving the cultivator a right
to the product of the land he has tilled, gives him a right to
the soil as a consequence, at least until the harvest, and
thus from year to year; which, creating continuous possession,
is easily transformed into property. '
Self
It was a
general thought during the Enlightenment that only labours
gave rights to remunerations according to my knowledge.
Creative ideas have never been part of legal rights with
regard to remuneration. Discretionary bonuses currently
remunerate creative ideas but much creative ideas stay
unremunerated and to change that is the main aim of ICrM.
Kant and
Rousseau both lived early 1700's. Kant and Smith it seems
espoused competition but Rousseau did not.
Extracts
from ' The social contract or principles of political
right ' by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Henry
J. Tozer. London: Swan Sonnenhein & Co. In
Leesbundel pp. 127-137
Page 128
' In
this investigation I shall always strive to reconcile what
right permits with what interest prescribes, so that justice
and utility may not be severed. '
Page 133
' If
I should concede all that I have so far refuted, those who
favour despotism would be no farther advanced. There will
always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and
ruling a society. When isolated men, however numerous they may
be, are subjected one after another to a single person, this
seems to me only a case of master and slaves, not of a nation
and its chief; they form, if you will, an aggregation, but not
an association, for they have neither public property nor a
body politic. Such a man, had he enslaved half the world, is
never anything but an individual; his interest, separated from
that of the rest, is never anything but a private interest. If
he dies, his empire after him is left disconnected and
disunited, as an oak dissolves and becomes a heap of ashes
after the fire has consumed it.
A nation,
says Grotius, can give itself to a king. According to Grotius,
then, a nation is a nation before it gives itself to a king.
This gift itself is a civil act, and presupposes a public
resolution. Consequently, before examining the act by which a
nation elects a king, it would be proper to examine the act by
which a nation becomes a nation; for this act, being
necessarily anterior to the other, is the real foundation of
the society. '
Self
Possibly
reality is that practically all physical property belonged to
kings in the past before rights to remuneration after labours
were instituted. Currently most benefits of ideas belongs to
' kings ' with little benefit going to conceivers of
those ideas. ICrM thus aims to create intequible divisions of
benefits flowing from the conceiving (conceivement) of ideas.
The above quote from Rousseau supports my thoughts that
perhaps God are honest people (creators) that cracked and
became despots after cracking or some other related reality.
How do persons reach states in which they as individuals can
control multitudes. A logical manner is if they are willing to
use force. Another possibility could relate to the
' noble lie ' Plato wrote about. I could not find
the reference of the ' noble lie '. I remember to
have read about that in the Republic. Maybe a ' noble
lie ' that instills fear in subjects.
Page
133-134
Rousseau
explains how a group of people combine their powers into a
formal group to enhance their chances of survival. He calls
the group ' city ' or ' republic ' or
' body politic '. ' Forthwith, instead of the
individual personalities of all the contracting parties, this
act of association produces a moral and collective body, which
is composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, and
which receives from this same act its unity, its common self (moi),
its life, and its will. '
Self
The
' moi ' of South Africa I assume is the
constitution. According to my knowledge the constitution does
not give sufficient rights to individuals. Groups can extort
ideas from individuals legally unless I am mistaken. The best
available protection exist according to civil court procedures
that is very expensive. Smaller groups can have a memorandum
of incorporation (MOI) according to the new Companies Act. A
problem of this belief of a ' common self (moi) '
is the different groups that eventually caused civil war in
the British Isles at the time of Hobbes. In South Africa
several kingdoms exist that could lead to the same problems.
If ICrM acknowledge different groups maybe benefits of kreatieë can settle
in a group, but that would imply that each person have to be a
member of a sub-group in the Republic of South-Africa. It is
more logical that by being a citizen one should be member of a
national pool in which ideas are developed with rights to
conceivers of ideas. The current biggest problem is that
information is traded across borders. Free ideas are thus
benefitting mainly the traders of these ideas whilst not being
developed formally by using sanctioned capital as is being
used by the OECD countries. In the OECD countries any
conceiver of an idea can apply for development capital. I am
not sure how it works in practise. In South-Africa conceivers
do not have the possibility. See quotes of Jordaan and Barlow
in Management accounting of intellectual creations (JETEMS,
2012 Feb). There has been developments in the OECD block with
regard to South-Africa recently but we are not on an equal
footing to citizens in other countries. If South Africa is
part of the OECD group the ICrM group is wider than national
and then the traders of South-Africa's ideas have obligations
to other nations of the OECD group as well.
22 October
2012
Page 137
' I
shall close this chapter and this book with a remark which
ought to serve as a basis for the whole social system; it is
that instead of destroying natural equality, the fundamental
pact, on the contrary, substitutes a moral and lawful equality
for the physical inequality which nature imposed upon men, so
that, although unequal in strength or intellect, they all
become equal by convention and legal right.* ..
* Under bad
governments this equality is only apparent and illusory; it
serves only to keep the poor in their misery and the rich in
their usurpation. In fact, laws are always useful to those who
possess and injurious to those that have nothing; whence it
follows that the social state is advantageous to men only so
far as they all have something, and none of them has too
much. '
Self
Again,
this view of Rousseau will not ensure sufficient ICrM to
survive in the long run because he does not consider laws of
truths that do not distinguish between possessors and those
who have nothing. ' .. always useful to those who
possess ..' is not true, maybe not even at his type of
laws. The generalisations about laws is not sufficient because
there are universal laws and laws that are not universal. The
non-universal laws are the laws he refers to.
2.3.1.2
Hume
Page 106
' Like
John Locke, David Hume was an empiricist, one who believed
that experience and experiment were the only real sources of
truth. He also called himself a “sceptic”, since he doubted
all kinds of doctrines, and especially our knowledge of the
“metaphysical”. '
Page 107
' He
realised that the idealising of the method of natural science
had its limits, and that it would fail, especially in
analysing human culture and its products.
Hume seems
to use concepts of rationality, which indicates his wider
[than followers of scientism like Locke] view of the matter.
Although he doesn't use names for them, one could say that he
distinguished between a lower kind of rationality and a higher
kind. The lower kind of rationality is that of the natural
sciences, based on sense experience, induction, mathematical
deduction, and logical reasoning. The higher kind of
rationality is practical: the concept of experience here
includes “skill” (as in the expression: “a man of experience
in writing or painting”). “Experience”, in this case, even
implies having had much exercise, or practise, in rational
judgement.
It is the
latter kind of rationality that comes into play in the case of
morals and art. These disciplines are both part of human
sentiment, but the sentiment is refined by experience in
judgement of utility (morals) and beauty (fine arts). The
possibility of such experience is based on the structure of
human consciousness (a priori), yet we do need some
experience to awaken our ability to judge.
It is
interesting to note that, like Rousseau, Hume wanted the
scientific rationality of the lower kind to be subject to the
higher, practical kind of rationality. Since he was no
democrat like Rousseau, but a monarchist, practical
rationality to him was not political thinking, but rather
bound to the life of the nobility in the British Isles (he was
a Scotsman), which was a life of useful service to the
kingdom, and of appreciating the finer things in life. Hume
seriously believed that the reading of poetry would make any
person a better mathematician or physicist. '
Page
107-108
' For
Hume, “nature” also implies realism and simplicity,
but art in itself is something decorative, artificial and not
natural. This gives us two extremes: simplicity and
refinement. Good art is the golden mean between the two,
but the mean is a range, and since we tend to exaggerate to
one side, we must force ourselves to lean over to the opposite
side, so as to get the balance. Thus our human tendency will
be towards exaggerating refinement. It is therefore a good
policy in art production to force ourselves in the direction
of simplicity. '
Self
If truth,
the concept, is the ' really real ' it implies that
physical sensible realities/actualities are that what are.
Metaphors of art can taint our memories and remove us from
realities to such an extent that we cannot work properly. It
seems the problem is at metaphors. Words that explain concepts
could be not metaphorical. Those words can have their own
essences that should not be mixed with actualities that could
confuse us away from realities. The word truth should
therefore perhaps only be used to refer to the concept. When I
say someone speaks truths, that is incorrect because I should
rather say someone speaks realities. If truth relate only to
the concept then 'speaks truths' is a metaphor that can
confuse. Designing beautiful shapes is part of ICrM. If we
talk about our Father in heaven it is a metaphor that perhaps
remove our abilities to design beautiful forms. We should
therefore rather just talk about God because the word is not
metaphorical.
Page 108
' Like
the secondary qualities in the theory of Locke, so the
qualities of good art, according to Hume, are constituted
inside the mind. The work of art itself stimulates, via the
senses, this structural a priori of the mind: the sentiments
of beauty (in the case of art) and utility (in
the case of moral behaviour). It is on the basis of these
sentiments recreating the qualities, that we judge the
stimulant, the work of art, to be good or bad. '
Self
The
reference that Hume made to utility of moral decisions
could imply that his a priori sentiments have been
tainted and that he was not capable of really real good
judgement. My conception of Truth exclude utility with regard
to moral decision making because ICrM rejects the
' sacrifice ' of ' ones ' as a means of
survival by extorting valuable ideas from people who have
individuality. Let's say a father base his moral decision
making on the utilisation of material things by his family. He
argues that his lies are moral because the lies help to supply
utilities to his wife and children and maybe extended group
members. According to ICrM that is short sighted because it
only looks at the immediate. Utility is a short term concept
because it relates to immediacy. In a categorical hierarchy
Truth is at the top or near the top and honesties are included
in the concept Truth. Truth in one's life is an a priori
decision because, how can it be proved that Truth overrides
immediate utilisation of an effect that requires lying.
18 October
2012
2.3.2
Neo-Classicism
Page 110
' With
most of the eighteenth-century philosophers, we find a
tendency towards neoclassicism. They avoided, in other words,
taking norms and standards from Christianity, and returned to
classical sources for their inspiration and standards.
' ..
Plato's central religious doctrine. The gods, he teaches in
the Laws, punish severely all those on the wrong side
in the conflict between good and evil, a conflict which is
explained as that between collectivism and individualism. And
the gods, he insists, take an active interest in men, they are
not merely spectators. It is impossible to appease them.
Neither through prayers nor through sacrifices can they be
moved to abstain from punishment. ' (Popper,
K. 2011. The open society and its
enemies. p. 135 [First published 1945] London and
New York: Routledge Classics)
Page 112
' We
must now have a closer look at ART (as rule or Idea), to
better understand what they meant.
From the
point of view of ART itself, one could express it in a
formula: for example the “golden mean” equals the right
mixture of opposites (and a good work of art fulfils
this rule). The opposites intended were such as extreme
emotions, extreme change of fate, action versus silence, new
versus old, simplicity versus decoration.
Self
The above
explains partly the current culture with regards to
' Ideas '. ART was investigated as Idea; a separate
entity. ' Idea ' in brackets after ART implies that
Idea is a separate entity that nobody owns. It is common
property and it is taken away from the artist. According to
ICrMA (Intellectual creations management accounting) their
should be a recorded link between ideas and the conceivers of
the ideas because links will inspire people to create and that
will increase the volhoubaarheid of a territory and its
people. Whether this link should be transferred to other
generations, by choice, by the conceiver is an issue, but the
current is a bigger issue.
2.3.3
Hegel
Page 112
' Kant
believed that reason created its own order form (sic) the
chaos of impressions coming in through the senses, but that we
do not really know the order of the world-in-itself, as it is
outside the mind. In fragmentary form, reason can impose its
own plan on the things-in-themselves but, according to Hegel,
Kant does not succeed in putting reason in charge of the
universe. Hegel himself wants to be the consistent rationalist
– he therefore goes much further than Kant: he represents
reason as the creator of the world and the guide of history.
In fact, all of reality is the out-flowing product of the Idea
(which, to Hegel, is the same as reason). Reason is fully
autonomous. It is god in becoming. '
Page
113-114
' Hegel
assumes the dialectical method as the expression of real
history. In other words, he believed that history moves
through polar opposites. The main opposites are: Idea, Nature
and Spirit.
According
to Hegel, the Idea is the most abstract form of reason. It is
pure logic. Yet logic flows out of itself (much like in
Plotinus the Super Intellect emanates from the One), and this
outflow is the polar opposite of the Idea, namely Nature.
Although Nature is the opposite of the Idea, it emanates from
the Idea and is actually the same as the Idea, but in another
form: It is the alienated Idea (alienated, then, from itself).
In the form of Nature, the Idea is bound to the laws of
necessity – like the law of gravity (which nobody can avoid),
or the laws of vegetation, from which no living being is
exempted. Stones and trees and animals are all forms of the
Idea as Nature. In the same way, my senses and emotions are
all forms of reason in its state of nature.
In the
second phase, the Idea returns to its original logical form,
but it is now enriched, and we call the Idea in this form
Spirit. Spirit which is reason in its richest and most
concrete form, to Hegel meant the same as freedom. As mankind
becomes progressively more rational in all its higher
functions, it also becomes more “spiritual” and “freer”.
Spirit itself moves through three phases, namely subjective
spirit (this is the lowest form of spirit, realising that it
is bound to the laws of nature), objective spirit (this is the
external projections of Spirit in cultural works like the
state, construction, et cetera), and absolute spirit, which is
art, religion and, finally, philosophy. …
The
dialectic of Nature versus Culture in Hegel is concerned with
the latter two phases of the development of the Idea, namely
Nature and Spirit (for it is the Spirit that produces
culture). Hegel attempts to overcome the alienation between
nature and culture that is part of modern Western tradition.
When Kant stated that reason does not know what the order of
the thing-in-itself is, yet can impose its own order on those
things-in-themselves (even if only in a fragmentary way) and
also that rational man creates his own moral order, there was
a clear alienation of man from nature and of subject from
object. Culture became a threat to nature and nature, from
which culture was born, was considered something dangerous to
be overcome. Hegel thought that he could overcome this
alienation through the dialectical method. On the one hand, he
stated that Idea, nature, and Spirit are all the same, since
they are all different forms of reason or of the Idea; on the
other hand, he allowed for the alienation by also maintaining
that they are opposites. In this way nature is subject to
(p.114) necessity, but Spirit is free. And the freest and most
divine form of Spirit is philosophy, which is at the summit of
progress and of the “history” of the Idea. '
Self
According
to my current knowledge Hegel's philosophy influenced current
copyright law a lot. Copyright is only applicable to physical
work. An idea is common property but when it is converted into
paper and ink (computer files?) copyright becomes applicable.
I read somewhere that in Germany spoken word also applies in
copyright law. Spoken word is thus seen as physical nature
that was converted from Hegel's ' Idea ' and can be
owned. ICrM investigates the ' Ideas ' and currently
ascribes a bigger origination effect to humans than current
culture. ICrM is mainly concerned with the time from the
origination of the Idea to the time of conversion to nature.
The process that takes place when nature is converted into
Spirit is a communal process because it relates to
observations, interpretations and analyses of multitudes that
culminates in culture. Current studies at Northwest University
has as objective a paper that proves a more substantial link
between ' Ideas ' and humans. Hegel's
' Idea ', according to current intequism (ienkếtismi)
originates more substantially in human thought than is
currently believed by majorities.
The idea
of ICrM formed in my head by adding my experiences and
previous knowledges together. The process that started in 1987
(probably earlier) with studies, can be compared to Hegel's
' Idea '. Whilst writing my thoughts on paper ideas
become something physical that can be compared to Hegel's
' nature '. According to Hegel, buildings, bridges,
books and institutions are natures. The more visible our works
become the deeper its are entrenched into nature. Nature then
becomes Spirit (Zeitgeist) when others are influenced by our
new ' natural ' surrounds. Spirits beget cultures
that are prevalent for times and when new
' natures ' (books, buildings etc.) replace old
Spirits new cultures are begotten. During this process there
are economic interests that change, which cause oppositions
and enemies but we can show that changes of ICrM encourage
volhoubaarheid and the changes would be more easily accepted,
without Plato's opposition, especially after the anomaly of
Plato is understood.
Wikipedia:
' The
German word Zeitgeist
is often attributed to the philosopher Georg Hegel
but he never actually used the word. In his works such as Lectures
on
the Philosophy of History, he uses the phrase der Geist seiner Zeit
(the spirit of his time) — for example, "no man can surpass
his own time, for the spirit of his time is also his own
spirit." '
(From:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitgeist>
on
18 October 2012)
The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
' It
is thus that Hegel has effected the transition from a
phenomenology of “subjective mind,” as it were, to one of
“objective spirit,” thought of as culturally distinct patterns
of social interaction analysed in terms of the patterns of
reciprocal recognition they embody. (“Geist” can be
translated as either “mind” or “spirit,” but the latter,
allowing a more cultural sense, as in the phrase “spirit of
the age” (“Zeitgeist”), seems a more suitable
rendering for the title.) '
(Redding,
Paul, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/hegel/>.
On 18 October 2012)
19 October 2012
2.3.4
Romanticism
Page 114
' In
romantic aesthetics, the accent was to move away from the
Neo-Classicist obsession with rules or standards of taste. The
focus moved away from the audience to the artist. From the
Idealists, like Kant and Hegel, they had adopted a
preoccupation with the autonomy of the subject, even though
they did not necessarily focus on the rationality of the
subject. The “nature” (inner experience of the artist) is the law.
… To them,
nature was the ideal and the divine was inside nature. Many of
them tended to look for idyllic natural surroundings where
they lived and worked – their works tending to be dreamlike,
idyllic, mystic, and melancholic. '
Self
The
romantics put more emphasis on the creators, therefore they
were more in line with ICrM. The creations (buildings, books
etc.) that Hegel saw as nature seems to be a correct
reflection of nature according to the Bible. God (humans)
created the trees etc. long ago. The way that current
creativities with regard to genetics and so forth are
developing includes the possibility that humans can again
create organic things that can pro-create and grow and act
like organisms. New creations might enter the universe again
just like trees and other organic material did according to
the Bible.
Page 115
' Freud
produced a combination of the nature-culture dialectic with
evolutionism. He was neither real romantic nor a naturalist,
but his psychiatry is framed by these themes. He distinguishes
between the Id (literally the “it”), the Ego (the “I”) and the
Superego (literally “that which is above the I”). The “Id” is
his version of the naturalistic, brute side of our personality
– the remnants of our animal ancestry; i.e. his conception of
“nature” is us. The “Superego” is that which governs me from
outside. He explains this to be the normative structure of
society. There is a very real conflict between the forces of
the Id and those of the Superego. Freud, however, does not
finally choose for the one or the other; in fact, his
conception of rationality is that of a balance between the
two, which is the Ego. If a real balance is not reached, the
person becomes psychologically sick (“irrational”), and the
work of the psychoanalyst is to put this right. In practice,
it means one has to find a way to satisfy both one's own
irrational drives and society's normative needs in a balanced
way. '
Self
The
current situation with regards to ICrM, that could change,
depending on the circumstances of the ages are as follows: The
Superego includes dishonest people who are controlling culture
as a group. They are the people in control according to Capra
and Toynbee (page 86). Id includes the honest instinct or
reborn nature that creators have and if they have too much
contact with the Superego then they become unstable. The
interactions between two groups of people; deceivers and the
honest, should be minimized for ICrM to flourish. Deceivers
logically develop telepathic abilities and memories. Most of
us want to know reality. Being in contact with deceivers thus
decrease reality-reflecting verbal and written communications.
Honest communications lead to creative abilities and
dependence on reality-reflecting verbal and written
communications. Deceits and honesties could have evolutionary
effects with regard to verbal and writing (typing) abilities.
Knowledges that form the individual pieces of the puzzle with
which new knowledge is being created should be reality other
wise ICrM cannot be effective. Egos, tending towards natural
honesties need the knowledges of the system in order to build
new puzzles and thus have to come in contact with deceivers.
Contact with deceivers has to be understood by creators in
order to know the effect that they have on the honest in order
to stay balanced. Another way to keep a balanced Ego is by
joining deceivers but that will decrease creative abilities
and increase telepathic abilities with possible evolutionary
effects towards absolute truths in the form of animals.
Possibly when groups' telepathic abilities become so effective
that deceits cannot exist, those groups become part of nature.
I have always regarded nature as trees, mountains, animals
etc. but since yesterday I have been influenced by Hegel to
regard buildings and man made things also as nature according
to his idealistic dialectic. Our dwellings, furnitures and the
books in our bookshelves are therefore an extension of the
trees and animals outside as part of nature. WE are not part
of nature. WE have the honest part of nature as instinct and
reborn characteristic and unless WE keep that characteristic
we could become wholly part of nature.
2.3.4.1
Van Wyk Louw
' Van
Wyk Louw, the Afrikaans poet, wrote an epic poem called Raka.
…
The
brutish figure, Raka, is the symbol of the dark, primitive,
earthly, instinctual side of life; animal-like. It is the
“Dyonisian” side of Nietzsche's cycle of recurrence. At the
same time, it is also the “animal”, the brute, in man himself,
which constantly threatens the veneer of civilisation.
Koki
represents the culture of his tribe, their civilisation and
traditions. … He represents the Apollonian half of Nietzsche's
cycle. '
Self
A culture
can be changed by creating new natural buildings, books etc.
Creations then, according to Hegel changes Ideas into nature.
Popper calls this type of change ' piecemeal
engineering ' in contrast to ' Utopian
Engineering '. (Popper,
K. 2011. The open society and its
enemies. p. 147 [First published 1945] London and
New York: Routledge Classics)
Another manner of change is by revolutions that
destroys Hegel's natural things by breaking buildings and new
technologies. If a small part of society for example lives
apart from the rest of society, utilising much foreign
products that cannot be afforded by the majority of the
population, this type of destruction can take place when
revolutions take hold. Raka seems to be this second type of
destructive behaviour, but I am not sure. In the Bible the
following was written as having been said by Jesus, which
could imply that Raka in the poem is a creator more in line
with piecemeal engineering. Jesus was not a revolutionary. He
opposed revolution.
'
“You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, 'Do
not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to
judgement.' But I tell you that anyone who is angry with his
brother will be subject to judgment. Again, anyone who says
to his brother, 'Raca,' is answerable to the Sanhedrin. But
anyone who says, 'You fool!' will be in danger of the fire
of hell. ' (Matthew
5:21-22)
' Piecemeal
engineering '
according to Popper relates more to a negative influence, by
fighting ' evil ' on a piecemeal basis, in contrast
to making sweeping new creations as in ' Utopian
engineering '. Piecemeal engineering happens when, in an
open society, crime for example is opposed, in a state where
individuals are protected against groups. ' Utopian
engineering ' refers to Platonic philosophy in which a
whole new city is created on Utopian principles of a
philosopher king in a closed society. Popper seems to have
tended towards negative thinking because falsification of
knowledge and piecemeal engineering was preferable in contrast
to more positive measures like inductive creation of knowledge
and utopian engineering.
2.3.4.2
Karl Marx
Page 117
' Like
Rousseau, he finds a connection between division of labour and
property. In fact, he says that division of labour was the
first form of property for, as you specialise, you own your
specialised knowledge, which becomes a property to be sold and
used as power. '
… The
final progress will therefore also be the elimination of the
lapse into the sin of division of labour and private property,
which is at the same time a regress to the original state of
man. '
Page 118
' Karl
Marx seems to have had a double concept of nature: on the one
hand there is man in his original nature, unspecialised and
without any private property. On the other hand, there is
nature as environment, which has to be subdued and changed
according to the needs of mankind. This is done culturally.
According to Marx, cultural activity is focussed on
production. Man is by nature a worker, but originally he does
not divide his productive activity, for everybody does
everything for himself (or herself). Once division of labour
is introduced, the relationships of production become culture
and form the basis of mental culture. Whenever production
relationships change, the mental culture will also change. The
final change in production relationships, which Marx hoped
would come about through the activities of communism, was the
elimination of the division of private property. The final
stage of history was therefore supposed to be a return to the
original state of man, i.e. a return to nature. '
Self
Intequism
inspires the following view of the future. Creativities are
enhanced with remunerations to conceivers of ideas. New cities
are created with utopian engineering and individuals are
protected against groups with piecemeal engineering.
Mechanisation and artificial intelligence will decrease job
opportunities as a ratio of output. There will thus never
again be jobs for everyone. A state thus will have to make use
of socialist policies to keep people busy if they do not have
work. People who do not have work should be funded by the
state to develop themselves by playing sport and practising
art or by studying to become creators. Public golf courses,
tennis courts and other sporting facilities should be built.
Art facilities should also be created in which unemployed
people can develop their artistic skills like painting and
musical abilities to earn foreign currency. An insurance fund
of incomes could be created for them so that the big earners
support the unsuccessful artists. It should be free, because
there will never again be enough jobs for everyone. If persons
do not have jobs they should be given training to be creators
if they choose to be. The state should create new things in
order to be competitive in the world economy and in order to
defend itself against rogue states.
The final
return to nature according to Marx makes sense but the
property relations of Marx in the final stage is not
realistic. According to ICrM properties will mainly be
controlled by creators because they will create the new
natural surrounds and will not spend most of their time
playing unprofitable sports or practising unprofitable art.
Their actions will be part of activities relating to selling
products and services. People who live free unprofitable lives
according to socialist/communist believes will have to settle
for less wealthy and less decorative livings because they will
be net unprofitable consumers. Gardeners for example will have
a more decorative life than unprofitable players of sport or
unprofitable musicians and other people that do not have
profitable lives. People with unprofitable lives should
however still have dignified lives whilst receiving
opportunities to join the creative capitalist class by
becoming reborn and by reigniting their instincts of Truth
that could give them again abilities to create profitable
utilities and ideas. It is possible that people with
unprofitable lives include people with Truth as guide because
of corruption in the capitalist class. Minimalist life styles
of unprofitable players of sport and unprofitable artists
could be the future of humans if it is reality that honest
persons cannot get rich. If ICrM is however implemented as
currently envisaged in a world where piecemeal engineering
protects individuals against groups that extort wealth from
individuals, it could change the current negative correlation
between honesties and wealths.
22 October 2012
3. The
idea of order
3.1
Introduction
Page 140
' ..
to clarify some concepts such as the “order of the cosmos”,
the “order of the “world”, as well as the “laws” behind it
because, as it is today, philosophers tend to deny, at least
regarding human life, that there is any universal “order” or
that there are universally valid “norms”. Now this, of course,
is critical: for instance if one wants to talk about human
rights and one claims that there are no norms, for what reason
then could we, or should we, be sensitive about human
rights? '
3.2
Ancient Greeks
3.2.1
Background
Page 140
' Firstly,
the “cosmological” level: This means thinking about the
order of the totality of the world for “cosmology” means our
knowledge or our theory regarding the whole cosmos. …
Heraclitus
…
Parmenides
…
Anaximander
… Pythagoras '
Page 141
' Secondly,
we can also talk about order on the level of cultural
philosophy. …
The first
point .. antropomorphic … Hesiod …
The second
point of view was the relativistic one of the
Sophists. …
Thirdly,
there was the objectivistic point of view of Socrates,
… universal qualities .. stabilising factor. '
Self
On the
cosmological level Heraclitus said nothing stays the same,
Parmenides said nothing changes and Anaximander and Pythagoras
combined stability and change. ICrM accepts ideas that cause
good changes as remunerable when good changes are caused by
creators.
3.2.2
Plato
Page 142
' (i)
Firstly, he argued that we do not understand the external,
visible characteristics or qualities of things, without
presupposing stable proportions. We have to presuppose stable
proportions if we want to allow for any kind of stability in
the external qualities of things.
(ii)
Secondly, we are unable to make judgements and to work and be
culturally active without presupposing norms for beauty,
truth, goodness, etc. If we do not have such norms and cannot
presuppose them, then there won't be any directive force in
our cultural engagements. …
Now,
according to Plato, this sensible world cannot have its order
from itself; because that is the position already taken by
Pythagoras and Socrates (ascribing the presence of order to
the presence of certain characteristics). Plato, as we have
indicated above, had already rejected that position, arguing
that the characteristics always change together with their
underlying subject. …
“straightness”.
So where does this notion come from? Plato reckoned that this
notion referred to a higher reality which was more
encompassing than the macrocosm and which was an absolute
reality in which notions like “straightness” were situated.
This reality he called the “intelligible” world. '
Page 144
' Yet
Plato's theory of ideas is a nomism, i.e. he
exaggerates the role of the law, because he calls them the
only real (the really real), and even the craftsmen-god, who
makes the world (in his book the Timaius), is subject to the
ideas, and has to imitate (obey) them when he creates the
world. In so doing, Plato actually seemed to say a very
strange thing: since (for example), the ideal man in the
intelligible world is the real man, and the man whom we can
see is only real to the extent that he imitates the ideal man,
he therefore seems to have said that in the sensible world the
real is only real insofar as it is an imitation of the really
real! '
Self
Venter
writes about ' the ideal man '. Plato was according
to me referring to concepts and not a man in the intelligible
world. Creators are subject to truths (pre-knowledges) in
order to build new puzzles. Pre-knowledges are subject to
truths, the concept.
3.2.3
Aristotle
Page 144
' in
his little book, The Categories, Aristotle
distinguishes between what he calls “universal” substances and
“individual” substances. Individual substances are individual
entities like John, Peter and so forth, and universal
substances are the essential characteristics of things like
the “humanity” of man or the “whiteness” of white. ..
Aristotle was trying to say .. universal characteristics are
not in the separate world of ideas .. present in the
individual things … essence of a human being is present in
Plato or Socrates as an individual. In other words, what Plato
called ideas actually represented the universal side of the
individual, here in the sensible world itself. '
Page 145
' Secondly
… “teleological” .. telos, which means a “goal” or
“destination”, and thus every single thing has a “goal” or a
“purpose” or a “destination”. …
everything
has a “material” base, which he called “potentiality” …
an “intention”, which he called the “form”. .. that for
which the entity is destined. …
Form,
therefore is actuality; … The form of a human being is
intellectuality and that of a dog is emotionality. ...
Thirdly,
Aristotle brought these two aspects together in what he called
the essence (in Afrikaans “wese”) of the entity. The “essence”
is the same as the “definition”, which for Aristotle consists
of genus and difference – a human being is a living being
(genus) with an intellect (difference), whilst a dog is a
living being without intellect, but with senses and emotion
(difference). Every entity has matter and form.
Self
What is
the matter and form of ICrM that makes up the essence?
Page
145-146
Aristotle
distinguishes four causes:
..
efficient cause [verb] …
final
cause [unlimited adjective/noun] …
material
cause [noun] … Without the potentiality that can assume a
specific form, there is no way in which a form can be
realised. …
formal
cause [limiting adjective] ... highest potential a specific
thing can realise. … Human beings .. intellectuality .. '
Self
ICrM has
as efficient causes; research and conceiving of ideas. A verb
used is intequitise. Final cause is noumenon (unlimited
adjective). Material causes [nouns] are intequity, accounting
of ideas and ICrM. Formal causes are limiting adjectives;
intequible and honery. What type of word is honery? It
describes what is being tested. ' Testing ' can be a
noun or a present participle verb.
23 October
2012
Page 147
' Aristotle
combined the theory of the four causes into a dynamic theory
of reality, one functioning eternally according to a stable
pattern. The supreme good [final cause / unlimited adjective]
is the highest efficient cause [verb], which induces matter to
change over into form by using a secondary efficient cause,
which induces matter to form … from matter to form and so it
continuous for evermore. Thus one could see a kind of cyclical
movement starting from God as the highest cause, acting on the
one hand as the supreme efficient cause and, on the other
hand, as the final cause;
these two are actually the same, because God, being the
highest good (final cause), draws everything unto him, and in
this way he activates the secondary efficient causes to change
matter into form.
Figure 5
gives a representation of this process in which the supreme
good, being pure intellect, also functions as a final cause,
and in this way stimulates, for instance, intellectual debate.
This latter may serve as a secondary efficient cause in which
an idle living being with a potentiality for intellectual
debate, comes into actuality (i.e. begins to participate in
intellectual pursuits). The human being, for example, will,
through debate, realise his own intellectual potential, and so
its own form, striving to be as much as possible like the
supreme good. '
Page 149
' At
the upper end of the scale we find god, who is pure intellect,
pure form and pure actuality. He is really only interested in
Himself, and doesn't know anything else apart from Himself.
Yet, as if he were a magnet, he is exerting an effect on the
whole hierarchy, being their final aim and goal, and
everything strives to be as much as possible like god.
By
rejecting Plato's theory of ideas, Aristotle rejected a theory
that provided for order by absolutising every element of this
world into an ideal pattern, which was considered so absolute
that even the gods were seen to be subject to it. However,
Aristotle then reverted to the objectivism which Plato had
rejected. The basis of order, the law, he finds to be in the
universal substance which is a characteristic of the
individual thing. This universal substance he later calls
“essence” (genus and difference), and therefore especially one
characteristic of the individual thing, the telos of
its species, becomes both the law and the pattern of its
functioning. For the human world, therefore, Aristotle will
measure every action according to the standards of the
intellect, for the “telos” of mankind is to be
intellectual, and it is natural for human beings to imitate
those that are intellectually the most sophisticated. But to
be able to determine what the purpose of each species is, he
took what he thought to be the purpose of man
(intellectuality), ascribed [upscaling of Aristotle] that to
god in a purified form, and measured all species against that
standard.
Self
It could
be argued that the upscaling in Aristotle's philosophy from
human intellectuality to his God was a reversion back to
pre-Greek antiquity. Plato did not upscale as far as I know
because he saw his Ideas (Being true and good that cause
beauty) as concepts, not as an upscaled version of humanity.
Concepts are man made ideas but the ' origin ' is
from what we see and experience. If I use the word
' origin ' in the previous sentence's sense then
that would mean I am a materialist or determinist, which I am
not, because I do not generalise to materialism and
determinism. On the contrary, it is part of intequism to not
generalise. To not generalise is a generalisation and
therefore a
contradiction, therefore there has to be some generalisations
that are warranted. Ideas, that are formed in thoughts are
equally important to determined influences, because ideas,
formed partly in people, create our environment and keep it in
place together with other labours. There is something behind
the determined, that is sometimes noumenon, that determines us
in determinism. We can assume that, that something, is behind
ideas as well but that would then discredit ICrM. We should
just stay with what we can experience (pre-knowledge) and
think, epistemologically, in order to stay in the integrated,
non-contradictory cosmos, without upscaling theories we cannot
be sure of. In this way we stay in the noumenon reality tat we
know is integrated and subject to Truth. It seems thus that my
thoughts are now more in line with Plato than Aristotle
although I disagree with Plato because of his anomaly (Truths
and stabilities combined in the two parts of the cosmos).
Perhaps Plato's philosophy with stabilities excluded would be
similar to intequism. It is not clear to me what Plato's
philosophy was. Popper said his summary of religion was that
God punishes (sacrifices?) individuals. Who or what was his
God? Venter said he subjected creators to his Ideas. Does that
imply that he thought of himself as God with a group and that
they sacrificed individuals. Maybe the thirty tyrants of
Athens; the Oligarchs.
' And
the
state will erect monuments … to commemorate them. And
sacrifices will be offered to them as demigods, … as men who
are blessed by grace, and godlike.
PLATO. '
(Popper,
K. 2011. The
open society and its enemies. p. 131 [First published
1945] London and New York: Routledge Classics)
' He
will restore us to our original nature, and heal us, and make
us happy and blessed
PLATO '
(Popper,
K. 2011. The
open society and its enemies. p. 162 [First published
1945] London and New York: Routledge Classics)
3.3
Hellenism
Page 150
' Hellenism
is the period of transition between the ancient Greek period
and early Christian philosophy. During the Hellenistic period,
some of the philosophical schools of ancient Greece continued
in their traditions, but some new schools also developed, such
as scepticism and stoicism. '
3.3.1
Scepticism
Page 150
' Scepticism
believed that there is no truth. Their argument was that
philosophers differ from one another, each having their own
theory. Cultures also differ, each claiming to be the true
one. The Sophists had already contended that there was no
reason to assume that my culture is the true one, that my
religion is really the only true one and that our norms are
better than those of other cultures. Furthermore, scepticism
says, we cannot trust our senses, meaning that Plato's whole
theory of ideas is problematic, for if we cannot trust our
senses, how can we trust them when they remind us of the
ideas? And since one opinion is as good as any other, how can
we trust our intellect? Therefore they propagated the
suspension of judgement. '
… for the
sake of practical life, they advised people to act on the
basis of what they called probability” or verisimile,
which is the Latin word for that which resembles the
truth. '
Self
' my
culture is the true one ' is a way of using the word
truth that does not correspond with intequism. Truths
according to intequism relate to the correspondence and
coherence theories of truths that according to my
understanding includes probabilities. It does therefore not
relate to a wide concept like culture as in the quoted
sentence. Maybe a culture can be attempted to be truthfully
explained but to say a culture is true does not make sense
with intequism. The correspondence theory, as understood by
intequism, is understood to theorise that the more true
corroboration there is with regard to sense experiences the
more true something is. I read for example somewhere that once
in Spain many people agreed that the sun neared them with
dangerous intent. Although something like that was written
down as being corroborated, it is one of those things that is
difficult to be accepted as true, unless one was there to
experience it.
3.3.2
Stoicism
Page 150
' The
Stoics tried to find a solution for the problems posed by the
Sceptics, and for this purpose they actually developed a new
theory of reality. According to them, inherent in the physical
universe, there exists what they called “the natural law”. The
natural law provides the order of the universe in which we
live, and according to them we have followed the law of
nature, or natural law, also in our ethical and cultural life.
… The whole process of knowing had been made incredible by the
criticism of the Sceptics.
However,
the Stoics did manage to find a solution for this problem ..
They realised that one needs knowledge for practical life and,
to bridge the gap of untrustworthiness of the knowing process,
they presupposed innate concepts and principles. In other
words, our knowledge of the law of nature – at least the
basics of it – is obtained from our genetic make-up. We are
born with it! '
3.3.2
Plotinus
Page
152-154
Plotinus
constructed a hierarchy. ONE at the top, then the
Super-Intellect lower, then the World Soul. ' From the
World soul, however, the individual souls of human beings have
emanated and each individual soul has quickened a piece of
matter as its body. This, to Plotinus, represents the fall of
the soul, but it is also possible for the soul to be
converted, and to return into itself introspectively. By this
conversion, it can unify or identify with the soul of the
world and through the World-soul with the Super-intellect, and
so acquire knowledge of the ideas (the intelligible world in
the Super-intellect). In this way, Plotinus circumvents the
Sceptic criticism for by some kind of mystical contact we know
the ideas. We don't need our senses for this. Via the
Super-intellect our soul can identify mystically with the One.
Through this unification the human soul will be in a kind of
ecstasy and lose its individual identity totally. … For man
this implies that to live an orderly life, a mystical attitude
is essential. He must turn away from the sensible world into
his own intellect, in which the likeness of the World-soul
will carry him “upward” to the Super-intellect, in which
again, he will find the simple ideas of the “Good”, the
“Beautiful”, the “True” - all of these mirroring the oneness
of the One. … Complexity and combination comes to be
associated with evil and transitoriness, whilst unity and
simplicity are identified with goodness, stability and
eternity.
3.4
Early
Christian period
Page
154-155
' ..
we take as representative the most important and most famous
of the Church Fathers, namely Augustine.
… He
associated the Father with “being” and the Holy Spirit with
“goodness”. It is especially with regard to the Son that we
see a very strong influence of Plotinus. Before Augustine,
another Church father called Clement of Alexandria had
associated the term logos or “word” used to refer to the Son
in the Gospel of John (chapter 1) as evidence that the Son was
God's “mind” or God's “intellect”. “Logos”, a Greek word, can
mean “word”, or “argument”, or “reason”, and is therefore
associated with intellectuality or rationality. Augustine
calls Him the “Wisdom” of God, but also God's intellect, in
whom Plato's ideas are present. This mirrors the theory of
Plotinus (the Super-intellect contains the ideas). However,
being a Christian, Augustine could not (like Plotinus) accept
a divine hierarchy in God. The Church would consider that a
heresy. Thus Augustine did not follow Plotinus to the extent
of putting the Father at the summit, followed by the Son, and
then the Holy Spirit (three Gods in a column, one below the
other, as Plotinus did). Augustine placed all three on the
same level, but the Son, being the “second” person, contains
the ideas or the laws. He situated the intelligible world of
Plato in the “Logos”, and in this way made Jesus, as the
“mind” of the Father, the source of the order of creation.
This had
very interesting consequences. On the one hand, creation has
to imitate the divine mind, and on the other hand, God and His
laws for creation are viewed as one and the same. In fact, the
laws are part of God, for the laws of creation are inside the
Divine mind and God is total simplicity. This meant that God
had some eternal blueprint in his mind, according to which He
created. This is a typically Platonic (and not a biblical)
representation of creation. '
Self
Creativity
is important to survive. From the above it could be argued
that Augustine tried to monopolise creativity in the church by
saying the church that ' controls ' God must control
creativities. The word creativity needs to be differentiated
because when Venter uses the word he does not distinguish
between creation of planets, products, essences of selves and
children. The efficient causes (verbs - Aristotle) that
describe how different creations originate show the difference
but there seem to not be a differentiation. All creativity is
ascribed to ' God ' but the different efficient
causes are treated differently. Conceiving children is treated
completely different from designing a product. Consequentially
the terms should be split.
Page 155
' Secondly,
Augustine also followed Plotinus in the belief that a kind of
mystical unity is possible between the human intellect and the
Son, who illumines the mind of man. We can, therefore, know
the laws of God, through direct contact of our minds with God.
3.5 Middle
Ages
Page 156
' Thomas
Aquinas was a follower of Aristotle rather than of Plato or
Plotinus, although he still inherited influences of Plotinus
from Augustine and others. We find in him a synthesis of
Christianity with Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism.
24 October
2012
Page
156-157
He also
had a two directional philosophy. God to him was essence and
existence in equal measures. God was perfect form and 100%
actuality in Aristotle's words. He then divides God's actions
between likenesses and exemplars. Likenesses are essences of
what God plans to create. Exemplars are divided between
technical plans and eternal laws. This is where two
directionality becomes relevant. Technical plans are
actualised by combining essences and existences. In this
manner angels, people, plants and minerals are formed. Their
and its actualities are however not equal to essences. The
process is a downward forming of complex beings (noun).
Exemplars also includes eternal laws that draws the beings
towards God in order to reach God's perfection. Beings
(material and soul except angels that are non-material) imply
potentiality and beings reach towards perfect actuality/God's
essence by complying to God's eternal laws.
15
November 2012 [Insert]
Self
The word
' likenesses ' implies that parts of God's essences
that are implemented via the exemplars are copied ideas.
3.6
Renaissance
Page 159
-
Rejected church control
-
Classicism emphasised Western culture
and practical problems
-
Reformation that included members of
congregations on same level as ministers of churches
-
Scepticism reappeared and Stoic's
innate ideas (a priori)
-
New research after reading classical
texts.
3.7 Modern
rationalism
Page 160
' Descartes
marks, .. the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of a
new era, one in which not classical texts, but reason and
natural science dominates: Rationalism. '
' What
is “rationalism”? It is a life and world-view according to
which it is reason alone that can provide us with
certainty.
Medieval
thinkers believed that faith provides us with certainty about
the things we cannot see, and that reason, combined with the
senses, under the direct or indirect guidance of God, provides
us with certainty about creation. Medieval thinkers usually
debated about the right way to combine faith and reason to
lead us to truth. However, they did not doubt that some
combination of reason with faith was necessary; neither did
they doubt that reason, in its search for rational truth, was
in some way dependent upon God.
Rationalist
thinkers tend to eliminate faith and God as prerequisites for
certainty. They trust in reason, with its a priori
mechanisms, to provide certainty. Rationalists tend to focus
their debate on the relationship between reason and the
irrational factors in man, such as sentiments, passions, the
senses, the instincts, biological needs and external
circumstances. Their (often unspoken) aim is to diminish the
role of these irrational factors and to increase the dominance
of reason. '
Page 160
' Rationalism
grew in phases ..'
The
low-level initial rationalist opinion was that God warrants
truths that we need for rational thought. The second
medium-level phase opined we cannot define God and should
limit ourselves to that what we can know. The third phase
reasoned we can define God by reasoning and ' therefore
the world-order is a logical order. '
15
November 2012 [Insert]
Self
It seems
that Intequism is between medium-level and high-level
rationalism because it defines part of God by reasoning. The
most faith that I could ever quicken in myself is with the
current definition of intequism's God. All honest people are
the physical part of God, because they all are the physical
support that all honest people need to survive in the
communalist world. Honesty could be a type of a-priori
phenomenon that are formed by innate genetic
(idealistic/materialistic) and deterministic
(material/idealistic) influences. The metaphysical part of God
is noumenon. Noumena are rationally determined
entities-in-themselves that cannot be described objectively.
Knowing that we don't know is part of rationality and
acceptance of truths.
3.7.1
Descartes (low-level rationalism)
Page
161-162
' Scepticism
seriously contends that all claims to truth are
doubtful.
Together
with his Renaissance predecessors, Descartes rejected the
aggregated systems of Medieval Scholasticism, but he did not
reject the medieval belief that truth, and certainty of truth,
is possible. Descartes held that philosophical certainty could
only be attained if i) the vast, inconsistent, scholastic
philosophical systems could be replaced by a system
constructed by one man, with the help of ii) trustworthy
logical techniques and on the basis of iii) secure principles.
… In this he was also influenced by Machiavelli's argument
that a sound state constitution can only be the product of a
single leader proceeding from well-established legal
principles.
Therefore,
although Descartes clung to the possibility of certainty, he
found a use for sceptical doubt after all. Descartes proposed
to doubt all philosophical opinions inherited from the past.
The intention of this doubt was not scepticistic however. He
was not seriously questioning all truth and the certainty
thereof. He was rather using doubt as a method to test the
certainty of all opinions. We call this “methodical doubt” (in
contrast to “scepticistic doubt”). '
Page 162
' Only
one certainty initially survived the onslaught of methodical
doubt, namely: “I doubt.” The only statement that I cannot
doubt is the one stating that I doubt.
…
Firstly he
needed a warranty that this whole effort to establish
certainty was not a dream. This warranty he found in a proof
that God is unable to cheat. The capabilities of reason to
acquire certainty cannot therefore be all deceit. The role of
God is reduced to that of “certifier” of reason. '
3.7.2
Leibniz (low-level rationalism)
Page
163-164
Leibniz
refers to God as an Architect and Monarch. The universe
consist of monads. Between God and the world there is a monad
in which whole of reality is reflected. His rationalism is
low-level because ' he does not present the order of the
universe as a rational construct of the mind that can be used
to straightjacket external reality as Kant, the next
philosopher .. '
3.7.3 Kant
(medium-level rationalism)
Page
165-166
' A
chaos of sense impressions is coming in from outside. Human
consciousness orders and synthesises this chaos in space
and time. Space and time, therefore, are not aspects or
characteristics of things as they exist autonomously within
themselves. Space and time are ways in which we experience
things. They are part of human consciousness. Now, the forms
of space and time produce representations that are
elevated to a higher level
of understanding.
On the
level of understanding, we have a higher level of ordering or
synthesis, in which we order by categories, such as
modality and relation [and quantity and quality]. According to
Kant, the relationship between cause and effect is, for
instance, not part of external reality. It is rather part of
human understanding. This new order, viz. the categories of
the understanding, produces concepts and rules, which
is as far as science and scholarship can actually go.
Above the
understanding, there is a higher level, namely power and
judgement. Here consciousness structures its knowledge
and synthesises it even further under the guidance of ideas.
These ideas include the idea of God, the world, the soul, the
good and the beautiful. This produces value-judgements.
We must, realise, however that value-judgements are
“metaphysics”.
Self
I do not
agree with Kant that ideas are metaphysics that cannot be
scientifically looked at. The way that ideas are formed can be
logically seen in some instances. Descartes as far as my
knowledge goes distinguished between the sorts of ideas.
3.7.4
Transitions
after Kant
Page 167
' Hegel
was a high-level rationalist, one believing that reason is a
kind of divinity. He believed that reason created the world.
It does not only construct order on the level of knowledge and
compel the world to adjust to it. Reason really creates, and
is, the order of the world because it is the logical law of
the world. To Hegel, therefore, everything is logical. The
whole world was logical because it is created by reason.
We have
just spoken of Hegel. Hegel was what we would call a
“metaphysical idealist”. Metaphysical idealism says that the
“idea” is the same as reason, it is the same as “spirit” and
it is the same as “God” It is the creator of the world, the
source of all order. The world is orderly in a logical sense.
Phrased differently, the order in the world is logical order.
Such
extreme views always calls for a reaction. Positivism
arose as a reaction to metaphysical idealism. August Comte is
the principal philosopher with regard to positivism.
Comte said
that everything is subject to a very solid, stable natural
order, but that man could dominate rationally and be in
control by using this order. If we know the order, then we can
be engineers, even on a social level, to reset life in
accordance with the natural order. '
3.8
Irrationalism
Page 167
' Irrationalism
is a very varied philosophical movement emerging in the second
half of the nineteenth century. The Western confidence and
trust in human rationality at this stage started to
decline. '
3.8.1
Sartre
Page 167
' If
we take Jean Paul Sartre, one of the major philosophers of
existentialism as a representative example of irrationalism,
we can see the difference between rationalism and
irrationalism quite clearly. Whereas Hegel had said that
everything was orderly and everything was logical, Sartre
maintained that for human life, at least, there is no such
logical order.
Page 168
' We
have seen in Thomas Aquinas that the essences of things in God
precede their existence in creation. God was supposed to have
had some blueprint in His mind. Just as Aristotle, he also
called it “essences”. …
Sartre was
an atheist, however. He believed that there is no God, and
hence denied the idea that human beings were made according to
a certain essence, aim or goal. ...
So,
whatever “essence” a human being has, Sartre said, had been
created by that person himself. By making our choices, by
being confronted with different situations in which we make
different choices, we “create” ourselves. …
We
transcend. We try to be God, but we cannot. In our planning of
ourselves we become the hell for all the others. In Sartre's
words, “my neighbour is already my hell because he is planning
his life in contradiction with my planning of my life. … We
are actually choosing. Every time we choose, we choose also
for the whole world, not just for ourselves. '
Self
According
to me Sartre was influenced by the Stoics' ' innate
knowledge '. He meant also that when we decide we
influence our innate inborn natures and we transfer that to
our descendants. See page 171 and 167-177 of the study guide
for the contradiction in the text of the study guide (Venter's
opinion and excerpt from ' Existentialism '.
I marked it with an encircled star. Sartre contradicted
himself with regard to values and innate natures. That makes
it possible that the excerpt from Existentialism can
be interpreted in more than one way.
Page 171
' Thus
we cannot say how man should live, for man has no destination,
since he has no essence. Every man creates himself and the
whole world by his choices, but he has nothing to guide him in
his choices. He has no norms and no innate ideas [I do not
agree with this because Sartre referred to honesty and Kant's
universal laws as norms]. '
Title:
Classic philosophical questions – Seventh edition – edited
by James A. Gould – Extract from Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism,
trans. By Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1947), 14-18, 34-39, 45-46. In Leesbundel pp
175-179.
Page
175-176
' ..
let us say that, for the paper-cutter, essence—that is, the
ensemble of both the production routines and the properties
which enable it to be both produced and defined—precedes
existence. Thus, the presence of the paper-cutter or book in
front of me is determined. Therefore, we have here a technical
view of the world whereby it can be said that production
precedes existence.
When we
conceive God as the Creator, He is generally thought of as a
superior sort of artisan. Whatever doctrine we may be
considering, whether one like that of Descartes or that of
Leibnitz, we always grant that will more or less follows
understanding or, at the very least, accompanies it, and that
when God creates He knows exactly what He is creating. Thus,
the concept of man in the mind of God is comparable to the
concept of paper-cutter in the mind of the manufacturer, and,
following certain techniques and a conception, God produces
man, just as the artisan, following a definition and a
technique, makes a paper-cutter. Thus, the individual man is
the realization of a certain concept in the divine
intelligence.
In the
eighteenth century, the atheism of the philosophes
discarded the idea of God, but not so much for the notion that
essence precedes existence. To a certain extent, this idea is
found everywhere; we find it in Diderot, in Voltaire, and even
in Kant. Man has a human nature; this human nature, which is
the concept of the human, is found in all men, which means
that each man is a particular example of a universal concept,
man, as well as the bourgeois, are circumscribed by the same
definition and have the same basic qualities. Thus, here too
the essence of man precedes the historical existence that we
find in nature.
Atheistic
existentialism, which I represent, is more coherent. It states
that if God does not exist, there is at least one being
in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before
he can be defined by any concept, and that this being is man,
or, as Heidegger says, human reality. '
Self
An
interpretation of Sartre opines that ' at least one
being ' above refers to the current species. I do not
agree because the second last paragraph above does that. He
then changes that reference in the last paragraph above to the
future species of man.
15
November 2012 [Insert]
Aristotle
defined essence as genus plus species or matter plus form.
Aquinas used another word ' existence ' and he said
that in the simplicity of God, essence equals existence. The
essences of things that God creates according to Aquinas
(Venter's) are divided into likenesses (theoretical) and
Exemplars (practicable). See page 158 of study guide. A
likeness is a copy. Does that imply that the God of Aquinas
develops copies of ideas that are gathered in an information
system that ICrM opposes? If patents and patens are related it
could mean that. It seems as if these likenesses was in
Sartre's words because he refers to the concept of a
paper-cutter and the concept of a human. The manufacturer and
God which he then compares bring the already existing concept
into being. It seems now as if the God he refers to is a
reference to parents that conceive a child because the concept
human already exist. He does not refer to the first appearing
human being because the concept of a first human being can be
compared with the first ever made paper cutter. It also
depends on when the first paper cutter was made.
3.9
Summary
Page 170
' ..
during the early Christian period and the Middle Ages from the
first until the fourteenth century, the basic idea was somehow
that the order is founded in God.
This had
the drawback that God and His law were considered to be one
and the same and so that everything of the order of creation
is believed to be eternally present in God. It follows that
God is thereby actually thought to be the cause of everything
that happens on the creational level.
So, this
theory in fact made God also the cause of everything that goes
wrong in the world. Some Christians, at the end of the Middle
Ages, said the doctrine should not be elaborated in this
way. '
15
November 2012 [Insert]
Self
Maybe the
Catholic Church monopolised all manufacturing during the
Middle Ages and that was partly the reason of the opposition
to the church during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.
25 October
2012
4.
The
dominance of reason
4.1
Introduction
Page 184
' Since
very early on in the Western tradition, one aspect of human
life, namely its logical functioning, was considered to be the
supreme or most essential aspect of man's whole being. This
took precedence over all the other aspects of human life and
therefore, since then, rationality has been elevated to a
position of dominance in Western tradition. Already in Greek
philosophy this occurred to a considerable extent; it was
adopted by the Christian thought – the early Church fathers as
well as the mediaeval Christians. In modern secular
philosophy, Rationalism, the absolutising of reason, dominated
for more than three centuries. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, however, Western man seemed to have lost some trust
in reason and progressively became irrationalist. '
4.2 Ancient thinkers and
Hellenism
4.2.1
Mythological
thinkers
Page 184
' Initially
Greek culture, like that of the Egyptians and the Babylonians,
imaginatively produced myths about the Divine Being; such
myths had a spontaneous, narrative character. They took the
form of stories about generations of gods, by which the coming
into being as well as the structures and processes with which
we are confronted every day, were explained .. '
Self
(Thoughts about mythology and the current)
The
' imaginatively ' is over emphasising the non-real
part of the myths. The actualities of gods (persona and
anima), without arguing about meanings of words, of those
times, cannot be denied. Herodotus and Hesiod as historians
wrote partly about facts of those people. Another part of
their work could have been propaganda. Possibly, ' Divine
Being ' is a description in the singular for a God that
does not exist. Singularity (One person) is weak and can
therefore not have the power of God. It depends how Venter
defines ' Divine Being '. It seems to me that the
gods (rulers) of the cities and the intellectuals (priests?)
were in power struggles and narratives of Hesiod imply
unhappiness on his side about the descend of the human race.
He therefore wrote history in such a way to take power away
from gods to suit his and friends' purposes. The narrative has
been carried forward in Christian philosophy and has been
interpreted to envisage a majority non-material God. In the
process, most conceiving of creativities, have also been
removed to this non-material God, although reality is, much
industrial creativities are rationally conceived by people.
Rationally here does not include metaphysical reasoning. On
the other hand, metaphysical faiths, that support honesties,
can be rationally incorporated in ICrM's intequism.
4.2.2
Xenophanes
Page 185
' Xenophanes
complained about the fact that the tradition of mythological
thinking produced an anthropomorphic view of the divine world
(in other words, they represented the gods in human form).
This approach, according to Xenophanes, was unsuitable for the
essence of the divine, because the gods were represented also
with our human weaknesses and even racial differences. The
gods of mythology tended to snatch one another's wives, to
cheat and also to treat mankind very badly whenever it suited
them. ...
Xenophanes
does not totally relinquish this [anthropomorphic] approach –
he is rather looking for a way in which he can remove the
enlarged human weaknesses and vices from our representations
of the gods, yet retain the strengths and virtues. He wanted
to represent the divine as ideals that we can imitate and
follow.
What
Xenophanes then did, was to abstract that which he considered
the best characteristic common to all human beings (in spite
of their different outward appearances), namely consciousness
(life, sensitivity and thought), and to project this onto the
divine. … The product of this idealisation was a conception of
“God” as one simple entity: all ear, eye, and (especially)
thought, and without a body. Corporeality was associated with
differences, the need of others – e.g. the opposite sex – and
the possibility of conflict and disempowerment. … in
mythological thinking there was no clear distinction between
“spirit” and “body” ..
Xenophanes
may have thought that he avoided the pitfalls of the
anthropomorphic representations of the gods. In fact he simply
slipped into another kind of anthropomorphism, namely treating
the gods not according to the outward human form, but rather
modelling the divine on that which he considered the highest
in humans, which is consciousness, with logical thinking at
its summit. '
Self
The values
that was abstracted still have to be implemented by humans,
therefore the concept of God cannot be removed from humans.
Whether humans who uphold those values, that are important for
ICrM, are part (semantics) of God or influenced (semantics) by
God is not the primary importance in this sentence. The
acceptance of values and implementation thereof is of primary
importance. In current social conditions the implementation of
those values is not possible for me, without my God, of whom I
am part, in my view. If I say I am merely influenced by God to
act in an intequible way, then God becomes an incorporeal
being that does not have the power that is ascribed to God.
The power, required to quicken intequible behaviour, can only
exist if God is corporeal plural.
4.2.3
Plato
Page 189
Plato's
epistemology is situated in the following cosmos: Two regions
can initially be identified. That is the sensible world and
the intelligible world. The sensible world can be divided into
two regions again; one pertaining to senses and the other
pertaining to intellectual insight. Intellectual insight is
the domain of Plato's epistemology. Intellectual insight is
still part of the sensible world but it is nearing the
intellectual world where the perfect Forms are situated—being
true and good cause beauty. Senses and intellectual insight
can again be subdivided each into two areas. Senses are
divided into imaginations (for example the skewness of
something under water due to light refraction that is not a
real skewness) and ' beliefs ' (physicality that we
see with our eyes and hear with our ears). Intellectual
insights make use of these sense experiences to deduce
knowledge from ' beliefs ' (seen and heard etc.).
Intellectual insights (knowledge) are also acquired by
dialectical reasoning from ' beliefs ' (seen and
heard etc.) towards higher realities that are stable and do
not ever change. The sensible world is subject to constant
change. Higher realities (Forms) or the ' really
real ' according to Venter's terminology, are the first
stable existing principles, that order dialectics and
deductions of intellectual insights scientifically. These
higher realities that are called higher, because of the
stableness and timelessness thereof, are a priori truths that
can be summarised by saying; being true and good cause beauty.
In the intelligible world below being, truthfulness, and
goodness Plato incorporated Pythagoras' numbers that serve as
measurement units in order to make scientific measurement
possible. There are thus two extreme sides with regard to
belief that work together. The belief (Religion) of the
intelligible world supports the ' beliefs '
(positivism) of the sensible world and in between we have
opinion. ' Beliefs ' of the sensible world, although
close to realities are still only opinion because only the
realities of the intelligible world are stable enough to be
called truths. Basically there are just two regions for Plato.
Belief (stable) on one side and ' beliefs '
(opinions) on the other side.
CERTAINTY |
5 |
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x |
x |
4 |
x |
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x |
x |
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3 |
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x |
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2 |
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x |
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1 |
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x |
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Opinion is/are |
Belief (Being) Ought to be |
|||||||
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SENSIBLE WORLD |
INTELLECTUAL WORLD |
||||||
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|
Sense experience |
Intellectual insight
(knowledge) |
Numbers |
Beauty |
Being True |
Being Good |
||
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' Belief '
= Reality |
Imaginations |
Deduction
by hypothesis |
Dialectics |
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|
Self
The
philosophy of Plato with regard to the cosmos we can fathom
seems to be agreeable. There is a problem with regard to his
philosophy though. According to Karl Popper, Plato wanted a
stable sensible world. A stable sensible world was not
possible during his time and currently because of change and
creativities that are the results of Truths. I call it the
anomaly of Plato.
From:
(Popper,
K. 2011. The open society and its
enemies. pp. 36 and 530-531 [First published
1945] London and New York: Routledge Classics)
Page
36
' Accordingly,
no
sensible things (except perhaps the most excellent ones)
resemble their Forms sufficiently closely to be unchangeable.
'Absolute and eternal immutability is assigned only to the
most divine of all things, and bodies do not belong to this
order' (3) '
Page
530-531
' (3) This
quotation
is from the Statesman, 269d. ... Ultimately, I may
perhaps refer to general psychological considerations. On the
one hand the fear of innovation (illustrated by many passages
in the Laws, e.g. 758c/d) and on the other hand, the
idealization of the past ... All this indicates the
view that our unhappy and unblessed state is a consequence of
the development which makes us different from our original
nature—our Idea; and it further indicates that the development
is one from a state of goodness and blessedness to a state
where goodness and blessedness are being lost; but this means
that the development is one of increasing corruption. '
4.2.4
Aristotle
26
September 2012
Page 190
' ..
the highest destination anything can have being
intellectuality, for this is the “divine one”. At the summit
of the hierarchy we have god as pure form and this pure form
is the supreme form of intellectuality. In other words, god is
pure intellect. Then comes the astral world (the heavenly
bodies), and all of those are also intelligences or gods ..
Next in line the super-intellect: one single activating pure
intellect for the whole universe (which Aristotle needed since
his god was self-centred) On the next lower level we find the
first or highest combination of matter and form: the human
being. The destination of the human level is intellectuality,
although the human being is not pure intellect, but also has
sensitivity, biological life, and space and time as its
material side. Conscious beings (sensitive ones, i.e. animals)
are considered as worthier than non-conscious ones, for they
occupy the next lower level; living ones are worthier than
non-conscious ones, and therefore given second-level status
above minerals (which are destined to move only in space and
time).
Thus, in
the totality of reality, the dominant aspect is the
intellectual one, to be found in man, in the super-intellect
and in god. '
Page 191
' Aristotle
believed human consciousness to be passive. To him, the active
element in the knowing process is the objects of sense:
smells, colours, tastes, figures and surface structures. The
objects of the senses actualise the sensitive level of human
consciousness by making an “impression” on it (like stamping a
little picture with a rubber stamp on it). The intellect has
only the sense impressions as its information. Yet, hidden in
the sense impressions, are the objects of logical analysis
(Aristotle called them logical “forms”). These objects of
logic must be extracted from the sense impressions. This can
happen only if the logical level of consciousness is
actualised – which is done by the super intellect. '
Self
According
to Aristotle thus creativities comes from logic that comes
from the super-intellect that is an entity below God and below
the planets. The entity could be part of the world but it is a
common entity. Individual creativities can not be truly
claimed because the origin is not sufficiently enough from individuals.
Only godlike individuals can reach the intellectuality to
create according to Aristotle. WE cannot have affection for
his god because his god is selfish.
Page
191-197
' Consciousness
being passive and god being self-centred, Aristotle had to
invent an entity that could actualise the intellect into
active logical analysis. The intellect as it stands can be
considered as matter (potentiality) which has to be actualised
by some efficient cause and <page 192> “moved” to its
form. The senses are also passive, but they are actualised by
the objects of sense. What can actualise the intellect, other
than, higher intellect? Aristotle therefore invents what he
calls the nous, the super intellect, which is one for the
entire world and which actualises all the individual human
intellects.
What
happens when the individual intellect comes into action, being
actualised by the super intellect? It extracts the logical
forms from the little pictures or sense impressions on the
sense level. It might, for example, have many impressions of
human beings and from these impressions it abstracts the concept
that “a human being is a living being with an intellectual
form”. In this way it acquires a whole stock of general
concepts.
By
connecting the general concepts with one another, the
intellect produces generalisations – i.e. universal
propositions like: “all human beings are alive” and “all human
beings are intellectual beings”. From amongst these
generalisations, Aristotle (especially in his later works)
specifically singles out those that indicate the cause of a
phenomenon. According to him, causal statements express
definitions. The statement “an eclipse of the moon occurs when
the earth moves in between the sun and the moon, casting its
shadow on the moon” provides both the definition of an eclipse
of the moon, and also spells out the cause of an eclipse of
the moon. … statement as a universal one as follows: “All
eclipses of the moon are...”
When we
have a number of these causal, definitional, propositions
about the same topic, deductive arguments (called
“syllogisms”) can be constructed from them – arguments having
the same structure as the proofs in the geometry of Euclid.
For example: “A is the cause of B; B is the cause of C;
therefore A is the cause of C”. This kind of syllogism,
consisting of two universal, causal premises, from which a
third, universal, causal statement, the conclusion, is
deduced, is the only really scientific way of building
knowledge. This is Aristotle's equivalent for what Plato
called epistêmê.
The
process is twofold: starting from sense experience the mind
moves, by means of intuitive abstraction, to general concepts
that are bound into general statements. Such a generalisation
process is usually called “induction”, and it helps us to
discover definitions and general causal principles.
“Scientific” knowledge starts only from this point: it boils
down to the connecting of general causal statements into
deductive chains of propositions from which unavoidable
conclusions can be deduced. Aristotle apparently shared
Plato's belief that the world resembles the pattern of a
deductive argument – he specified, however, that the
principles from which we deduce, had to be causal statements,
thus strengthening the confusion between “principle” and
“cause”.
… <p.
193> Aristotle insisted that everything that is moving,
therefore everything that is changing, is being changed or
moved by something else. Now this “something else” is
moved in turn by yet another mover.
Each moved
mover itself has potentiality, which is changed into actuality
when it is moved by another mover. What Aristotle means is
that whenever something is moved, some aspect or
characteristic is transferred from the mover (the “efficient
cause”) to the moved. For instance, if water is being boiled,
then heat is transferred from the actually hot fire to the
water, which moves from potentially hot to actually hot. So
the heat of the fire is transferred to the water. However, the
fire in turn needs a mover that causes it to be hot (e.g.
somebody striking a match) and so on.
Every one
of these movers is therefore moved by something else. Yet,
says Aristotle, we cannot go into infinity presupposing that
everything which is moved has something else which is moving
it. We must somehow arrive at the point from where all the
movement is initiated: at an unmoved mover. In other
words, our retrograding search must stop somewhere at a first
principle of movement. (Aristotle's argument here resembles
Plato's dialectics.) The unmoved mover is the principle of all
movement, of all change on earth; it is god, Aristotle says.
He is the highest goal – the supreme Good for which everything
strives for everything loves the Good).
29 October
2012
<p.
194> Having proven the necessary existence of the unmoved
mover, Aristotle started to deduce the essential
characteristics of this god:
(i)
It is pure actuality. It cannot have any
potentiality in it, for if it had potentiality it would have
needed some other mover to change its potentiality into
actuality. The only way in which it can be the eternal unmoved
mover, is that it be pure act, so that it will not need any
other mover to actualise it.
(ii)
For the same reason that it is pure act, it
must also be pure form. Matter is considered to be
potentiality and, if it is pure actuality, it cannot contain
any matter.
(iii) Aristotle
then tried to prove that it is a pure intellect. Being a form
and being the supreme form, it must surely resemble the
highest form on earth, the human intellect. Yet the intellect
of man is combined with matter, which, with the divinity
cannot be the case (as has already been shown). It must
therefore be an intellect without matter – a pure intellect.
An
analysis such as this one could be called a metaphysical
analysis of god: it starts with the physical world but then it
transcends to “behind” the physical world, to that which is
not physical (and cannot be experienced by our senses).
Exactly because metaphysical analyses move away from that
which can be experienced by our senses, it tends to be
deductive in approach.
Aristotle's
intellectualism is not limited to his “theology”, as he
himself called his metaphysics of god. …
Aristotle
distinguished between two kinds of virtue: namely the
intellectual and the ethical virtues.
(i)
An intellectually virtuous person is a
person who keeps himself busy with theory, attempting to
understand the world. That Aristotle should choose this as
supreme virtue is understandable: the form or destination of
man is to be intellectual. If you do not occupy yourself with
theoretical pursuits (or practical pursuits based on
universal, causal, theoretical statements, like being a
doctor), you are therefore actually dehumanising yourself.
Moreover, the supreme Good, the god whom everyone strives to
imitate (except those who are misguided and do not understand
what is good for them), is pure intellect. If, therefore,
human beings want to be the best they can be, they should
strive to be as much as possible like the god. Aristotle's
intellectualism and his accentuation of deductive thinking as
the really valid process of knowing, has “scientism” as a
consequence. “Scientism” is the idea (which we shall discuss
in a later chapter) that all of our life should be governed by
academic, theoretical insights, thereby denigrating practical
insights and religious beliefs as invalid or even
superstitious.
(ii)
Ethical virtues occur on the level of emotion
and sense, but we will not have real ethical virtues if our
emotional and sense aspects are not under the control of the
intellect and its theoretical thinking. Ethical virtues are
virtues of the golden mean. However, we cannot really
find the golden mean on an emotional level if our emotions are
not governed by our intellect for, according to Aristotle, the
world of emotions and sense experience is always a world of
extremes. The virtuous life lies somewhere in the middle –
between the extremes.
<p.
195> Left to people's emotions, we could have a totally
discriminatory society, or we could have a social system where
everybody was treated exactly equally. Both of these are
extreme positions .. left: total discrimination; right: total
equality. The virtuous position, justice, will be halfway
between discrimination and equality. It is the intellect
that will show us where this middle position, the golden mean,
is.
…
<p.
196>
Aristotle's
intellectualism also stretches out to his theory of
literature, especially his theory of drama, to which his
ethical theory is applied. (We, unfortunately, do not have a
complete analysis of drama by Aristotle as his only extant
work is On Tragedy.)
According
to him in the tragedy the hero – the main character – is an
above-average man, but he is not perfect. He is not the very
best man in his class – the ideal-type. A drama, especially a
tragedy, is a mimesis, an imitation of action; it has a plot.
The action is initiated on the basis of a mistaken judgement
by the hero. Because the hero is an above-average man, we
admire him, but because he is not perfect, he makes an error
of judgement and the consequences of his error of judgement
structures the sequence of action in the drama.
Remember
that, according to Aristotle's epistemology, scientific
knowledge is knowledge gained by deductive arguments based on
causal premises. Thus the tragedy is also structured on the
basis of cause and effect of actions – every effect causes
another effect … ending in a final catastrophe.
This
catastrophe is experienced by the audience as a catharsis
(“purification”). Greek drama developed from the rituals of
Greek religion in which the cosmic events were imitated as a
way of relating to the divine powers. Aristotle still saw
something of this religious origin in tragedy. He ascribed to
it the function of “purifying” the audience. Intellectualists
tended to shy away from the rituals, because rituals excited
sensuality and emotions. Purification, however, remained
important to them, exactly to rid the person of the
indecencies connected with body, sense, and emotion –
producing purified intellectuality as a result. Plato,
believing in the return of the soul to the world of ideas (and
to its own true intellectual calling) through a process of
transmigration, substituted intellectual pursuits (theoretical
philosophy) for performing rituals, as a means of purification
– rejecting “poetry” (drama) because it played on the senses
and the emotions. Aristotle, although an intellectualist too,
rejected both the theory of ideas and the transmigration of
the soul closing Plato's door for the ordinary soul to escape
from his bodily miseries) [sic: one parenthesis after
miseries] Aristotle [' Aristotle ' own insert] had
to find other means of purification for the man in the street.
He chose participation in a quasi-ritual, engaging the senses
and emotions in a way as close as possible to science (and
therefore to intellectual virtue) – the drama!
.. we can
see how the ethics of the golden mean was applied as an
intellectualist purification ethics in Aristotle's drama
theory. The audience may be frightened and in fear as the
consequences of the hero's error unfolds but, given that he is
a good man, they will also sympathise with him. A good tragedy
will have excited the right mixture of fear and sympathy. It
will move the audience to midway between fear and sympathy,
i.e. where the audience has enough sympathy with the hero to
identify with him, to relive his experiences and also the
catastrophe that befalls him yet is fearful enough (given the
consequences) not to follow the hero's example and repeat his
error of judgement.
<p.
197>
This is
the liberating aspect that Aristotle sees in tragic drama. He
is looking at tragedy as something very similar to science and
just below it on the scale of values. Theoretical scientific
activity works by pure logic from general causal principles,
while the drama still needs sense experience because it is a
staging, an exhibition, of such cause and effect relationship
in human life. One has to watch it to gain insight into the
logic behind the visible process.
To
recapitulate, we can say that Aristotle has a moralistic
theory of the drama. To him, it serves the purpose of moral
purification and the aesthetic value of a drama will be
measured by its ability to move an audience to the golden
mean. Yet it is also an intellectual theory of drama, for the
success of a drama to move its audience to the golden mean
will depend on how effectively the plot (the unfolding of the
action sequence) exhibits and can induce in the audience, a
quasi-scientific sense of the causal logic of actions that
follow on bad or good judgment. The hero of the drama is
almost (!) the ideal type of man of Aristotle's ethics. A true
ideal type will probably be somebody who bases his actions on
sound, theoretical, intellectual conclusions, pointing to the
right (golden mean) line of action. Undoubtedly all this, as
also Aristotle's deductions of the existence and essence of
god, are all expressions of the belief that intellectual
thinking, especially in its deductive form, can solve all
philosophical and practical problems.
But we
have to note that to Aristotle, the object was always
important. It is not a subjectivist intellectualism, in which
the knowing subject holds all the cards in his hand. The
intellect in the knowing subject depends on the intellectual
object, which is the “form” or the destination of something,
which is also the “good”. Even god, the pure intellect, needs
an object. The only object worthy of him is the Supreme Good,
which is he himself. So he accepts himself as object and
intellectualises only about himself. This is why Aristotle
characterises his god as “the intellectualising of
intellectualising” (Greek: noêsis noêseoos; usually
loosely translated as: “the thinking of thinking”). '
Self
The implications of
Aristotle's philosophy about drama can be related to human
sacrifice and the following section from the Republic by
Plato.
Socrates
discusses with Glaucon and Adeimantus the reasons for justice
and injustice. Glaucon made the following statement before
Socrates answered him with reference to the formation of a
society wherein different people group together their
individual attributes to have a better combined living than a
living a single person can have when not part of a group. The
quote thus relates to the interaction between groups and
individuals and it seems to be biased towards a group. The
good man has to overcome evil by transcending reality in this
world to be happy and the evil man receives happiness although
he does not comply to universal laws of Jesus and Kant.
“Adeimantus and
Glaucon Restate the Case for Injustice ...
'So much for that. Finally, we come to
the decision between the two lives, and we shall only be
able to make this decision if we contrast extreme examples
of just and unjust men. By that I mean if we make each of
them the perfect of his own line, and do not in any way
mitigate the injustice of the one or the justice of the
other. To begin with the unjust man. He must operate like a
skilled professional – for example, a top-class pilot [There
was no pilots at the time. The editor is a pilot] or doctor,
who know just what they can or can't do, never attempt the
impossible, and are able to retrieve any errors they make.
The unjust man must, similarly, if he is to be thoroughly
unjust, be able to avoid detection in his wrongdoing; for
the man who is found out must be reckoned a poor specimen,
and the most accomplished form of injustice is to seem just
when you are not. So our perfectly unjust man must be
perfect in his wickedness; he must be able to commit the
greatest crimes perfectly and at the same time get himself a
reputation for the highest probity, while, if he makes a
mistake he must be able to retrieve it, and, if any of his
wrongdoing comes to light, be ready with a convincing
defence, or when force is needed be prepared to use force,
relying on his own courage and energy or making use of his
friends or his wealth.
'Beside our picture of
the unjust man let us set one of the just man, the man of
true simplicity of character who, as Aeschylus says, wants
"to be and not to seem good". We must, indeed, not allow him
to seem good, for if he does he will have all the rewards
and honours paid to the man who has a reputation for
justice, and we shall not be able to tell whether his motive
is love of justice or love of the rewards and honours. No,
we must strip him of everything except his justice, and our
picture of him must be drawn in a way diametrically opposite
to that of the unjust man. Our just man must have the worst
of reputations for wrongdoing even though he has done no
wrong, so that we can test his justice and see if it weakens
in the face of unpopularity and all that goes with it; we
shall give him an undeserved and life-long reputation for
wickedness, and make him stick to his chosen course until
death. In this way, when we have pushed the life of justice
and of injustice each to its extreme, we shall [own
emphasis on shall] be able to judge which of the two is the
happier ... And if the description is somewhat
brutal, remember that it's not I that am responsible for it,
Socrates, but those who praise injustice more highly than
justice. It is their account that I must now repeat.' " (Plato,
2007c. The Republic [357 BC, Translated by
Desmond Lee], 2nd
edition, p.45:360a. England, London:
Penguin)
4.2.5
Sceptics
and the Stoics (Hellenism)
Page 198
' Firstly,
the Sceptics doubted all truth and they very seriously
believed that one cannot find truth and that all viewpoints
are equivalents in their truth claims. Secondly, this
paralysed not only theoretical thinking but also practical
life. There is no way in which we can make sense of our
practical life if we do not believe that at least a few
statements are true.
The Stoics
produced a notable answer to the challenge from Scepticism –
or at least, they found a way to circumvent the potholes
pointed to by the Sceptics.
The
solution they offered was initially aimed at reopening the way
to meaningful practical life: a priori (innate)
concepts, as guidelines for ethics. Human beings were supposed
to have innate concepts of virtue that “germinate” like seeds
as the person matures, and which become useful of about the
age of fourteen. …
In this
way, the Stoics saved intellectual thinking and, in fact,
equipped the intellect with what was later to be called
“reason”. “Reason” (Latin: ratio) meant something more
than “intellect” or “understanding”; it referred to an
understanding or an intellect equipped with innate ideas, or
innate concepts, or innate principles, or innate mechanisms by
means of which it can circumvent the problematic aspects of
acquiring the truth – those aspects pointed out by Scepticism.
The Stoics
produced a very important response to Scepticism; in fact,
their response provided the basis for modern secular
Rationalism. '
4.3 Early Christianity and
the Middle Ages
Page 198
' Most
Christians were from common stock, without any theoretical
learning, finding themselves surrounded by pagans educated in
Greek or Hellenistic thought, persecuting and oppressing them.
They needed learning to defend their faith, but how could they
be Christians and yet learned people when the education of the
day was totally pagan?
By the
second century, opposing points of view about this matter had
developed: the viewpoint of Clement of Alexandria was in
opposition to that of Tertullian. The former favoured the
adoption of some pagan learning; the latter was totally
antipathic towards it. '
4.3.1
Clement
Page 199
' Clement
of Alexandria said that we can learn something from the
pagans, especially from Plato, from whom he borrowed many
ideas. '
4.3.2
Tertullian
Page 199
' What
Tertullian actually meant was: In Jesus Christ, God became a
human being. Human beings are not God, so God became something
which is not God. … When God does something that is
contradictory in terms of our human logic, this shows that He
transcends even the strict laws of logic, and therefore is
boundless – we can really belief in Him as really being God.
He was saying something like the following: only a real god
can transgress the laws of logic. The Greeks derived the laws
of logic from the perceived identity of objective being.
According to them, nothing could be itself and simultaneously
something different from itself. Tertullian seems to say: “No,
there is one exception to this rule: God in the flesh!”
The second
main point of Tertullian's argument was that God loves the
flesh, … soul and body as a unity are image and likeness of
God – this in contrast to Clement of Alexandria who limited
the image of God to the intellectual part of the soul,
excluding the body from it.
Page 200
' Therefore,
every Christian who attempts a rational theology is in danger
of heresy. All heretics, he says have their origin somewhere
in Greek philosophy. '
Self
ICrM is
more in line with Tertullian because he acknowledged the
physical part of God. He could not explain it because he
referred mostly to the meta-physical part of God. ICrM
explains the physical part of God and describes the
metaphysical part as noumenon.
4.3.3
Augustine
30 October
2012
Page 200
' Augustine
of Hippo became one of the most famous Christian thinkers of
all times, and the most well known father of the early church.
What is more, he is special to us, because he was an African.
… He wrote many books after his conversion, and progressively
moved his own accents away from the capabilities of the
intellect to dependence on faith, God and the Scriptures.
In his
earliest works after his conversion (like the Soliloquia), he
showed a considerable trust in reason. All he wanted, he said,
was rational knowledge of God and the soul. Probably because
he was confronted with the Manicheans (he had a dear friend
who belonged to this sect), Augustine realised that the ideal
of rational knowledge of God and the soul was not a totally
safe one for a Christian. The Manicheans pretended to be
Christians and also to have rational knowledge of God. …
Through this debate, probably, Augustine shifted his position
somewhat, stressing faith as the starting point of all
knowledge.
In a
letter to his Manichean friend, which he published as a
booklet entitled On the Advantage of Believing, he
stresses that all rational insights have their starting point
in God's authority. God has established his authority
in the world through his revelation, through the prophets, His
miracles and through the advent of Jesus Christ.
Augustine
firmly believed that we can have rational knowledge of God,
but such knowledge presupposes purification that comes through
faith .. Faith, again, is based on the authority of Christ who
entered the horizon of time and therefore represents the
authority of God himself. … Yet, even though purified, reason
cannot act independently – it always depends on God Himself
for “illumination”.
Page 201
' Christ,
therefore, works in two ways: one, by entering time
and creating faith and, secondly, by illuminating our
soul's eye so that we can see God in a kind of mystical
vision. This was the approach of the early Augustine.
Sadly,
Augustine did not reject pagan insights out rightly. He rather
believed that such knowledge, carefully selected and
well-purified, could help our reason to move forward in its
search for an understanding of God. In On Christian Doctrine
he said that, after the initial purification of the mind by
faith, purposefully selected pagan insights could serve our
understanding of the Bible, which again served the further
purification of the mind's eye, to finally bring us the wisdom
(the latter being a “mystical, intuitive, direct vision of
God”.)
The
creation, Augustine now said, was a reflection of God. To his
mind, we can represent the creation in terms of concentric
circles .. The outer circle represents the physical world,
which has its own trinities. The second one represents the
soul, with its own trinity reflecting the Trinity of God. The
inner circle, the intellect, with its trinity, is the real
image and likeness of God: it is both a unity and a
multiplicity: it is a unity in that the intellect is directed
at itself; it is a multiplicity (namely a trinity) of
remembering, understanding, and loving itself.
Self
ICrM seems
to correlate with some things Augustine said for example that
real faith makes clearer reason possible. Because of the trust
that can be put in God to be rational under difficult
circumstances. Faith is therefore important to keep
creativities in place that support communities.
4.3.4
Thomas Aquinas
Page 204
' He
really thought that our earthly life is dominated by the
intellect, yet he tries to analyse the intellect in such a way
as to leave room for faith. According to him, we have a
continuous line between extreme functions of the intellect.
-
On the one extreme, there is knowledge
gained through “vision” and producing “certainty”. This
knowledge is a product of direct experience of the object.
-
On the other extreme, there is doubt,
which is the opposite of knowledge. Where there is no direct
experience of the object, there is also no certainty.
-
The middle position (the golden
mean??) is taken by faith. Faith shares with doubt the
lack of directly experiencing the object. However, with
knowledge it shares certainty. Although we have (for faith) no
object that we can directly experience, faith still has
certainty. Moreover, faith is an intellectual activity
according to Thomas; it is not something of its own.
31 October
2012
Page
204-205
' According
to Thomas Aquinas, there are two levels of knowledge: the natural
and the supernatural one. This is in accordance with
man's two destinations: man has a natural destination,
namely to act intellectually (as Aristotle indicated),
and he also has a supernatural destination, to have a
direct intuition of God (as the Christian faith,
according to Thomas, clearly teaches).
(1) Thomas,
therefore, did provide for a natural knowledge of God
– a knowledge that can be either intellectual or rational, and
which human beings can acquire without intervention of God's
grace (unbiblical) or Scripture. Thomas also had no room for
the idea of a purification or reason by faith, as we have in
Clement of Alexandria or Augustine. Rational knowledge is
analytic and argumentative (moving from unity to multiplicity)
– a distinction reminiscent of Augustine's distinction between
reason and intellect. This knowledge of God is called “natural
theology”, which is divided into negative
(natural) theology and positive (natural) theology. In
negative theology we can, by rational argument, deny
certain characteristics as being applicable to God. In positive
theology we can prove God's existence by deductive
argument (as Aristotle and his Arab followers had already
done).
(2) Even
the supernatural knowledge of God can be intellectual.
Supernatural knowledge (of God and His creation) has its
source in faith, but faith, as we have already seen, is an
intellectual activity, which has its roots in grace (as
God's supernatural gift, added on top of the natural gifts
implanted at creation). We also have a kind of science on the
supernatural level: Thomas calls it “sacred theology”.
Thomas specifically tried to show that sacred theology is a
science, an argumentative body of knowledge departing from
steadfast principles that are self-evident in themselves.
These principles are, in fact, as good as innate concepts –
the only problem is that that which is self-evident in itself,
may not be so evident to a human being. Therefore, the
doctrines of sacred theology may need extensive argument and
logical explanation before human beings can see that they are
in fact true in themselves (biblical?)
Self
The
explanation of Aquinas' supernatural theology explains why his
theology was probably used to justify sacrificing people, by
burning them during the Middle Ages. Supernatural theology
cannot be an argumentative science because it is noumenon.
Extracts
from ' Summa Theologiae – Questions on God ' by
Thomas Aquinas. Brian Davies, Brian Leftow (eds.). New York:
Cambridge University Press. In Leesbundel pp. 227-241.
Page 299
' The
thirteenth century .. fostered a new institution called a
'university'. … Thomas Aquinas .. As a young man he joined the
the Dominicans, who supported systematic theological studies
for their members as a preparation for preaching, especially
to non-Christians. He later became a professor in the Theology
Faculty of the University of Paris, and Aristotle became the
chief philosophical influence on his defence and explanation
of Christian theology.
… Siger of
Brabant, who defended as Aristotle's opinion the view of
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) that all humans share a single soul.
Page
230-231 [Parts added on 16 November 2012]
' Article
I: Is it self-evident that God exists?
...
But once
we understand the meaning of the word 'God', we immediately
see that God exists. For the word means 'that than which
nothing greater can be signified'. So, since what exists in
thought and fact is greater than what exists in thought alone,
and since, once we understand the word 'God', he exists in
thought, he must also exist in fact. It is, therefore,
self-evident that God exists. …
On the
contrary, as Aristotle's discussion of first principles
makes clear, nobody can think the opposite of what is
self-evident.(4) But we can think the opposite of the
proposition 'God Exists.' For 'the fool' in the Psalms 'said
in his heart: “There is no God.” '(5) So, it is not
self-evident that God exists.
Reply:
A proposition can be self-evident in two ways: (a) in itself,
though not to us, and (b) both in itself and to us. For a
proposition is self-evident when its predicate forms part of
its subject's definition (thus, for example, it is
self-evident that human beings are animals since being an
animal is part of the meaning of 'human being'). And if
everyone knows the essence of the subject and predicate, the
proposition will be self-evident to everybody. This is clearly
the case with first principles of demonstration, which employ
common terms known to all of us (such as 'being' and
'non-being', 'whole' and 'part', and the like). But if some
people do not know the essence of its subject and predicate,
then a proposition, though self-evident in itself, will not be
so to them. …
So, I
maintain that the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident in
itself, for, as I shall later show, (7) its subject and
predicate are identical since God is his own existence. But
because we do not know what God is, the proposition is not
self-evident to us and needs to be demonstrated by things more
known to us, though less known as far as their nature goes –
that is, by God's effects. ...
... Indeed,
some people have believed God to be something material. And
even if someone thinks that what is signified by 'God' exists
in reality rather than merely as thought about. If we do not
grant that something in fact exists than which nothing greater
can be thought (and nobody denying the existence of God would
grant this), the conclusion that God in fact exists does not
follow.
' (4)
Metaphysics 4.3, 1005b11; Posterior Analytics
1.10, 76b23-7.
(5) Psalms
13:1. The numbering of the Psalms follows that of the Latin
Vulgate. '
Self
Anselm's
proof of material existence of God is dependent on his
definition of God. Aquinas mentioned that in Summa Theologica
as an argument against Anselm's definition without referring
to Anselm if I remember correctly. There was no reference
after the quote ' 'that than which nothing greater can be
signified' ' in Summa Theologica on page 230. Aquinas
refers to Psalms 13:1, Latin Vulgate version. The New
International Version ©2003, Psalm 13:1:
' Psalm
13
For
the director of music
A
psalm of David.
1
How long, O LORD?
Will
you forget me for ever?
How
long will you hide your face from me? '
I recall that Anselm referred to
Psalm 14:1 (not sure what version) that reads in the New
International Version:
' Psalm
14
For
the director of music. Of David
1
The fool (a) says in his heart,
“There
is no God.”
They
are corrupt,
their
deeds are vile;
there
is no one who does good. '
' (a) 1 The Hebrew words
rendered fool in Psalms denote one who is morally
deficient. '
The definitions of essence at
Aquinas' and at Aristotle's seem to differ because essence at
Aristotle's is a wider concept (form plus matter) according to
the study guide than at Aquinas' (form as a likeness). Jesus
also referred to ' fool ' with reference to Raka
(See 2.3.4.1). See 4.8. for Anselms definition of God and his
reference to a Psalm 14:1.
Page
232-233
' There
are five ways in which we can prove that there is a God.
The first
and most obvious way is based on change. … we are bound to
arrive at some first cause of change that is not itself
changed by anything, which is what everybody takes God to be.
…
The second
way is based on the notion of efficient causation. … If you
eliminate a cause, however, you also eliminate its effect. So,
there cannot be a last cause, nor an intermediate one, unless
there is a first. If there is no end to the series of
efficient causes, therefore, and if, as a consequence, there
is no first cause, there would be no intermediate efficient
causes either, and no last effect, which is clearly not the
case. So, we have to posit a first cause, which everyone calls
'God'. '
In the
third proof Aquinas wrote some objects can be or not. He wrote
that objects that exist, are brought into being by existing
things. Therefore there always had to be something that
existed that could cause the first existence of other objects.
God is that that was not caused and always exists. God cannot
not be, therefore God is.
' The
fourth way is based on the gradation that we find in things. …
when many things possess some property in common, the one most
fully possessing it causes it in the others. … So, there is
something that causes in all other things their being, their
goodness, and whatever other perfection they have, and we call
this 'God'.
The fifth
way is based on the governance of things. For we see that some
things that lack intelligence (i.e. material objects in
nature) act for the sake of an end. … So, there is a being
with intelligence who directs all natural things to ends, and
we call this being 'God'.
… So, it
belongs to the limitless goodness of God that he permits evils
to exist and draws good from them. '
Self (page
230-233)
Aquinas
questioned Anselm's proof of God because he says the
definition of Anselm's God is not true. He says God does not
have to be defined as the Greatest we can think of. Anselm's
proof of God is based on a definition. Aquinas's proof of God
is based on cause and effect. He proves God with reference to
effects we can see. It is thus similar to the deductive proof
of Aristotle.
Page 236
' It
is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal; which
things philosophers prove by natural reason. .. It is
necessary for man to receive by faith not only things which
are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason;
and this for three motives. … The third reason is for the sake
of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things
concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers, in their
inquiry into human affairs by natural investigation, have
fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves.
And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of
God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for
divine truths to be delivered to them by way of faith, being
told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot
lie. '
4.4
Summary
of first section
Page
206-207
Mythological
philosophers, Xenophanes, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Clement,
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were emphasised.
4.5 Renaissance and the
modern era
4.5.1
Introduction
Page 207
' The
Renaissance attempted to return to ancient philosophy, which
led to a revival of Scepticism. Although the Renaissance did
not produce many serious sceptics, at least the sceptic
arguments from the Hellenistic era surfaced again, and
Renaissance philosophers had to take account of these. '
4.5.2
Tomasso Campanella
1 November
2012
Page 207
' The
following is Campanella's version of the Augustinian argument:
(i)
The basic sceptic position is to doubt every
viewpoint.
(ii)
When I say that I doubt, this implies that I
am thinking. Even if I doubt everything, I still, at least,
cannot deny that I am doubting, so I cannot deny that I am
thinking, which means that I cannot deny that I am existing.
(iii)
Next, the fact that I doubt implies that I am
a limited human being, i.e. that I am not perfect or complete,
but defective. However, the fact that I can also love means
that there must be other people in the world.
(iv)
Furthermore, the fact that I am limited
implies that I have the idea of finitude, or finiteness in my
mind. This in turn implies that I also have the opposite idea,
namely of the infinite, or of infinity. I could not have had
in my finite mind the idea of the infinite if the infinite did
not exist, and if he had not himself implanted that idea in my
mind.
(v)
This is infinity in the sense of power, wisdom
and love, which again is mirrored in different degrees of
being: the nearer a being is to the infinite being, i.e. the
higher it is in the hierarchy of being, the more wisdom, love
and power it has, and the lower it is in the scale, the less
it has of these. This provides us with proof of the whole
cosmic hierarchy.
Self
Augustine's
and Campanella's have to be read to see if they also referred
to the infinite as ' he ' and ' himself '.
Except for that it seems the Augustinian argument cannot be
doubted, which implies life of a doubting human. With
accounting teaching we were taught to double check by double
doing tasks. Doubt is therefore an integral part of the
philosophy of auditing. Accounting of ideas seems to therefore
implies accounting where there is not much doubt involved at
first thought, but is that reality. Can no doubt exist. It can
be very certain that an idea exist when it is written down or
recorded in another manner. The accounting process that
follows after that first recording of an idea will determine
things like uniqueness in a territory, ownerships, copyrights,
renumeration etc. The doubt exist primarily at these secondary
processes that follow the initial recording of an idea.
4.5.3
Descartes
Page
208-209
' Campanella
was in a way a predecessor of René Descartes. Like
Campanella, Descartes had to take account of the sceptic
arguments. … The sceptics doubted the possibility of
certainty; Descartes was defending the position that certainty
is based on human reason. [Self: Uncertainties exist whether
Descartes wrote God warrants truths and thus reasons, whether
reasons were Descartes' God and/or whether humans are God]
This he probably found in the writings of Campanella, who had
just been released from incarceration by the Roman Catholic
Church and was supervising the first complete edition of his
writings in Paris, France, when Descartes was still a young
man. [Self: Why did the Roman Catholics incarcerate Campanella
if he followed Saint Augustine's argument in essence?]
Descartes
believed that it is the primary function of rational thought
to distinguish values: it is supposed to distinguish the true
from the false and the good from the bad. The main steps of
Descartes' defence of reason against scepticism are the
following:
(i)
One of the values that we can distinguish is
that of clarity and distinctness, Like Campanella and
Augustine, Descartes argued that if I doubt everything, it
implies that I think, and therefore that I exist. This is a
clear and distinct idea. Clarity and distinctness are
therefore values that are predicated of the proposition “I think, therefore I
am”, and which reason can really distinguish.
(ii)
My doubting, as Descartes says, following
Campanella, implies that I am imperfect, that I am finite.
This again implies the opposite idea: the idea of the perfect,
infinite God – therefore God must exist.
(iii)
But suppose, Descartes says, that some strange
horrible god has made my mind such that it always deceives
itself about its own existence, then nothing that I can figure
out with my reason would hold. Since God is perfect, He cannot
deceive me and, therefore, he could not have given me a
deceiving reason. Therefore I can trust my own reason to lead
me to the truth.
Descartes
wanted to prove that reason is trustworthy and that makes him
the first modern rationalist. He therefore produces proof of
the existence of God. Augustine did so too, as did Anselm of
Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas. Yet all of these were proving
the existence of God so as to be able to assure their readers
that all creatures are in the good hands of an Almighty God,
who cares about us. Descartes used his proof of God's
existence in another way, namely as an argument that, for
truth and certainty, we may put our trust in reason. Although
intellectuality and/or rationality had played an important
role up to then, it had never been the warrantor of truth and
certainty. This is a very modern idea in Western
thought. '
Page 219
' ..
low-level rationalism of Descartes, trusting reason for truth
and certainty. Descartes is not even hesitant to use God to
prove the trustworthiness of reason. '
Self
Currently
intequism argues that faiths give warranties for creativities.
Faiths of God in God that tie up with Descartes ' very
modern idea in Western thought '. God warrants truths as
first principles that are used in the processes of creations.
Creations can be divided as creations of essences of selves,
products to consume and planets for example. Intequisms
philosophise about products to consume. Even at that level,
Jesus' fishes become relevant. For now Jesus' fishes are
ignored. Descartes combined the ideas of Saint Augustine with
his own. Even doubt about all implies a certainty, because
doubt about all implies certainties by selves that we exist.
Doubts and certainties are thus very close. In the arguments
doubts are primaries and finites. Certainties are secondaries
and infinities that implies existences of selves. Existence
predates doubts because I have to exist before I can doubt.
Chicken or the egg? Certainties relate to creativities as
secondaries. It seems that doubts about all after existences
as primaries are the starts of reasoning and of intequism,
because intequisms are currently limited to living, thinking
humans.
4.5.4 Kant
Page
209-211
' He
looked at reason or consciousness in two ways:
Firstly,
there are the different levels of consciousness that we
discussed in the previous chapter. Starting with the level of
sense, a chaos of impressions comes into consciousness,
ordered by sense into representations. On the level of
understanding, the representations are categorised and brought
together into relationships, which gives us science as a
product of the level of sense and understanding together.
Transcending this level, we have the level of the power of
judgement, where ideas will be used to synthesise knowledge
even more.
Secondly,
there are two sides to consciousness: one is the theoretical
side and the other one is the practical side. … the right-hand
side the practical (ethical) aspect, and on the left the
theoretical aspect.
The
implication of the latter is that reason is the ordering
principle of our knowledge; it governs our lives not only on a
scientific level, but also on a practical level.
In his
essays on the Enlightenment and on the Origin of man, Kant
views man as an end in himself, which means that no man
ought to be used as an instrument by another human being.
This, according to Kant, is the idea of freedom.
… Whereas
Thomas Aquinas would have said that man is subservient to God
who is the end (goal) of everything, filling Aristotle's
terminology with some biblical content, Kant does not
refer to God as the end for man, but to man as an end in
himself.
This idea
of freedom (man as an end in himself), is the a priori
law of practical reason, which we can interpret as act in
such a way that your actions can serve as a law for
everybody else. In other words, practical reason sets a
law for itself; it needs no law from elsewhere; it is
autonomous; it needs no heteronomy. Reason creates this
conception of a law.
… The
conception provides the broad framework of an ethical law,
namely: always act in such a way that your action can be a law
for everybody else.
<p.
210> … In our providing rational content to the conception
of the law, we autonomously come to know what the “good” is,
and we live for the sake of the good. That is acting from
respect for the law – not the external law, but law created
by reason itself, from which duty is derived – a priori
duty .. We can now act on the basis of respect for autonomous
law, and not on the basis of the advantage that it brings, or
from revenge, but really and only on the basis of a priori
duty, as intuited by reason (without experience)
<p.
211> … Starting from the chaos coming in on the sense level
and ordered into representations, further ordered on the level
of understanding and changed into scientific knowledge, one
finally arrives on the level of the judgement where our
knowledge is related to our most fundamental presuppositions,
explicating what we have been presupposing all the time.
…
Practical knowledge follows an opposite route: it starts on
the level of the power of judgement with the idea of
freedom, and moves “downwards” to the level of the
understanding, to derive the concept of pure duty, which is
finally expressed in external, visible acts. Instinctive
(pre-rational) man – one would even be able to call him
“primitive man” - is a slave of his instincts. Rational modern
man is autonomous, understanding his duty as being guided by
the idea of freedom. '
Self
In Genesis
knowledge is described as an opposing force to God. According
to the above description of Venter and Genesis, instinctive
illiterate people are closer to God than literate people.
4.5.5
Transitions
after Kant
Page
211-212
' By
the middle of the 19th century, this confidence in
reason somehow started to collapse.
To make
this understandable, we must realise that already Descartes'
thinking shows a kind of tension concerning the human being.
He exalts reason as the function that can bring us truth if –
and only if – it works in the way of the mathematician. [See
pp. 209, 219] He also realised that there can be some
obstructions like our passions and external circumstances.
… Western
thinkers came to the conclusion that, more often than not,
mankind is guided by irrational factors like passions, drives,
and hunger for power rather than by reason. Thus, in the early
20th century, a very strong current of irrationalism
began to flourish. This does not mean that reason and its role
were now totally rejected. In the view of these thinkers,
reason was merely being shifted from the “driving seat” to the
“back seat”, or given a secondary role as an instrument of
these irrational factors.
… A Number
of irrationalist currents developed in the 19th
and 20th centuries, like the philosophy of life of
Nietzsche and Bergson (which we shall discuss only later), the
Existentialism of Sartre (discussed in the previous chapter)
and Pragmatism (which we shall now analyse). All of these
different currents proposed a different irrational aspect as
the dominant one. The existentialists <p. 212> said
that man was doomed to freedom, that we have to choose in
every situation, and that our choices are not guided by laws
or norms provided by reason (as Kant had said), or implanted
in man by God (as Thomas Aquinas had said). The philosophers
of life (the vitalists like Nietzsche and Bergson) called the
irrational force that is supposed to guide us the “life
force”, a force that controls even our reason. The
pragmatists, again, held that the practical situation to which
we react in all kinds of (mostly irrational) ways (as long as
they work), is the regulative one. Thus, when we use our
reason we use it in service of practice. '
Self
Venter
seems to write here that if philosophers isolate one dominant
concept as regulative over reason then they are
irrationalists. High-level rationalisms, which he does not
seem to accept, because it places reason above God, are
philosophies that opine reasons determine the world at a
metaphysical level (Hegel). Perhaps the distinction between
rationalisms and irrationalisms becomes clearer when looking
at plurals and singular. The plural of ' reason ' is
' reasons ', that implies causal relationships.
Maybe causality then is the essence of rationalism. If
miracles are believed to be causes then that can still be
rationalism because of an event or object that was caused
by a temporary break in causality. Rationalism currently means
to me faith of God in God that gives logical reasoning powers
under pressure. Sometimes it seems that Venter regards himself
to be not rational nor irrational. He or someone else wrote on
page 32 of the leereenhede:
' Jy
het nou kennis gemaak met basies drie verskillende idees oor
wet:
Rationalism
on the level of intellectual creations of consumable products
is important for intequism. Consumable products are
prioritised from the most basic upwards from food and shelter
first. A ICrM practitioner must understand first that actual
faiths cause ICrM. Someone who already are utilising basic
products.
4.5.6
William James
Page
213-214
' Firstly,
we have direct knowledge coming into consciousness -
consciousness being represented by the [a circle, Venter
referred to figure 12 on p. 213] circle. Our consciousness
acts as a kind of sieve, selecting what we need (usually
primarily for survival) and it is these selected fragments of
knowledge that James calls ideas. Direct knowledge originates
in sense experience.
...
From the
left-hand side .. there is another line coming in, indicating
mediated knowledge. Mediated knowledge is knowledge that we
have not directly acquired, but which we have received via
other people (as media), like our parents and our teachers.
Mediated beliefs are also included in our corpus of ideas.
How does
this inclusion process work? According to James, it is a two
tier process:
(1)
When we include new ideas, we shall try for a
maximum consistency, attempting to make the new ideas fit in
logically with the old ones. A tension arises if the new idea
does not fit in logically with the older, and shifts may start
to occur in the whole body of ideas (some being thrown out and
others adjusted), until a new consistency is arrived at.
(2)
Ideas are the basis of action, and the truth
of an idea is determined by its efficiency in action: whether
it can solve very old controversies in philosophy (which
formerly seemed insoluble) – its efficiency being tested by
just drawing its practical consequences; or whether it is able
to guide us in solving a practical problem.
<p.
214> Ideas that are coherent can form theories. Theories
are not true in themselves, for they serve as instruments to
solve certain practical problems and to guide our actions.
Thus theories are tested in the same way as ideas regarding
their coherence with our body of ideas and their efficiency in
solving our problems.
… Whereas
the rationalists of the 18th and 19th
centuries believed in automatic progress, the pragmatists
rather believed that we had to improve our own future by
experimenting (yet there is no guarantee of success, of
course).
James even
applies this to theology. According to him, we have a right to
believe in God, for the sake of our own salvation. It is valid
to believe, on condition that our idea of God has a salutary
effect. Does it contribute to our sense of liberation? What
kind of practical effect does the idea of God have? And if it
has no practical effect, then our God is dead. '
Self
Pragmatism
can be used by ICrM at a low level because ICrM does not pay
attention to judgements. Pragmatism cannot be used when
judging has to take place for example when ICrM must decide
about levels of development that can cause global warming for
example, reason being that experiments cannot show results at
that level of reasoning. Pragmatism is not practical then
according to my current knowledge.
4.6
Christian alternatives since the Renaissance
2 November
2012
4.6.1 John
Calvin
Page
214-216
' He
wrote a doctor's thesis on Seneca (who was a Roman member of
the Stoic schools in ancient times). Calvin was educated
strictly in the Catholic (scholastic) tradition on the one
hand, but, being a typical Renaissance scholar on the other
hand, he wanted to revert to classical times – thus he wrote a
doctor's thesis on Seneca. Like the early Renaissance thinker,
Petrarca, he became fascinated by Augustine (somewhat later)
and he became more and more Augustinian in his thought.
Reaching maturity, Calvin would become a reformer of the
Church.
…
Foremost in
Calvin's thinking was the relationship between theology and
philosophy. Just as with Thomas Aquinas, this thinking
expressed his views on the role of rationality, because it
shows how he believed reason and faith were to be related to
one another.
… Calvin
fell in line with an ancient Stoic view, namely <p. 215>
that philosophy is the search for Wisdom regarding both divine
and human affairs. According to Calvin, we can find wisdom on
the basis of converted reason, which is obedient to God –
obedience on the one hand to the Holy Scriptures and, on the
other hand, to the Holy Spirit.
…
There are
different kinds of knowledge of God to be found by either
reason or revelation.
On the
left-hand side .. is represented knowledge of God as the
Saviour and this, of course, we can only find through revelation
(in the Scriptures), our reason being obedient to what
Scripture says.
But then
.. right-hand .. we have knowledge of God as the Creator
and of this there are two kinds again: the knowledge which we
find in (i) the Scriptures, and the knowledge which we
find (ii) in creation.
Knowledge
of God from creation, is again of two types: the knowledge
that has been (a) implanted (or innate – the a
priori of the Stoics), i.e. the consciousness of God
that all of mankind has: every human being, according to the
Bible and Calvin, knows that there is a God and we all have a
conscience, a feeling of guilt when we have done anything
wrong. This is innate. On the other hand, there is (b) an
acquired knowledge of God, from creation, which again, Calvin
divides into two types:
<p.
216> The first is derived from nature, and is
everywhere – available for everybody to observe, Calvin says.
The other one comes from history – God reveals Himself
by favouring his children, or any human beings, favouring them
when they do not even deserve it.
However,
all the knowledge of God that we acquire from creation cannot
be had in a mature and developed sense, if we are not obedient
to Scripture, because only a submissive reason (submissive to
Scripture and to the Holy Spirit) can transcend the spiritual
blindness caused by sin. … The knowledge .. right-hand .. i.e.
all the knowledge that we gain of God from creation, can only
be had on the basis of the knowledge of God from Scripture,
with our reason being guided by this while we are studying
creation.
Calvin
thus focuses on the knowledge of God. He does believe that we
can know God rationally if, and only if, our reason is
obedient to the Holy Spirit and to the Scriptures. … He
obverts the schema of his early Christian predecessors – an
elaboration of the Platonist and Stoic ideas of wisdom – who
wanted to derive rational knowledge of God from rational
knowledge of the human soul. Calvin rather wants to derive the
knowledge of man from the knowledge of God. '
Self
Again, the
distinction between types of creativity cannot be found. The
word creator refers to God without distinguishing between
creations of God and creations of humans; that causes the
problems of ICrM. Calvin seems to have had a similar view to
Plato with regard to truths. Venter writes that Plato and the
Stoics prioritised human reason from where they upscaled to
God. Calvin started at knowledge of God that is derived from
the Scriptures and the Holy Spirit.
4.6.2
Reformed
Scholasticism
Page 216
' Calvin
rejected the Aristotelian tradition as we find it in Thomas
Aquinas. By the 16th century, however, Reformed
Scholasticism reverted to Thomas Aquinas and Aristotelianism.
… The
Reformed scholastics added Descartes' belief in innate ideas
to their Aristotelian, Thomistic idea of God. Represented in a
diagram, we get the following: God knows Himself in a
theological way; He is producing theology about Himself. (This
is a new elaboration of Aristotle's idea of God, as “the
intellectualising of intellectualising”; as intellectualising
about himself.) How we human beings could know that God is
theologising about Himself, is a question one would like to
ask the Reformed Scholastics.
…
Theology, being the thoughts of God Himself (and not of human
theologians) is the queen of all sciences. The Reformed
theologians thus moved away from the direction given to them
by John Calvin.
Self
The God
thought is very clear to identify here. ' Himself '
causes the
problem. Are selves God or not. Should I classify myself as
part of God or as God or follower of God etc. The singularity
implicit in first person singular references to God that we
are brainwashed with hampers our honesties that are necessary
for ICrM to be effective.
4.6.3
Blaise Pascal
Page 217
' ..
under the influence of Descartes. Later he became converted to
the Jansenism – an order in the Catholic Church.
... He
still used the Thomistic distinction between a supernatural
and a natural sphere, but he explicitly stated that the former
one, the sphere of grace and faith, guided the natural one of
reason.
… In fact,
almost all the French schools were using the books written by
Jansenists. '
4.6.4
Maurice Blondel
Page
218-219
' Maurice
Blondel was a 19th century Catholic thinker, and is
important for the way in which he posed the position of
rationality. '
He opposed
the nihilists because effectively the nihilists nullified
action; the nihilists did not believe in positive knowledge.
Blondel argued they have to know what truths are because one
cannot argue against something one does not know.
Blondel
wrote that we strive to be like God and when we realise that
it is not possible it causes a desire for the infinite which
we try to reach by transcendence. We reach out to others but
still we cannot reach the idea of God as one human being.
Descartes resolved the same problem, of being a doubting human
being, coupled with the orthodox idea of the singular human
nature of God, arguing that God is perfect. Perfect implies
incorporeal, although I did not read that Descartes,
explicitly acknowledged that implication. God being perfect
and incorporeal they effectively excluded themselves from the
weighty idea of self being or becoming God as Blondel did.
' The
desire for the infinite also refers to a theme in Thomas
Aquinas called the desiderium naturale. Thomas Aquinas
maintained that, inside every creature, there is a “natural
desire” to be as much as possible like God. This belief he
adopted from Aristotle, but again Blondel puts <p. 219>
this in a different context. The desire for the infinite
creates the internal consciousness, the awareness that the
full truth cannot be known in a purely rational way – we also
need to depend on faith and grace. Inside the domain of
philosophy, Blondel would not allow for a direct role of
faith. Rather, he said, from within the domain of philosophy
one cannot but realise that there is a natural striving
towards the unlimited, towards the infinite, since we do not
and cannot in our actions ever reach that which we see as our
ideals. This truth compels us to agree that we need something
more than what we acquire by pure reason. '
Blondel
did not through Venter refer to God as the singular human form
as referred to above. That singular physical form is however
the problem in Blondel's argument that is not acknowledged in
direct positive communication.
Self
According
to ICrM the problem is resolved by ICrM's definition of God.
God has a metaphysical part that is noumenon and a physical
part that is all living honest men and women. Dead honest
people and their words are included in the metaphysical part
of God. The problem that is called the God thought, Mother of
God thought etc. is a problem that honest people, maybe all
people at a stage of their lives, naturally have to deal with,
because truths and God are analogised in theology and
philosophy. The problem can be solved like Descartes etc. did,
or the problem can be solved by changing the singular form of
the definition of God. Changing the definition to plural
causes more faith, therefore the plural physical form of the
definition of God is closer to truths. When a person can trust
more other people, being or becoming part of God, to take fair
decisions based on truths, that person can have more faith
than when believing in just an incorporeal God. Those higher
faiths in other honest people and in selves and in the
metaphysical part of God enhances intellectual creativities
because communication become more coherent and corresponding
with consequential assemblenesses.
4.7 Summary of the second
section
Page 219
The
thoughts about rationality changes from Descartes' low level
rationalism to Hegel's high level rationalism in the 19th
century.
At the
same time of Descartes the church started to reform by
acknowledging the selfness of God in orthodox religion.
4.8
Anselm's Proslogium
Page
221-226
Anselm
bases his argument that God exists on his definition of God -
' God is that, than which nothing greater can be
conceived. ' Something that exist is greater than
something that does not exist therefore God must exist.
Page
224-225 [16 November 2012 insert]
' AND
so, Lord, do you, who do give understanding to faith, give me,
so far as you knowest (sic) it to be profitable, to understand
that you are as we believe; and that you are that which we
believe. And indeed, we believe that you are a being than
which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such
nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God?
(Psalm xiv. 1) '
Self
See 4.3.4;
Aquinas' Summa Theologiae where he refers to Anselm's
ontological argument for the existence of God. Aquinas argued
against the method because a definition can change for people.
Currently in my mind, Aquinas can be sorted with Socrates and
Aristotle. More materialist than idealist. Prof. Mashuq Alli
of Unisa, if I remember correctly, changed Anselm's argument
slightly by writing that Anselm wrote - God is the greatest
truth (reality). Corporeality is closer to reality than
incorporeality, in an objectivist sense, therefore God is
corporeal. What is the truest? According to Plato it is the
idea of truth that cannot be killed. God is not either or;
corporeality or incorporeality. God is both. Humans have to
uphold honesties that cause assemblenesses after understanding
the incorporeal concept of truths. The concept truths, is
potentiality that becomes actualities during acts of beings
(noun), being (verb) and becoming honest.