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to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
Author: Popper, Karl R. (Karl Raimund), 1902-1994
Book name: The Two Fundamental
Problems of the Theory of Knowledge
First published 2009 by Routledge
First published in Routledge Classics 2012
Simultaneously published in the USA
and Canada by Routledge of New York, NY.
Editor: Troels Eggers Hansen
Translated from German by: John
Kinory and Andreas Pickel.
ISBN: 978-0-415-61022-3 (pbk)
Reader: MD Pienaar
12 April 2012
Book 1 The Problem of Induction Experience and Hypothesis
Page 99
' The sceptic, who first doubted the
absolute truth of our knowledge, is in turn compelled to
explain this (absolute) concept of truth as anthropomorphic.
But what he still doubts can now no longer be expressed; for
it is evident that even the concept of doubt
presupposes the concept of truth. '
Self
In the book Popper says that there is
no first principle of induction and therefore logically,
induction cannot prove something true. An endless regression
exists at inductions. Above however he implies that truth is
the first principle of inductions. Most things we say, prove,
doubt, disprove have as first principle, I think today, truth.
Without truth as an idea communication, science and deceit
would not have existed, or is it the other way round. Was the
intention of the first word ever spoken truthful or deceitful?
Page 101
' The “absolute” can be
grasped only subjectively (that is, “believed”); all objective
(that is, universally valid, intersubjectively testable scientific)
knowledge is “relative”. “It seems to me that
this pair of opposites, subjective-absolute and objective-relative,
contains one of the most fundamental epistemological insights
that can be gleaned from science,” writes Weyl, (15)
admittedly without reference to Kant's doctrine; and he
continues: “Whoever desires the absolute must take the
subjectivity and egocentricity as part of the bargain; whoever
feels drawn toward the objective faces the problem of
relativity.”(16) '
' (15) Hermann Weyl, Philosophie
der Marhematik und Naturwissenschaft (1927), p.83
[English translation by Olaf Helmer: Philosophy of
Mathematics and Natural Science, rev. and augm. English
ed. (1949), p. 116. Emphasis as in the German original. Tr.] '
' (16) As Weyl himself emphasises,
this idea is also found in Max Born. Die
Relativitȁtstheorie Einsteins und ihre physikalischen
Grundlagen (1920), Introduction; and even earlier,
Reininger offered a very similar statement; cf. Robert
Reininger, Das Psycho-physiche Problem (1916), pp. 290
f. '
Page 107
' The rather high hopes that Kant
derived from the correct insight that a general scepticism is
self-contradictory have proved to be unjustified. '
Self
When I read the above I did not agree
with Popper. I thought that a general negation is self
contradictory because to say something is always uncertain is
a certainty of always uncertain. It is thus in effect a
positive statement but a contradictory positive statement
because of the always and the negation. It relates to my
argument with the Burger when they changed my comment with a
heading to ' Los die veralgemenings ' which I explained is a
generalisation and thus contradictory.
Today I read in the Pretoria news
that children should be brought up stricter than current
practice. If a child is disciplined with reference to a
negation is has to according to my current thoughts always be
in the context of the time the disciplinary action took place.
A child cannot be told to never do something or in other words
always not do something. A child could perhaps be influenced
to always do something if positive generalisations should be
allowed. Apparently the Ten Commandments appeared in Egyptian
graves in the positive as history of what was done during
lifetimes of people.
19 April 2012
Page 304
' According to deductivist (sic
OO) empiricism too, the thesis that natural laws can never be
[demonstrably] true is equivalent to the thesis that
we have no possible empirical (and certainly no a priori)
justification for asserting the existence of universal
states of affairs.
(We can, therefore, only assert the
existence of those states of affairs that can be represented
by singular statements; that is, only the existence of
singular states of affairs.)
On the question whether or not
experiential, empirical universal states of affairs exist,
deductivism (sic OO) is in agreement with logical positivism:
both answer this question in the negative. (2) '
' (2) As long as the emphasis is
on the words “experiential” and “empirical”, this statement is
correct. It follows that the proposition “universal states of
affairs exist” is metaphysical; but it does not follow that
natural laws are fiction. '
Self
“Universal states of affairs exist”
thus means that metaphysical events exist and can be
investigated because it is not fiction.
21 April 2012
Page 313-314
' The more highly developed
natural sciences, in particular, consist almost entirely of
natural laws (universal statements): “We ought not to forget
that any description of the world by means of mechanics will
always be of the completely general kind. For example, it will
never mention particular point masses: it will only
talk about any point masses whatsoever.”(15)
Mechanics, as correctly characterised
here by Wittgenstein, is a natural science according to the
viewpoint of natural science. It can, however, never be
included in Wittgenstein's concept of a natural science. The
philosophical critique of language maintains that the putative
strictly universal empirical statements of mechanics are
actually pseudo-statements, and it excludes them from
the domain of scientific statements, that is, it
sharply demarcates “natural science” so as to keep them
out. '
' (15)Ludwig
Wittgenstein ', Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1918/1922),
Proposition 6.3432.
Self
It seems Popper categorise science
according to the definition of truth by Plato in The Republic.
Basic truths that Wittgenstein state. Then mechanics which
includes universal statements and could thus be almost defined
as metaphysical and then metaphysics which uses
pseudo-statements.
Page 314
' The analysis of the
pseudo-statement positions leads our discussion of the problem
of induction to the problem of demarcation. This problem does
not merely constitute the background of the logical-positivist
concept of meaning: on closer examination it becomes evident
that it is in fact the problem of demarcation that
underlies the problem of induction. '
Page 316
' If we ask about the analogous
demarcation criterion for statements – this is of much greater
interest to us here – and avoid the subjectivist-psychologistic
mode of expression, then inductivism must arrive at the
following criterion, which
I call the fundamental thesis of inductivism.
All legitimate statements of science
must be reducible to elementary empirical statements. In other
words: the truth of all legitimate statements must depend on
the truth values of some elementary empirical statements.
(“Elementary empirical statements”
are to be understood as (objective) descriptions of the
simplest states of affairs, which can be tested directly (in
principle, by any subject) through “perceptions”; cf. Section
11.)
As long as induction, or the
inference of universal statements from singular experiences,
is accepted as justified, the “fundamental thesis of
inductivism” proves to be an exceedingly useful demarcation
criterion with the help of which natural laws can also
be demonstrated to be “legitimate”. But should genuine
inductive inference be regarded as impermissible and
self-contradictory (Hume), then natural laws can no longer be
reduced to elementary empirical statements. Put another way:
Legitimate statements can no longer
be elevated to the rank of generalisation, that is, to the
level of natural laws. They are cut off from natural laws by
the demarcation criterion (by this very “fundamental thesis”);
the boundary runs below the level of natural laws. Legitimate
statements remain confined to experience, that is, to the
singular. '
Self
Be vary careful to quote Popper
unless you really understand what he means. He writes in ifs a
lot. If this is the case that is the conclusion. It is thus
possible to quote a conclusion without quoting the premises
that leads to the conclusion. '
Page 330
' We already know that only
singular empirical statements can, in principle, be
verified and falsified, whereas strictly universal
empirical statements are, in principle, only falsifiable.
These properties can be used in order
to distinguish, with sufficient precision, between singular
and strictly universal empirical statements. To this end,
however, it is above all necessary to define more precisely
the expressions “in principle verifiable” and “in principle
falsifiable”. For without such a definition, the statement
“Singular empirical statements are, in principle, verifiable and
falsifiable” would be ambiguous. Its wording could be so
understood as to make it permissible for one and the same
statement to be both true and false. Similarly, the statement
“Universal empirical statements are in principle only
falsifiable” could be misinterpreted as stating that universal
empirical statements can, in principle, only be false.
I propose, therefore, the following
more precise definition: the phrase “in principle
verifiable” is to be understood as saying that no logical
reasons stand in the way of empirical verification.
The statement “Singular empirical
statements are, in principle, verifiable and
falsifiable” is to be understood as saying that no logical
reasons stand in the way of empirical verification or
falsification of singular empirical statements. Similarly,
“Universal empirical statements are, in principle, only
falsifiable” is to say that experience can, for logical
reasons, decide only their falsity but never their truth.
No logical statement justifies our
saying a priori that universal empirical statements
are false (otherwise they themselves would be logical
contradictions, and experience could in no way decide them);
we can, however, say a priori that their truth cannot
be demonstrated by experience. '
Page 334
' In section 15, the statements
that are a priori true and, as hypotheses, have
primary probability 1, were called “empirically empty”. These
(analytic) judgements state nothing about reality; experience
cannot decide them. This also is why they should not be called
“empirical statements” (but perhaps “conceptual
analyses”) '
Self
My truth to creativity explanation of
the paper on the table has a probability of 1 and can be
demonstrated.
22 April 2012
Page 351-353
' From a historical perspective,
the systematic attempt by positivism to discredit Kant's
project has, undoubtedly, seriously harmed the development of
epistemology (and of the “scientific world view”).
(See, for example, the historical
address (4) to the Prague Congress [1929] on the “epistemology
of the exact sciences”. One searches in vain for Kant's name
among those of the very many philosophers of all periods.
Finally we find it, when Franz Brentano is boldly praised (5)
for having “spared himself the Kantian interlude”. We
can only wonder: Why Brentano in particular? Does such an
evaluation of Kant not suggest that it should, instead, have
been this or that positivist boasting of this?)
In order to emphasise my commitment
to Kant, if not to Kant's apriorism. I should like to quote in
full several paragraphs from the Critique of Pure Reason (“The
Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason”).(6) This
passage might well serve as motto for my work. In any event,
it is appropriate to quote it at this point in the argument,
which deals with dialectical corroboration and therefore with
historical justification, for it sheds light on one of Kant's
ideas:
“If however, the universal is
admitted as problematic only . . . the
particular is certain but the universality of the rule of
which it is a consequence is still a problem. Several
particular instances, which are one and all certain, are
scrutinised in view of the rule, to see whether they follow
from it. If it then appears that all particular instances that
can be cited follow from the rule, we argue to its
universality, and from this again to all particular instances,
even to those which are not themselves given. This I shall
entitle the hypothetical employment of reason.
“The hypothetical employment of
reason . . . is not, properly speaking, constitutive,
that is, it is not of such character that, judging in all
strictness, we can regard it as proving the truth of the
universal rule that we have adopted as hypothesis. For how are
we to know all the possible consequences which, as actually
following from the adopted principle, prove its
universality? The hypothetical employment of reason is
regulative only; its sole aim is, so far as may be possible,
to bring unity into the body of our detailed knowledge, and
thereby to approximate the rule to universality.
“The hypothetical employment of
reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the
knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the criterion
of truth of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere
idea) is, however only a projected unity, to be
regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only. This
unity aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding
in its manifold and special modes of employment, directing its
attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering it
more coherent.”
I have not quoted this passage until
now because it is, perhaps, only at this point that it can be
fully appreciated. It supports my view that the thread of the
epistemological debate has to be rejoined at the point where
post-Kantian metaphysics had torn it: with Kant. '
' (4) OttoNeurath, Wege der
wissenschaftlich Weltauffassungen” [“Ways of the Scientific
World View. Tr.] Erkenntnis 1 (1930), pp. 106
ff. '
' (5) Neurath, op. cit.,
p. 120. '
' (6) Immanuel Kant, Kritik
der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed., 1787), pp. 674
f. [English translation by N. Kemp Smith (1929), 1965, Critique
of Pure Reason, pp. 534 f. Tr.]
Book II The Problem of Demarcation Experience and Metaphysics
APPENDIX SUMMARY EXCERPT (1932)
24 April 2012
Page 471
' . . This, the
“demarcation problem” (Kant's question about the limits of
scientific knowledge), can be defined as the question about a
criterion for distinguishing between “empirical
scientific” and “metaphysical” assertions (statements,
systems of statements). Wittgenstein's attempted solution (3)
is that the “concept of meaning” provides this demarcation:
every “meaningful statement” (as a “truth-function of
elementary statements”) must be fully reducible, logically, to
(singular) observation statements (it must be derivable from
them). If a supposed statement cannot be so derived, it is
“meaningless”, “metaphysical”, it is a “pseudo-statement”: metaphysics
is meaningless. With this criterion of demarcation,
positivism seemed to have achieved a more radical overthrow of
metaphysics than had earlier anti-metaphysical positions. But
along with metaphysics, this radicalism destroys natural
science also: natural laws, too, are not logically derivable
from observation statements (the induction problem!); under
consistent application of Wittgenstein's criterion of meaning,
they would become nothing but “meaningless pseudo-statements”
or “metaphysics” also. '
' (3) Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1918/1922) '